NATURAL THEOLOGY;

OR,

EVIDENCES OF THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY, COLLECTED FROM THE APPEARANCES OF NATURE.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT.

N croffing a heath, fuppofe I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might poffibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever ; nor would it perhaps be very easy to fhew the abfurdity of this anfwer. But fuppofe I had found a watch upon the ground, and it fhould be enquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet, why fhould not this answer ferve for the watch, as well as for the ftone? Why is it not as admiffible in the second cafe, as in the first ? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not difcover in the ftone) that its feveral partsare framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce mo B

tion, and that motion fo regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the feveral parts had been differently fhaped from what they are, of a different fize from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use, that is now ferved by it. To reckon up a few of the plaineft of thefe parts, and of their offices, all tending to one refult: We fee a cylindrical box, containing a coiled elaftic fpring, which, by its endeavor to relax itfelf, turns round the box. We next obferve a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the fake of flexure) communicating the action of the fpring from the box to the fufee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting the motion from the fufee to the balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the fame time, by the fize and fhape of thofe wheels, fo regulating that motion, as to terminate in caufing an index, by an equable and measured progreffion, to pafs over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brafs, in order to keep them from ruft; the fprings of steel, no other metal being fo elaftic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glafs, a material employed in no other part of the work, but, in the room of which, if there had been any other than a tranfparent fubftance, the hour could not be seen without opening the cafe. This mechanism being obferved (it requires indeed an examination of the inftrument, and perhaps fome previous knowledge of the fubject, to percieve and underftand it; but being once, as we have faid, obferved and understood,) the interence, we think, is inevitable; that the watch maft have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time and at fome place or other, an artificer

or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to anfwer; who comprehended its construction, and defigned its use.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclufion, that we had never feen a watch made; that we had never known an artift capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing fuch a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of underftanding in what manner it was performed all this being no more than what is true of fome exquifite remains of ancient art, of some loft arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unfeen and unknown artist's fkill, if he be unfeen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time, and in fome place. or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arife concerning a human agent, or concerning an agent of a different fpecies, or an agent poffeffing, in fome refpects, a dif

ferent nature.

II. Neither, fecondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch fometimes went wrong, or that it feldom went exactly right. The purpofe of the machinery, the defign, and the defigner, might be evident, and in the cafe fuppofed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not neceffary that a machine be perfect, in order to fhew with what defign it was made: fill lefs neceffary, where the only queftion is, whether it were made with any defign at all.

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not difcover, or

had not yet difcovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain, whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case; if, by the lofs, or diforder, or decay of the parts in queftion, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be ftopped, or difturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to inveftigate the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or affiftance and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obfcurity to arife. Then, as to the fecond thing fuppofed, namely, that there were parts which might be fpared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment; thefe fuperfluous parts, even if we were completely affured that they were fuch, would not vacate the reasoning which we had inftituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his fenfes think the exiftence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of poffible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained fomne internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the ftructure now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as well as a different ftructure.

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his enquiry more fatisfaction to be answered, that there exifted in things a principle of order, which had difpofed the parts of the watch into their prefent form and fituation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order;

nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, diftinct from the intelligence of the watch-maker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be furprised to hear, that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think fo:

VII. And not lefs furprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the refult of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perverfion of language to affign any law, as the efficient, operative, caufe of any thing. A law prefupposes an agent; for it is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds it implies a power; for it is the order, according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both diftin&t from itself, the law does nothing; is nothing. The expreffion," the law of metallic nature," may found ftrange and harsh to a philofophic ear, but it seems. quite as juftifiable as fome others which are more familiar to him, fuch as "the law of vegetable nature,' "the law of animal nature," or indeed as "the law of nature" in general, when affigned as the cause of phænomena, in exclufion of agency and power; or when it is fubftituted into the place of thefe..

VIII. Neither, laftly, would our obferver be driv en out of his conclufion, or from his confidence in its. truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument. He knows the utility of the end: he knows the fubferviency and adaptation of the means to the end.. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reafoning. The confcioufnefs of knowing little, need not beget a diftruft of that which he does know..