kind, any dependency upon fupernatural aid, by unfixing those motives which promote exertion, or by relaxing those habits which engender patient industry, might introduce negligence, inactivity, and diforder, into the most ufeful occupations of human life; and thereby deteriorate the condition of human life itself.

As moral agents we should experience a still greater alteration, of which more will be faid under the next article.

Although therefore the Deity, who poffeffes the power of winding and turning, as he pleases, the course of causes which iffue from himself, do in fact interpofe to alter or intercept effects, which without fuch interpofition would have taken place, yet is it by no means incredible, that his Providence, which always refts upon final good, may have made a referve with respect to the manifeftation of his interference, a part of the very plan which he has appointed for our terreftrial exiftence, and a part conformable with, or, in some fort, required by, other parts of the fame plan. It is at any rate evident, that a large and ample province remains for the exercife of Providence, without its being naturally perceptible by us; because obfcurity, when applied to the interruption of

laws,

laws, bears a neceffary proportion to the im perfection of our knowledge when applied to the laws themselves, or rather to the effects, which thefe laws, under their various and incalculable combinations, would of their own accord produce. And if it be faid, that the doctrine of divine Providence, by reafon of the ambiguity under which its exertions prefent themselves, can be attended with no practical influence upon our conduct; that, al though we believe ever so firmly that there is a Providence; we must prepare, and provide, and act, as if there were none; I answer, that this is admitted: and that we further alledge, that fo to prepare, and fo to provide, is confiftent with the most perfect affurance of the reality of a Providence; and not only so, but that it is, probably, one advantage of the present state of our information, that our provi fions and preparations are not disturbed by it. Or if it be ftill afked, of what ufe at all then is the doctrine, if it neither alter our measures nor regulate our conduct, I anfwer again, that it is of the greatest use, but that, it is a doctrine of fentiment and piety, not (immediately at least) of action or conduct; that it applies to the confolation of men's minds, to their devotions,

devotions, to the excitement of gratitude, the fupport of patience, the keeping alive and the ftrengthening of every motive for endeavouring to please our Maker; and that these are great uses.

Of all views under which human life has ever been confidered, the moft reafonable in my judgment is that, which regards it as a ftate of probation. If the course of the world were feparated from the contrivances of nature, I do not know that it would be neceffary to look for any other account of it, than what, if it may be called an account, is contained in the answer, that events rife up by chance. But fince the contrivances of nature decidedly evince intention; and fince the courfe of the world and the contrivances of nature have the same author; we are, by the force of this connection, led to believe, that the appearance, under which events take place, is reconcileable with the supposition of design on the part of the Deity. It is enough that they be reconcileable with this fuppofition (and it is undoubtedly true, that they may be reconcileable, though we cannot reconcile them): the mind, however, which contemplates the works of nature, and, in those works, fees so much of means directed to ends,

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ends, of beneficial effects brought about by wife expedients, of concerted trains of caufes terminating in the happieft results; fo much, in a word, of counfel, intention, and benevolence: a mind, I fay, drawn into the habit of thought which these observations excite, can hardly turn its view to the condition of our own fpecies, without endeavouring to fuggeft to itself fome purpofe, fome defign, for which the state in which we are placed is fitted, and which it is made to ferve. Now we affert the moft probable fuppofition to be, that it is a state of moral probation; and that many things in it fuit with this hypothefis, which fuit with no other. It is not a ftate of unmixed happinefs, or of happiness simply : it is not a flate of defigned mifery, or of mifery fimply it is not a state of retribution: it is not a ftate of punishment. It fuits with none of these fuppofitions. It accords much better with the idea of its being a condition calculated for the production, exercise, and improvement, of moral qualities, with a view to a future ftate, in which, thefe qualities, after being fo produced, exercifed, and improved, may, by a new and more favoring conftitution of things, receive their reward,

or

or become their own. If it be faid, that this is to enter upon a religious rather than a philofophical confideration, I answer that the name of religion ought to form no objection, if it shall turn out to be the cafe, that the more religious our views are, the more probable they become. The degree of beneficence, of benevolent intention, and of power, exercised in the conftruction of fenfitive beings, goes strongly in favor, not only of a creative, but of a continuing care, that is, of a ruling Providence. The degree of chance which appears to prevail in the world requires to be reconciled: with this hypothefis. Now it is one thing to maintain the doctrine of Providence along with that of a future ftate, and another thing without it. In my opinion the two doctrines muft ftand or fall together. For although more of this apparent chance, may perhaps, upon other principles, be accounted for, than is generally fuppofed, yet a future state alone rectifies all disorders; and if it can be fhewn that the appearance of diforder, is consistent with the ufes of life, as a preparatory ftate, or that in fome refpects it promotes thefe ufes, then, fo far as this hypothefis may be accepted, the ground of the difficulty is done away.