purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its conftruaion, and defigned its ufe.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclufion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artift capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed: all this being no more than what is true of fome exquifite remains of ancient art, of fome loft arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unfeen and unknown artif's fkill, if he be unfcen and unknown, but railes no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of fuch an artift, at fome former time, and in fome place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arise concerning a hu nan agent, or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent poffeffing, in fone refpects, a different nature. II. Neither, fecondly, would it invalidate

our

our conclufion, tha the watch fometimes went wrong, or that it feldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the defign, and the defigner, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not neceffary that a machine be perfect, in order to fhew with what defign it was made: ftill less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all.

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet difcovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even fome parts, concerning which we could not afcertain, whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the firft branch of the cafe; if, by the lofs, or diforder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate

the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or affiftance: and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obfcurity to arife. Then, as to the fecond thing supposed, namely, that there were parts, which might be fpared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment,-these fuperfluous parts, even if we were completely affured that they were fuch, would not vacate the reafoning which we had inftituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his fenses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of poffible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained fome internal configuration or other ; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as well as a different ftructure.

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his enquiry more fatisfaction to be answered, that there

9

existed

existed in things a principle of order, which had difpofed the parts of the watch into their prefent form and fituation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, diftinct from the intelligence of the watch-maker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be furprised to hear, that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think fo:

VII. And not lefs furprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the refult of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perverfion of language to affign any law, as the efficient, operative, cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order, according to which that

power acts. Without this agent, without this power, power, which are both diftinct from itself, the law does nothing; is nothing. The expreffion, "the law of metallic nature," may found strange and harsh to a philofophic ear, but it seems quite as juftifiable as fome others which are more familiar to him, fuch as "the law of vegetable

B 4

vegetable nature"-" the law of animal nature," or indeed as "the law of nature" in general, when affigned as the caufe of phanomena, in exclusion of agency and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these.

He

VIII. Neither, laftly, would our observer be driven out of his conclufion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. knows enough for his argument. He knows the utility of the end: he knows the fubferviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reafoning. The confcioufnefs of knowing little, need not beget a diftrust of that which he docs know.

CHAP.