[

The not

properties to contrivance ab extra.
having that in his nature which requires the
exertion of another prior being, (which pro-
perty is fometimes called felf-fufficiency, and
fometimes felf-comprehenfion,) appertains to
the Deity, as his effential distinction, and re-
moves his nature from that of all things which
we fee. Which confideration contains the an-
fwer to a question that has sometimes been
afked, namely, Why, fince fomething or other
must have existed from eternity, may not the
prefent universe be that fomething? The con-
trivance, perceived in it, proves that to be im-
poffible. Nothing contrived, can, in a strict and
proper sense, be eternal, forafmuch as the con-
triver must have existed before the contrivance.

Wherever we fee marks of contrivance, we are led for its caufe to an intelligent author. And this transition of the understanding is founded upon uniform experience. We fee intelligence conftantly contriving, that is, we fee intelligence conftantly producing effects, marked and distinguished by certain properties; not certain particular properties, but by a kind and clafs of properties, fuch as relation to an end, relation of parts to one another, and to a common purpose. We fee, wherever we are wit

neffes

No

nesses to the actual formation of things, nothing except intelligence producing effects so marked and diftinguished. Furnished with this experience, we view the productions of nature. We obferve them alfo marked and distinguished in the fame manner. We wish to account for their origin. Our experience fuggefts a caufe perfectly adequate to this account. experience, no fingle inftance or example, can be offered in favor of any other. In this caufe therefore we ought to reft: in this cause the common fense of mankind has in fact refted, because it agrees with that, which, in all cafes, is the foundation of knowledge, the undeviating course of their experience. The reafoning is the fame, as that, by which we conclude any ancient appearances to have been the effects of volcanos or inundations, namely, because they resemble the effects which fire. and water produce before our eyes; and because we have never known thefe effects to refult from any other operation. other operation. And this refemblance may fubfift in fo many circumftances, as not to leave us under the smallest doubt in forming our opinion. Men are not deceived by this reasoning; for whenever it happens, as it fometimes does happen, that the

truth

truth comes to be known by direct informa tion, it turns out to be what was expected. In like manner, and upon the fame foundation, (which in truth is that of experience,) we conclude that the works of nature proceed from intelligence and defign, because, in the properties of relation to a purpose, fubferviency to an use, they resemble what intelligence and defign are conftantly producing, and what nothing except intelligence and defign ever produce at all. Of every argument, which would raise a question as to the safety of this reasoning, it may be observed, that, if fuch argument be liftened to, it leads to the inference, not only that the prefent order of nature is infufficient to prove the existence of an intelligent Creator, but that no imaginable order would be fufficient to prove it; that no contrivance, were it ever fo mechanical, ever so precife, ever fo clear, ever fo perfectly like those which we ourselves employ, would fupport this conclufion. A doctrine, to which, I conceive, no found mind can affent.

The force however of the reasoning is fometimes funk by our taking up with mere names. We have already noticed *, and we

* Ch. I. f. vii.

muft

the term

must here notice again, the mifapplication of law," and the mistake concerning the idea which that term expreffes in phyfics, whenever fuch idea is made to take the place of power, and still more of an intelligent power, and, as fuch, to be affigned for the cause of any thing, or of any property of any thing, that exifts. This is what we are secretly apt to do when we speak of organized bodies (plants, for inftance, or animals) owing their production, their form, their growth, their qualities, their beauty, their use, to any law or laws of nature: and when we are contented to fit down with that answer to our enquiries concerning them. I say once more, that it is a perverfion of language to affign any law, as the efficient, operative, cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent, for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power, for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both diftinct from itself, the "law" does nothing; is nothing.

What has been faid concerning "law," holds true of mechanifm. Mechanism is not itself power. Mechanifm, without power, can

do

do nothing. Let a watch be contrived and conftructed ever fo ingeniously; be its parts ever fo many, ever fo complicated, ever fo finely wrought or artificially put together, it cannot go without a weight or fpring, i. e. without a force independent of, and ulterior to, its mechanism. The spring acting at the centre, will produce different motions and different refults, according to the variety of the intermediate mechanism. One and the selffame spring, acting in one and the fame manner, viz. by fimply expanding itself, may be the cause of a hundred different, and all ufeful movements, if a hundred different and welldevised sets of wheels be placed between it and the final effect, e. g. may point out the hour age of of the day, the day of the month, the the moon, the position of the planets, the cyand many other ferviceable cle of the years, notices; and these movements may fulfill their purposes with more or lefs perfection, according as the mechanifm is better or worse contrived, or better or worfe executed, or in a better or worse state of repair: but, in all cafes, it is neceffary that the Spring act at the centre. The course of our reafoning upon fuch a fubject would be this. By infpecting the watch,