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cise of the tendons themselves; by any appetency exciting these parts into action; or by any tendency arising therefrom. The tendency is all the other way; the conatus in constant opposition to them. Length of time does not help the case at all, but the reverse. The valves also in the blood-vessels, could never be formed in the manner which our theorist proposes. The blood, in its right and natural course, has no tendency to form them. When obstructed or refluent, it has the contrary. These parts could not grow out of their use, though they had eternity to grow in. - The senses of animals appear to me altogether incapable of receiving the explanation of their origin which this theory affords. Including under the word “sense” the organ and the perception, we have no account of either. How will our philosopher get at vision, or make an eye? How should the blind animal effect sight, of which blind animals, we know, have neither conception nor desire? Affecting it, by what operation of its will, by what endeavour to see, could it so determine the fluids of its body, as to inchoate the formation of an eye; or suppose the eye formed, would the perception follow * The same of the other senses And this objection holds its force, ascribe what you will to the hand of time, to the power of habit, to changes too slow to be observed by man, or brought within any comparison which he is able to make of past things with the present: concede what you please to these arbitrary and unattested suppositions, how will they help you? Here is no inception. No laws, no course, no powers of nature which prevail at present, nor any analogous to these, could give commencement to a new sense. And it is in vain to inquire how that might proceed, which could never begin. I think the senses to be the most inconsistent with the hypothesis before us, of any part of the animal frame. But other parts are sufficiently so. The solution does not apply to the parts of animals which have little in them of motion. If we could suppose joints and muscles to be grad ually formed by action and exercise, what action or exercise could form a skull, or fill it with brains? No effort of the animal could determine the clothing of its skin. What conatus could give prickles to the porcupine or hedgehog, or to the sheep its fleece? In the last place: What do these appetencies mean when applied to plants? I am not able to give a signification to the term, which can be transferred from animals to plants, or which is common to both. Yet a no less successful orW*

ganization is found in plants, than what obtains in animals tion is wanted for one as well as the other. Upon the whole; after all the schemes and struggles of a reluctant bhilosophy, the necessary resort is to a Deity The marks of design are too strong to be gotten over esign must have had a designer. That designer mus have been a person. That person is God.

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It is an immense conclusion, that there is a God; a perceiving, intelligent, designing Being; at the head of creation, and from whose will it proceeded. The attributes of such a Being, suppose his reality to be proved, must be adequate-to-the-magnitude, extent, and multiplicity of his operations: which are not only vast beyond comparison with those performed by any other power, but, so far as respects our conceptions of them, infinite, because they are unlimited on all sides.

Yet the contemplation of a nature so exalted, however surely we arrive at the proof of its existence, overwhelms

our faculties. The ..o. the subject. TOne consequence of which is, •painful abstraetion the thoughts seek relief in sensible images. Whence may be deduced the ancient, and almost universal propensity to idolatrous—substitutions. They are the resources of a laboring imagination. False religions usually fall in with the natural propensity; true religions, or { such as have derived themselves from the true, resist it. | It is one of the advantages of the revelations which we acknowledge, that whilst they reject idolatry with its many - o accompaniments, they introduce the Deity to uman apprehension, under an idea more personal, more determinate, more within its compass, than the theology \f nature can do. And this they do by representing him. • xclusively under the relation in which he stands to ourselves; and, for the most part, under some precise character, resulting from that relation, or from the history of his providences. Which method suits the span of our intellects much better than the universality which enters into the idea of God, as deduced from the views of nature. When. therefore, these representations are well founded in point

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of authority, (for all depends upon that,) they afford a con descension to the state of our faculties, of which, they who have most reflected upon the subject, will be the first to acknowledge the want and the value. Nevertheless, if we be careful to imitate the documents of our religion, by confining our explanations to what concerns ourselves, and do not affect more precision in our ideas than the subject allows of, the several terms which are employed to denote the attributes of the Deity, may be made, even in natural religion, to bear a sense consistent with truth and reason, and not surpassing our comprehension. These terms are, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, eternity, self-existence, necessary existence, spirituality. "omnipotence, “omniscience,” “infinite ” power, “infinite” knowledge, are superlatives; expressing our conception of these attributes in the strongest and most elevated terms which language supplies. "We ascribe power to the Deity under the name of “omnipotence,” the strict and correct conclusion being, that a power which could create such a world as this is, must be, beyond all comparison, greater than any which we experience in ourselves, than any which we observe in other visible agents; greater also than any which we can want, for our individual protection and preservation, in the Being upon whom we depend. It is a power, likewise, to which we are not authorised, by our observation or knowledge, to assign any limits of space or duration. Very much of the same sort of remark is applicable to the term, “omniscience,” infinite knowledge, or infinite wisdom. In strictness of language, there is a difference between knowledge and wisdom; wisdom always supposing action, and action directed by it. With respect to the first, viz. knowledge, the Creator must know, intimately, the constitution and properties of the things which he created; which seems also to imply a foreknowledge of their action upon one another, and of their changes; at least, so far as the same result from trains of physical and necessary causes. His omniscience also, as far as respects things present, 's deducible from his nature, as an intelligent being, joined with the extent, or rather the universality, of his operations. Where he acts, he is; and where he is, he perceives. The wisdom of the Deity, as testified in the works of creation, surpasses all idea we have of wisdom, drawn from the highest intellectual Sperations of the highest

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class of intelligent beings with whom we are acquainted,
and, which is of the chief importance to us, whatever be its
compass or extent, which it is evidently impossible that we
should be able to determine, it must be adequate to the
conduct of that order of things under which we live. And
this is enough. It is of very inferior consequence, by what
terms we express our notion, or rather our admiration, of
this attribute. The terms, which the piety and the usage
of language have rendered habitual to us, may be as pro-
per as any other. We can trace this attribute much beyond
what is necessary for any conclusion to which we have
occasion to apply it. The degree of knowledge and power,
requisite for the formation of created nature, cannot, with
respect to us, be distinguished from infinite.
The divine “omnipresence” stands, in natural theology,
upon this foundation:—In every part and place of the uni-
verse, with which we are acquainted, we perceive the exer-
tion of a power, which we believe, mediately or immediate-
ly, to proceed from the Deity. For instance: in what part
or point of space, that has ever been explored, do we not
discover attraction? In what regions do we not find light?
In what accessible portion of our globe do we not meet
with gravity, magnetism, electricity? together with the
properties also and powers of organized substances, of veg-
etable or of animated nature? Nay, farther, we may ask,
what kingdom is there of nature, what corner of space, in
which there is anything that can be examined by us, where
we do not fall upon contrivance and design? The only re-
flection perhaps which arises in our minds from this view

of the world around us is, that the laws of nature every-

where prevail; that they are uniform and universal. But
what do we mean by the laws of nature, or by any law
Effects are produced by power, not by laws. A law cannot
execute itself. A law refers us to an agent. Now an
agency so general, as that we cannot discover its absence
or assign the place in which some effect of its continued
energy is not found, may, in popular language at least,
and, perhaps, without much deviation from philosophical
strictness, be called universal: and, with not quite the
same, but with no inconsiderable propriety, the person, or
Being, in whom that power resides, or from whom it is de-
rived, may be taken to be omnipresent. He who upholds
all things by his power, may be said to be everywhere
present.
This is called a virtual presence. There is also what
metaphysicians denominate an essential ubiquity; and

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which idea the language of Scripture seems to favor: but the former, I think, goes as far as natural theology carries uS. “Eternity” is a negative idea, clothed with a positive name. It supposes, in that to which it is applied, a present existence; and is the negation of a beginning or an end of that existence. As applied to the Deity, it has not been controverted by those who acknowledge a Deity at all.

Most assuredly, there never was a time in whic nothing \ existed, because that condition must have contifiued. The universal blank must have remained; nothing could rise

up out of it; nothing could ever have existed since: nothing could exist now. In strictness, however, we have no concern with duration prior to that of the visible world. } Upon this article, therefore, of theology, it is sufficient to know, that the contriver necessarily existed before th contrivance. “Self-existence” is another negative idea, viz. the nega

lion of a preceding cause, as of a progenitor, a maker, an

author, a creator. “Necessary” existence means demonstrable existence. - “Spirituality” expresses an idea, made up of a o part, and of a positive part. The negative part consists in the exclusion of some of the known properties of matter, especially of solidity, of the vis inertia, and of gravitation. The positive part comprises perception, thought, will, power, action; by which last term is meant, the origination of motion; the quality, perhaps, in which resides the essential superiority of spirit over matter, “which cannot move, unless it be moved; and cannot but move, when impelled by another.” I apprehend that there can be no difficulty in applying to the Deity both parts of this idea. :

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Of the “Unity of the Deity,” the proof is ty of plan observable in the universe. The universe itself is a system; each part eitherdepending upon other parts, or being connected with other parts by some common law of motion, or by the presence of some common substance

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