thefe objects; but over the impression itself he has no power, or very little; and that properly is the fenfe.

Secondly, there are many parts of animal bodies which feem to depend upon the will of the animal in a greater degree than the fenfes do, and yet with refpect to which this folution is equally unfatisfactory. If we apply the solution to the human body, for inftance, it forms itself into questions upon which no reasonable mind can doubt; fuch as, whether the teeth were made exprefsly for the maftication of food, the feet for walking, the hands for holding; or whether, these things being as they are, being in fact in the animal's poffeffion, his own ingenuity taught him that they were convertible to thefe purposes, though no fuch purposes were contemplated in their formation.

All that there is of the appearance of reafon in this way of confidering the subject is, that, in fome cafes, the organization feems to determine the habits of the animal, and its choice, to a particular mode of life; which, in a 'certain fenfe, may be called" the use arifing out of the part." Now to all the instances, in which there is any place for this fug

geftion,

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geftion, it may be replied, that the organiza-, tion determines the animal to habits beneficial and falutary to itself; and that this effect would not be seen fo regularly to follow, if the feveral organizations did not bear a concerted, and contrived relation to the fubftances by which the animal was furrounded. They would, otherwise, be capacities without objects; powers without employment. The web foot determines, you fay, the duck to fwim but what would that avail, if there were no water to fwim in? The ftrong, hooked bill, and sharp talons, of one species of bird, determine it to prey upon animals ; the foft ftraight bill, and weak claws, of another fpecies, determine it to pick up feeds but, neither determination could take effect in providing for the fuftenance of the birds, if animals bodies and vegetable feeds did not lie within their reach. The peculiar conformation of the bill, and tongue, and claws of the woodpecker, determines that bird to search for his food amongst the infects lodged behind the bark, or in the wood, of decayed trees; but what would this profit him if there were no trees, no decayed trees, no infects lodged under their bark,, or in their trunk? The pro

bofcis

bofcis with which the bee is furnished, de-. termines him to feek for honey; but what would that fignify, if flowers fupplied none? Faculties thrown down upon animals at random, and without reference to the objects amidft which they are placed, would not produce to them the fervices and benefits which we fee and if there be that reference, then there is intention.

Laftly, the folution fails entirely when applied to plants. The parts of plants answer their uses, without any concurrence from the will or choice of the plant.

VI. Others have chofen to refer every thing to a principle of order in nature. A principle of order is the word: but what is meant by a principle of order, as different from an intelligent Creator, has not been explained either by definition or example: and, without fuch explanation, it should seem to be a mere fubftitution of words for reafons, names for caufes. Order itfelf is only the adaptation of means to an end: a principle of order therefore can only fignify the mind and intention which fo adapts them. Or, were it Capable of being explained in any other sense, is there any experience, any analogy, to sus

tain it? Was a watch ever produced by a principle of order? and, why might not a watch be fo produced, as well as an eye?

Furthermore, a principle of order, acting blindly and without choice, is negatived by the observation, that order is not univerfal; which it would be, if it iffued from a constant and neceffary principle; nor indifcriminate, which it would be, if it iffued from an unintelligent principle. Where order is wanted, there we find it; where order is not wanted, i. e. where, if it prevailed, it would be ufelefs, there we do not find it.in the ftructure of the eye (for we adhere to our example), in the figure and position of its feveral parts, the moft exact order is maintained. In the forms of rocks and mountains, in the lines which bound the coafts of continents and iflands, in the shape of bays and promontories, nó order whatever is perceived, because it would have been fuperfluous. No ufeful purpose would have arisen from moulding rocks and mountains into regular folids, bounding the channel of the ocean by geometrical curves, or from the map of the world refembling a table of diagrams in Euclid's Elements or Simpson's Conic Sections. set

VII. Laftly,

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VII. Laftly, the confidence which we place in our obfervations upon the works of nature, in the marks which we discover of contrivance, choice, and defign, and in our reasoning upon the proofs afforded us, ought not to be shaken, as it is fometimes attempted to be done, by bringing forward to our view our own ig norance, or rather the general imperfection of our knowledge, of nature. Nor, in many cafes, ought this confideration to affect us, even when it refpects fome parts of the fubject immediately under our notice. True fortitude of understanding confifts in not fuffering what we know to be disturbed by what we do not know. If we perceive an useful end, and means adapted to that end, we perceive enough for our conclufion. If these things be clear, no matter what is obfcure. The argument is finished. For inftance; if the utility of vifion to the animal which enjoys it, and the adaptation of the eye to this office be evi dent and certain (and I can mention nothing which is more fo), ought it to prejudice the inference which we draw from these premises, that we cannot explain the use of the spleen? Nay more; if there be parts of the eye, viz. the cornea, the cryftalline, the retina, in

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