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circumstances that surrounded him from being more liberal than he was, he was fully aware of the peril of being less so ; and one of the most remarkable acts of his administration was, the ó mémoire' presented to the King in 1828, and concluding with these singularly prophetic words—
“ Insensate must they be who would advise your majesty to a dissolution of the Chamber. The electoral colleges would only return a more powerful and compact majority, who as their first act would declare the sovereignty of parliament. Then there would remain to your majesty but one of these two alternatives ; either that of bowing your august head before the Chamber, or of recurring to the unconstitutional power for ever alienated by the Charta, a power which, if evoked, could only be evoked once, for the purpose of plunging France into new revolutions, amidst which would disappear the crown of St. Louis."
Every thing which occurred in the two administrations that succeeded M. de Villèle's, is to be accounted for by the condition in whicb, as I have stated, that Minister left the crown. Legal severity had then been tried to the utmost; a feebleness beneath the law, or a violence beyond it, were the two alternatives that remained. The Ministry of M. de Martignac represented the one, as the Ministry of M. de Polignac represented the other. The King and the people alike looked upon the Martignac Ministry as a transition. They each saw that that Ministry could not stand, and that something must follow which would decide the long struggle of sixteen years, either by destroying the charta or by proclaiming that it was the right of the nation and not the gift of the King.
It is difficult to say whether the state of the country and of parties was such, that there could at this time have been made any concessions that would have kept the dynasty and the constitution the same. A feeling of hatred to the elder race of the Bourbon family had grown up among all classes and provinces of the kingdom. There was not perhaps a wide extended conspiracy against them, but there was a firm belief and conviction that they could not endure. I remember a conversation that I had in the year 1828, with one of the most intelligent doctrinaires of the present Chamber. I remember that conversation forming the subject of a letter to Sir Brook
Taylor, then at Berlin; and if he recollects, or has ever referred to that letter, he will remember that almost every thing was then predicted that since arrived, with this difference, that ten years were given to the development of events which two years decided. When a revolution has commenced its march, its steps are not to be numbered.
M. de Martignac himself shared the general conviction, and thus expressed himself to a friend, who repeated the remark to me :
“ We do all that we can-but all that we can do, is--to conduct the monarchy down stairs, whereas it would otherwise be thrown out of the window.”
However this might be, the only chance which the monarchy then had, was by conceding to the popular voice in names, and thus to avoid, or diminish, the necessity of doing so too violently in things. A country, when it knows and approves of the general principles and opinions of a minister, will allow him a certain latitude in following those opinions out. The mere ap
. pointment of Lord Chatham appeased, in his time, the popular discontent; the mere appointment of Mr. Canning quieted, in his time, the agitation of the Catholic claims.
Change in the form of a government ceases very frequently to be demanded when we feel sure that the spirit animating the government is good. The nomination of the popular man lulls suspicion, as the nomination of the unpopular one awakens it. A change of men—from unpopular ones—is, in fact, the only, the ordinary, and the reasonable resource which a representative government affords for its duration; and the cant, and nearly always hollow and perfidious cry of “measures and not men,” merely shows, where it is sincere, a double ignorance of human nature and affairs. Many acts of a government it is almost impossible for any person out of the government to know; an administration with popular appearances may be taking a subterraneous road to arbitrary power; if the general principles which a man has hitherto prosessed are hostile to your 'notions of right, and on his becoming a minister he seems to act in a manner favourable to your opinions, you are bound to mistrust him, for it is more likely that he is false to you than that he is false to himself. The statesman who, after a long political course, tells you suddenly that he means to sail on a new tack, is to be looked upon as a “Coster” in politics-a swindler the more dangerous for the smiling candour of his address. This is the sober way of viewing things, and this is the way which the public, with its broad and plain common sense, usually views thein. Mark the example! M. de Polignac comes into office--the first act of the minister, dreaded for his Jesuitism, is the abolition of the unpopular office of minister of religion,--the King speaks of prosperous finances, the minister announces administrative amendments* and economical concessions.
But, afar from these favours and promises of amelioration, severe and stern, with folded arms and knit brow, the great body of the nation stood aloof-full in front of the throne and its proud prerogatives, stood, I say, the people— firm against compromise ; embodying all their feelings in one opinion ; expressing thein all in one remonstrance ; replying to every argument of the Government by one sentence :-“ Remove the Minister !”
They listened to no other concession; they demanded no other compliance, for to an unpopular principle there is a definite and prescribed resistance, but to an unpopular person there is none—there are no bounds to suspicion, no bounds to fear, no bounds to hatred—and the name of M. de Polignac gathered round it, and attracted into a focus, as it were, all the hostile, and angry, and dangerous feelings that, differing one from the other, various and dispersed, were burning in the hearts of men, and which, in order to be irresistible, only wanted to be concentred.
Not a lip throughout the country that did not murmur in echo to that eloquent and terrible denunciation," Malheureuse France ! Malheureux Roi ”* and Lafayette, the old banner of republican feeling, was brought out once more amidst popular acclamations; and the press that had fallen into temporary
si oblivion during the better days of Martignac, lifted up its masculine voice, and felt the majesty of a new mission ; while the pation's representatives expressed their solemn sorrow,' and the nation itself quietly and publicly organized a resistance to
* Some in the Diplomacy were particularly good.
+ Words of a celebrated article published at the time in the Journal des Débats.
any system of government contrary to the national rights, and, let me add, to the national will. Such was the awful aspect of those things in presence of which the King's ministry had to deliberate, when their maintenance in office was the King's decision. Seated on his throne, environed by all the
, pride and circumstance of royal superstition, Charles X. had (on the 2nd of March, 1830) pronounced, with the studied accentuation of a theatrical display, his last address to the peers and representatives of France; to that address the famous majority of two hundred and twenty-one had made their historical response, * while the Monarch, with a fatal firmness, declared that the choice which alarmed his people was the irrevocable resolution of the crown. There was a long controversy in the cabinet. The Government, however, could have but one course to pursue : a dissolution was the first step : on the second chamber being as unfavourable as the one preceding it (and that it was so soon appeared), either the decision pronounced irrevocable was to be revoked, or an appeal to the people be succeeded by an appeal to the sword.
For some timne prior to July there hung upon the public mind a heavy cloud, which, with the fatal inspiration of calamitous times, every one felt to be charged with the dread burthen of great events. The mysterious stillness which brooded over the royal councils rather excited than dulled expectation ; and when the two famous ordonnances appeared, there was nobody out of the Diplomacy who had been deceived. They who best know Charles X. know that the greater part of his life had been passed in schemes of similar catastrophes. The first victim to the events of 1789, the long years of his exile had gone by amidst meditations on the manner in which those events might have been averted, and with a royal confidence in his own
1 ability, he always imagined that he was peculiarly fit for essaying those perilous shocks of fortune, by which a crown is lost or made secure. From the moment, then, that M. de Martignac came into office, Charles X. had looked to the famous XIVth Article* as the basis of a daring plan, which, if the
See Appendix. † Art. 14 DE LA CHARTE.—Le roi est le chef supreme de l'état ; il com-. mande les forces de terre et de mer, déclare la guerre, fait les traités de paix, d'alliance et de commerce, nomme à tous les emplois d'administration pubļi-.
conciliatory plans of his Minister were unsuccessful, would release majesty in a more summary manner from the vulgar opposition of the commons.
With more ability than is usually attributed to him, he saw at once, on the retreat of M. de Villèle, the future difficulties of his situation, he saw that he should be asked for great concessions—that he might be obliged to make a great resistance. Certain concessions he was prepared to make, larger ones he was resolved to refuse. Trying the milder system first,“ Let it fail,” said Charles X. “and fail I think it will, and I will take a minister of my own choice, of my own faction, in whom I can entirely rely. I will have at my disposal the whole force of royalty. The country may possibly yield when I display that force; if not, I am determined to use it.” “La chambre joue
; un gros jeu," said he, after receiving the address of the two hundred and twenty-one; " il pourra bien lui en cuire, de blesser ainsi ma couronne !” And thus amidst a series of events which we may call fortuitous, but which were so intertwined in the great mesh of human affairs as to make one almost believe that each was the necessary consequence of the other; thus, the two principles which had once contended came again into conflict, and a new example was bequeathed to posterity of the wisdom of the philosopher who, many years previous to our first revolution, declared that “all restorations were impossible.” I acknowledge, for my own part, that the more I linger over this period of history, the more I marvel, not that the Restoration should have at length perished, but that it should have so long endured. A frank and honest recognition of the great principles of civil liberty, and a practical policy in accordance with those principles, must have led to the declaration and acknowledgment that the monarch held his crown from the people, and not the people their liberties from the crown. This would have been, in point of fact, the revolution,—the revolution of July. It would have separated the monarch altogether from the emigration, from the nobility, from the priesthood; it would have put down the maxim—that wise emanation of king-craft, “That the king had never ceased to reign.”
But in this sentence the Restoration was contained; and, que, et fait les réglemens et ordonnances nécessaires pour l'exécution des lois et la sûreté de l'état.