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NATURAL THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT.

In c1 cssing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for anything—HRnew, the watch might

have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it

not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the oo:::::::::::::::: together for a purpose Y. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to TFOdúCC motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the

plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one

result: [Sce Plate I.]—We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain (ar.

tificially wrought for the sake of fiexure) communicating the

action of the string from the box to the fusee. We them A*

find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion, as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work; but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and under

watch must have had a maker;) that there must have existed, at sometime, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction,

o stood,) the inference, we think, is inevitable ; (that the r

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and designed its use.
I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion,
that we had never seen a watch made: that we had never
known an artist capable of making one; that we were alto-
gether incapable of executing such a piece of workman-
ship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was
performed ; all this being no more than what is true of some
exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to
the generality of mankind, of the more curious produc-
tions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million
know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind
exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist’s skill,
if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our
minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at
some former time, and in some place or other. Nor can
I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the
question arise concerning a human agent, or concerning an

agent of a different species, or an agent possessing, in .

some respects, a different nature. II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, L the design and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we ac

counted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a .*.*. in order to show with what design it was made: Sill less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all. III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not asceltain whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case; if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the imovement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although

we should be unable to investigate the manner according

to which, or the connexion by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared, without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment—these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before. IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that i - ible combinations of materi s; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, mast have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure. W. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction to be answ y - - - * - -

wered; that there-existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their ... "...o.o.o. a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker. VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so. *

VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of mTâssic nature. Ttris à perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power: for it is the order, according to which that power acts Without this agent, without this power, which are both dis

tinct from itself, the law does nothing; is nothing. The or

expression, “the law of metallic nature,” may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as “the law of vegetable nature,” “the law of animal nature,” or indeed as “the law of nature” in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion of ageni. and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these.

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument. He knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

—eCHAPTER II.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.

Suppose, in the next place, that the person who found the watch, should, after sometime, discover, that, in addition to all the properties which he had hitherto observed

in it, it possessed the unexpected property of producing,

in the course of its movement, another watch like itself, (the thing is conceivable;) that it eontained within it a mechanism, a system of parts, a mould for instance, or a complex adjustment of lathes, files, and other tools, evidently and separately calculated for this purpose; let us inquire, what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former"conclusion.

I. The first effect would-be to increase his admiration of the contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate #*.*.*.*. Whether he regarded the object of the contrivance, the distinct apparatus, the intricate, yet in many parts intelligible mechanism, by which it was carried on, he would perceive, in this new observation, nothing but an additional reason for doing what he had already done,—for referring the construction of the watch to design, and to supreme art. If that construction without this property, or, which is the same thing, before this property had been noticed, proved intention and art to have been employed about it, still more strong would the proof appear, when he came to the knowledge of this farther property, the crown and perfection of all the rest.

II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were, in same sense, the maker of the watch which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a ve r instance, is the maker of a chair; the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. with respect to these, the first watch was no cause at aii \ to the second; in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution and order, either of the parts which the new watch contained, or of the parts by the aid and ..) instrumentality of which it was produced. We might nossibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a stream of water ground corn; but no latitude of expression would allow us to say, no stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, that the stream of water built the mill, though it were too ancient for us to know who the builder was. What the stream of water does in the affair, is neither more nor less than this; by the application of an unintelligent impulse to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged independently of it, and arranged by intelligence, an effect is produced, viz. the corn is ground. But the effect results from the arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or author of time effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in the formation of the mill were not the less necessary, for any share which the water has in grinding the corn; yet is this share the same as that which the watch would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section. Thereore,

III. Though it be now no longer probable, that the individual watch which our observe had found was made

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