« VorigeDoorgaan »
I. To begin with the fructification of plants. Can it be doubted but that the seed contains a particular organization? Whether a latent plantule with the means of temporary nutrition, or whatever else it be, it incloses an organization suited to the germination of a new, plant. Has the plant which produced the seed any thing more to do with that organization, than the watch would have had to do with the structure of the watch which was produced in the course of its mechanical movement? I mean, Has it any thing at all to do with the contrivance? The maker and contriver of one watch, when he inserred within it a mechanism, suited to the production of another watch, was, in truth, the maker and contriver of that other watch. All the properties of the new watch were to be referred to his agency: the design manifested in it, to his intention: the art, to him as the artist: the collocation of each part, to his placing: the action, effect, and use, to his counsel, intelligence, and workmanship. In producing it by the intervention of a former watch, he was only working by one set of tools instead of another. So is it with the plant, and the seed produced by it. Can any distinction be assigned between the two cases;
between between the producing watch, and the producing plant? both passive, unconscious substances; both, by the organization which was given to them, producing their like, without understanding or design; both, that is, instruments.
II. From plants we may proceed to oviparous animals; from seeds to eggs. Now I fay, that the bird has the fame concern in the formation of the egg which she lays, as the plant has in that of the seed which it drops; and no other nor greater. The internal constitution of the egg is as much a secret to the hen, as if the hen were inanimate. Her will cannot alter it, or change a single feather of the chick. She can neither foresee nor determine of which sex her brood shall be, or how many of either: yet the thing produced shall be, from the first, very different in its make, according to the sex which it bears. So far therefore from adapting the means, she is not beforehand apprised of the effect. If there be concealed within that smooth shell a provision and a preparation for the production and nourishment of a new animal, they are not of her providing or preparing: if there be contrivance, it is none of hers. Although, E 4 therefore,
therefore, there be the difference of life and perceptivity between the animal and the plant, it is a difference which enters not into the account. It is a foreign circumstance. It is a difference of properties not employed. The animal function and the vegetable function are alike destitute of any design which can operate upon the form of the thing produced. The plant has no design in producing the seed, no comprehension of the nature or use of what it produces: the bird with respect to its egg, is not above the plant with respect to its seed. Neither the one ncr the other bears that fort of relation to what proceeds from them, which a joiner does to the chair which he makes. Now a cause, which bears this relation to the effect, is what we want, in order to account for the suitableness of means to an end, the fitness and fitting of one , thing to another: and this cause the parent plant or animal does not supply.
It is further observable, concerning the propagation of plants and animals, that the apparatus employed exhibits no resemblance to the thing produced; in this respect holding an analogy with instruments and tools of art. The filaments, anthers, and stigmata of flowers,
bear no more resemblance to the young plant, . > or even to the seed,'which is formed by their intervention, than, a chisel or a plane does to a table or a chair. What then are the filaments, anthers, and stigmata of plants, but instruments, strictly so called?
III. We may advance from animals which bring forth eggs, to animals which bring forth their young alive; and, of this latter class, from the lowest to the highest; from irrational to rational life, from brutes to the human species; without perceiving, as we proceed, any alteration whatever in the terms of the comparison. The rational animal does not produce its offspring with more certainty of success than the irrational animal; a man than a quadruped, a quadruped than a bird; nor (for we may follow the gradation through its whole scale) a bird than a plant; nor a plant than a watch, a piece of dead mechanism, would do, upon the supposition which has already so often been repeated. Rationality therefore has nothing to do in the business. If an account must be given of the contrivance which we observe; if it be demanded, whence arose either the contrivance by which the young animal is produced, or the contrivance manifested sested in the young animal itself, it is not from the reason of the parent that any such account can be drawn. He is the cause of his offspring in the fame sense as that in which a gardener is the cause of the tulip which grows upon his parterre, and in no other. We admire the flower; we examine the plant; we perceive the conducivenefs of many of its parts to their end and office; we observe a provision for its nourishment, growth, protection, and fecundity : but we never think of the gardener in all this. We attribute nothing of this to his agency; yet it may still be true, that, without the gardener, we should not have had the tulip. Just so is it with the succession of animals even of the highest order. For the contrivance discovered in the structure of the thing produced, we want a contriver. The parent is not that contriver. His consciousness decides that question. He is in total ignorance why that which is produced took its present form rather than any other. It is for him only to be astonished by the effect. We can no more look therefore to the intelligence of the parent animal for what we are in search of, a cause of relation and of subserviency of parts to their use, which relation and subserviency we see in