NATURAL THEOLOGY has ever been preffed with this question, Why, under the regency of a fupreme and benevolent Will, fhould there be, in the world, fo much, as there is, of the appearance of chance ?

The queftion in its whole compafs lies beyond our reach, but there are not wanting, as in the origin of evil, answers which feem to have confiderable weight in particular cafes, and alfo to embrace a confiderable number of cafes.

I. There must be chance in the midst of defign: by which we mean, that events which are not defigned, neceffarily arise from the pursuit of events which are defigned. One man travelling to York meets another man travelling to London. Their meeting is by chance, is accidental, and fo would be called and reckoned, though the journeys which produced the meeting, were, both of them, undertaken with defign and from deliberation. The meeting, though accidental, was nevertheless hypothetically neceffary, (which is the only fort of neceffity that is intelligible); for, if the two journeys were commenced at the time, pursued in the direction, and with the speed, in which and with which they were in fact begun and performed, the meeting could not be avoided. There was not, therefore, the

lefs neceffity in it for its being by chance, Again, the meeting might be most unfortunate, though the errands, upon which each party set out upon his journey, were the most innocent or the most laudable. The bye effect .may be unfavorable, without impeachment of the proper purpose, for the fake of which, the train, from the operation of which these confequences enfued, was put in motion. Although no cause act without a good purpose, accidental confequences, like these, may be either good or bad.

II. The appearance of chance will always bear a proportion to the ignorance of the obferver. The caft of a die, as regularly follows the laws of motion, as the going of a watch; yet, because we can trace the operation of thofe laws through the works and movements of the watch, and cannot trace them in the fhaking and throwing of the die, (though the laws be the fame, and prevail equally in both cafes,) we call the turning up of the number of the die chance, the pointing of the index of the watch, machinery, order, or by fome name which excludes chance. It is the fame in those events which depend upon the will of a free and rational agent. The verdict of a jury, the fentence of a judge, the refolution of an assembly,

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the iffue of a contested election, will have more or less of the appearance of chance, might be more or less the subject of a wager, according as we were less or more acquainted with the reasons which influenced the deliberation. The difference refides in the information of the obferver, and not in the thing itself; which, in all the cafes propofed, proceeds from intelligence, from mind, from counfel, from design.

Now when this one caufe of the appearance of chance, viz. the ignorance of the obferver, comes to be applied to the operations of the Deity, it is easy to foresee how fruitful it must prove of difficulties, and of seeming confufion. It is only to think of the Deity to perceive, what variety of objects, what diftance of time, what extent of space and action, his counfels may, or rather muft, comprehend. Can it be wondered at, that, of the purposes which dwell in such a mind as this, fo fmall a part should be known to us? It is only neceffary therefore to bear in our thought, that, in proportion to the inadequateness of our information, will be the quantity, in the world, of apparent chance.

III. In a great variety of cafes, and of cafes comprehending numerous fubdivifions, it ap

pears, for many reasons, to be better, that events rise up by chance, or, more properly fpeaking, with the appearance of chance, than according to any obfervable rule whatever. This is not feldom the cafe even in human arrangements, Each perfon's place and precedency in a public meeting may be determined by lot, Work and labour may be allotted. Tasks and burthens may be allotted.

Operumque laborem

Partibus æquabat juftis, aut forte trahebat.

Military service and station may be allotted. The diftribution of provifion may be made by lot, as it is in a failor's mefs; in fome cafes alfo, the diftribution of favors may be made by lot. In all these cases it seems to be acknowledged, that there are advantages in permitting events to chance, fuperior to those, which would or could arise from regulation. In all these cafes also, though events rise up in the way of chance, it is by appointment that they do fo.

In other events, and fuch as are independent of human will, the reafons for this preference of uncertainty to rule appear to be still stronger, For example, it feems to be expedient, that

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the period of human life fhould be uncertain. Did mortality follow any fixed rule, it would produce a fecurity in those that were at a diftance from it, which would lead to the greatest disorders, and a horror in those who approached it, fimilar to that which a condemned prifoner feels on the night before his execution. But, that death be uncertain, the young must fometimes die, as well as the old. Also were deaths never fudden, they, who are in health, would be too confident of life. The ftrong and the active, who want most to be warned and checked, would live without apprehenfion or reftraint. On the other hand; were fudden deaths very frequent, the sense of constant jeopardy would interfere too much with the degree of eafe and enjoyment intended for us; and human life be too precarious for the bufinefs and interefts which belong to it. There could not be dependance either upon our own lives, or the lives of those with whom we were connected, fufficient to carry on the regular offices of human fociety. The manner, therefore, in which death is made to occur, conduces to the purposes of admonition, without overthrowing the neceffary stability of human affairs.

Difeafe