propriate fenfe for the perception of the pleafure? Why should the juice of a peach applied to the palate, affect the part so differently from what it does when rubbed upon the palm of the hand? This is a conftitution, which, fo far as appears to me, can be refolved into nothing but the pure benevolence of the Creator. Eating is neceffary; but the pleasure attending it is not neceffary: and that this pleafure, depends not only upon our being in poffeffion of the fenfe of tafte, which is different from every other, but upon a particular state of the organ in which it refides, a felicitous adaptation of the organ to the object, will be confeffed by any one, who may happen to have experienced that vitiation of tafte which frequently occurs in fevers, when every taste is irregular, and every one bad.

In mentioning the gratifications of the palate, it may be faid that we have made choice of a trifling example, I am not of that opinion. They afford a share of enjoyment to man; but to brutes, I believe, that they are of very great importance. A horfe at liberty passes a great part of his waking hours in eating. To the ox, the sheep, the deer, and ether ruminating animals, the pleasure is doubled.

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ence.

doubled. Their whole time almoft is divided between browsing upon their pasture and chewing their cud. Whatever the pleasure be, it is fpread over a large portion of their exist. If there be animals, fuch as the lupous fish, which swallow their prey whole, and at once, without any time, as it should seem, for either drawing out, or relishing, the tafte in the mouth, is it an improbable conjecture that the feat of taste with them is in the ftomach; or, at least, that a fense of pleasure, whether it be taste or not, accompanies the diffolution of the food in that receptacle, which diffolution in general is carried on very flowly? If this opinion be right, they are more than repaid for their defect of palate. The feaft lafts as long as the digestion.

In fecking for argument we need not ftay to infift upon the comparative importance of our example, for the observation holds equally of all, or of three at least, of the other fenfes. The neceffary purposes of hearing might have been answered without harmony; of smell, without fragrance; of vifion, without beauty. Now "If the Deity had been indifferent about our happiness or mifery, we muft impute to our good fortune (as all design by this fuppofition

rend.

is excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to excite it." I alledge these as two felicities, for they are different things yet both neceffary: the fenfe being formed, the objects, which were applied to it, might not have fuited it; the objects being fixed, the fenfe might not have agreed wi h them. A coincidence is here required which no accident can account for. There are three poffible fuppofitions upon the fubject, and no more. The firft; that the fenfe, by its original conflitution, fuited the object: the fecond; that the object, by its original conftitution, fuited the fenfe: the third; that the fenfe is fo conftituted, as to be able, either univerfally, or within certain limits, by habit and familiarity, to render every object pleafant. Whichever of these fuppofitions we adopt, the effect evinces, on the part of the Author of nature, a ftudious benevolence. If the pleasures which we derive from any of our fenfes, depend upon an original congruity between the sense and the properties perceived by it, we know by experience, that the adjustment demanded, with relpect to the qualities which were conferred upon the objects that furround us, not only choice

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choice and selection, out of a boundless variety of poffible qualities with which these objects might have been endued, but a proportioning alfo of degree, because an excess or defect of intensity spoils the perception, as much almost as an error in the kind and nature of the quality. Likewise the degree of dullness or acutenefs in the fenfe itself, is no arbitrary thing, but, in order to preferve the congruity here fpoken of, requires to be in an exact or near correspondency with the strength of the impreffion. The dullness of the fenfes forms the complaint of old age. Perfons in fevers, and, I believe, in moft maniacal cafes, experience great torment from their preternatural acutenefs. An increased, no lefs than an impaired fenfibility, induces a state of difcafe and fuffering.

The doctrine of a specific congruity between animal fenfes and their objects, is strongly favored by what is obferved of infects in the election of their food. Some of these will feed upon one kind of plant or animal, and upon no other fome caterpillars upon the cabbage alone; fome upon the black currant alone. The fpecies of caterpillar, which eats the vine, will starve upon the elder; nor will that which we find upon fennel, touch the rose bush.

Some

Some infects confine themselves to two or three kinds of plants or animals. Some again shew so strong a preference, as to afford reafon to believe that, though they may be driven by hunger to others,, they are led by the pleasure of tafte to a few particular plants alone; and all this, as it should feem, independently of habit or imitation.

But should we accept the third hypothefis, and even carry it so far, as to ascribe every fo thing, which concerns the question, to habit, (as in certain fpecies, the human fpecies most particularly, there is reason to attribute fomething) we have then before us an animal capa→ eity, not lefs perhaps to be admired, than the native congruities which the other scheme adopts. It cannot be fhewn to refult from any fixed neceffity in nature, that what is frequently applied to the senses should of course become agreeable to them. It is, so far as it fubfifts, a power of accommodation confidered and provided by the author of their structure, and forms a part of their perfection.

In whichever way we confider the senses, they appear to be fpecific gifts, miniftring, not only to prefervation, but to pleasure. But what

we