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what is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained: but where there is no fuch tendency or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the feries. There is no difference as to the point in queftion, (whatever there may be as to many points) between one series and another; between a feries which is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain, composed of an infinite number of links, can no more support itself, than a chain compofed of a finite number of links. And of this we are affured, (though we never can have tried the experiment) because, by increasing the number of links, from ten for inftance to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, &c. we make not the smallest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency, towards self-support. There is no difference in this refpect (yet there may be a great difference in several respects), between a chain of a greater or less length, between one chain and another, between one that is finite and one that is indefinite. This very much resembles the cafe before us. The machine, which we are infpecting, demonftrates, by its conftruction, contrivance and defign. Contrivance must have had a contriver, defign, a defigner; whether the machine im

mediately

mediately proceeded from another machine or not. That circumftance alters not the case. That other machine may, in like manner, have proceeded from a former machine: nor does that alter the cafe: contrivance must have had a contriver. That former one from one preceding it no alteration ftill: a contriver is still neceffary. No tendency is perceived, no approach towards a diminution of this neceffity. It is the fame with any and every fucceffion of these machines; a fucceffion of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand; with one feries as with another; a feries which is finite, as with a feries which is infinite. In whatever other refpects they may differ, in this they do not. In all equally, contrivance and defign are unaccounted for.

The question is not fimply, How came the first watch into existence? which question, it may be pretended, is done away by fuppofing the series of watches thus produced from one another to have been infinite, and confequently to have had no fuch firft, for which it was necessary to provide a caufe. This, perhaps, would have been nearly the state of the queftion, if nothing had been before us but an unorganized, unmechanized, fubftance, without mark or indication of contrivance. It might

be

be difficult to fhew that fuch fubftance could

not have exifted from eternity, either in fucceffion (if it were poffible, which I think it is not, for unorganized bodies to fpring from one another), or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the queftion now. To fuppofe it to be fo, is to fuppofe that it made no difference whether we had found a watch or a ftone. As it is, the metaphyfics of that queftion have no place; for, in the watch which we are examining, are feen contrivance, defign; an end, a purpofe; means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the queftion, which irresistibly preffes upon our thoughts, is, whence this contrivance and design. The thing required is the intending mind, the adapting hand, the intelligeuce by which that hand was directed. This question, this demand, is not shaken off, by increasing a number or fucceffion of fubftances, deftitute of these properties; nor the more, by increasing that number to infinity. If it be faid, that, upon the fuppofition of one watch being produced from another in the course of that other's movements, and by means of the mechanifm within it, we have a caufe for the watch in my hand, viz. the watch from which it proceeded,

ceeded, I deny, that for the defign, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of inftruments to an ufe (all which we discover in the watch), we have any cause whatever. It is in vain, therefore, to affign a feries of fuch causes, or to alledge that a feries may be carried back to infinity; for I do not admit that we have yet

any cause at all of the phænomena, ftill lefs any series of causes either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver: proofs of design, but no defigner.

V. Our observer would further also reflect, that the maker of the watch before him, was, in truth and reality, the maker of every watch produced from it; there being no difference. (except that the latter manifefts a more exquifite skill) between the making of another watch with his own hands by the mediation of files, laths, chisels, &c. and the difpofing, fixing, and inferting, of thefe inftruments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch. already made, in such a manner, as to form a new watch in the courfe of the movements which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one fet of tools, inftead of another.

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The conclufion which the first examination of the watch, of its works, conftruction, and movement suggested, was, that it must have had, for the cause and author of that conftruction, an artificer, who understood its mechanism, and designed its ufe. This conclufion is invincible. A fecond examination presents us with a new difcovery. The watch is found, in the course of its movement, to produce another watch, fimilar to itself: and not only fo, but we perceive in it a fyftem of organization, feparately calculated for that purpofe. What effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase, beyond measure, our admiration of the fkill, which had been employed in the formation of fuch a machine? Or fhall it, inftead of this, all at once turn us round to an oppofite conclufion, viz. that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business, although all other evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this laft and fupreme piece of art be now added to the reft? Can this be maintained without abfurdity? Yet this is atheism.

CHAP

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