"I would employ three of these armaments to cruise separately along the whole Atlantic coast of France, and three more in the Mediterranean, and the two others in the North seas. I need not enter into any minute details of the instructions under which they would be ordered to act. Upon that subject there would be no difficulty; and, if the operations of those eight armaments were judiciously directed, I have an absolute conviction that they would keep up so constant an alarm on the whole range of the coast of France as would oblige our enemies to keep their whole or the greatest part of their numerous armies, to protect their own coasts from the dread of our predatory incursions. By such measures we should annoy our enemies more effectually than by any other means, and it is obvious that, in that manner, we should, at the same time, co-operate in the most beneficial manner with our allies, and give, to them that salutary aid, which the measures hitherto pursued by us have totally failed in doing. "I have only to wish that any intelligent and candid man would exercise his own reflection and judgment on comparing the probable effects of such a system, contrasted with all those expensive and disastrous operations which have been going on during the last two years. The expence of such a system would be comparatively trifling, and, in addition to its other salutary effects, would be the means of keeping constantly alive the spirit and enterprize of both our naval and military services. "It is scarcely necessary to observe, VOL, XVII. of hiring transports has been pursued in preference to maintaining a regular establishment of armed troop-ships, properly equipped and fitted for the reception and. accommodation of troops, in the shape of floating barracks. Yet, even if it could be proved that there really is a considerable saving in hiring transports, I should still adhere to the opinion I have formed; as I am convinced that no saving would counterbalance the many important advantages I have detailed to your lordships. I am not, however, prepared to allow the existence of this alleged economy: and I must trouble your lordships. with the reasons which lead me to question the truth of it. As, in considering the comparative expence of armed troop-ships and of hired transports, it is necessary distinctly to state the scale of establishment on which I propose that troop-ships should be fitted out, I shall proceed, shortly, to detail my sentiments on that head. I would, therefore, suggest that such ships of war as may be appropriated to the reception and conveyance of troops should be fitted, armed, manned, and equipped, on the following reduced scale: the crew not to exceed, at the utmost, one-third of the proper complement of men;-no ship to carry more than 20, nor less than 12, guns, (according to her class,) and these to be principally carronades; the ships also to have reduced masts and yards, the original lower masts only being kept in; and, upon these data, I am satisfied that the wear and tear of a ship so fitted and employed would not exceed one-fourth of an active cruizer, and that the expences and charges would, in the aggregate, be less than one half of the expences and charges incurred for that if, at any time, an object should present itself, upon which we could, with effect and benefit, émploy together the whole 24,000 men, a single letter from the War office and the admiralty could speedily assemble them at any rendezvous most expedient for the execution of the projected service." (Signed) MELVILLE, * Amongst other disadvantages arising from the extent to which the system of hiring transports has been carried, the inconvenience and impolicy of abstracting so much of the commercial shipping from the trade of the country must be obvious to every person who has had occasion at all to consider the subject. H ships when fitted, armed, and equipped, for the purposes of war.-And here it is very material to state, that these opinions have the full and entire concurrence of several naval officers, whose experience and judgment entitle them to perfect confidence in this respect, and that one of these officers commanded, nearly the whole of the late war, either an armed transport or a troop-ship, and was present at all the most important conjunct opera tions. From these premises the following comparative calculation of the expence of an equal quantity of tonnage of troop-ships and of hired transports has been made out; and though it is, perhaps, impossible to form a perfectly accurate computation, I am warranted (on the authorities I have just alluded to) in submitting the following to your lordships. I shall select a 64-gun ship for the comparison. Taking, therefore, into consideration the injury the ship would susain lying in ordinary;-the reduced scale of masts, yards, &c. and the small number and light weight of the guns, the annual expence may be as follows: The average tonnage of a 64 is about 1380 tons. Her complement of men is 491, but when fitted as a troop-ship I should propose 164, being only onethird. The mode of estimating a ship's expence is as under: Wages per man per month ..... Victuals do. do. ..... £1 17 This sum of 71. 2s. on the number of men is found to cover the monthly expence of the ship, upon a war establishment and full complement; but, as a troop-ship and on a reduced complement, I have taken the wages and victuals on the 164 men, separately, at 4l. 16s. per man per month; and the wear and tear, or the 21. 65. per ton per month, on the whole tonnage, this appearing to be the fairest mode of forming the estimate. Wages and victuals for 164 men, at 41. 16s. per man per month, amount annually to ..... £.10,233 12 0 Difference in favour of troop ships 150l. 18s.; so that, when this system is established, it would appear, after being thus explained, to be even more economical than that of hiring transports. In addition to the decided superiority of troop-ships in every other respect, they are calculated in a great degree to serve, as their own convoy, and in so far to render a smaller number of ships of war necessary for the purpose of accompanying any expedition. Besides, it must not be forgot that, by the adoption of the system, a very great additional security would be derived against the capture and loss of great numbers of our seamen and soldiers in hired transports. I should be most unwilling to estimate the lives of either on data of pecuniary compensation; but, if any cold calculator should think it advisable to follow out such an investigation, he might find, upon inquiry, that the expence of the recruiting service amounts to an enormous sum.+ But I reject all such calculations; for I hold the life of a British sailor or soldier to be inestimable; and if I had the means of bringing forward the evidence of our enemies upon that subject, I should willingly rest upon their testimony. I cannot therefore consent to have this subject considered upon the ground of a trifling saving of expense, even if the allegation were true; which, as I have already stated, I hold it not to be. I have also heard another objection. mentioned, which is of such a nature as to * The price paid during the last year. + Upwards of 120 transports have been captured or lost since the commencement of the present war (May 1803).—About 1700 persons were taken prisoners, and more than 1900 were lost, in these vessels. render it impossible for me to pass it over without an accurate examination. It has been stated that the equipment and keeping upon the requisite number, of armed troop-ships, upon the scale I consider necessary, would be such a drain upon the ordinary of the navy, and would. require so many seamen to navigate them, as to cause serious inconvenience to the naval service. In consequence, of these objections, I thought it necessary to move for many of the accounts, which were objected to as not bearing upon the question, but which objections will, I trust, be no longer entertained after a due consideration of the statements which I shall now endeavour to make, as accurately as I can, from the imperfect information with which I have been furnished. of Europe, who either are already our enemies, or who may be compelled to be come so. As the returns of ships in commission and in ordinary have not yet been laid before the House, the numbers cannot be precisely stated; but we have probably about 105 sail of the line in actual service, beside 7 serving as guard-ships and storeships, and five effective fifty-gun ships. We have likewise about 103 sail of the line in ordinary. I believe the following to be a pretty accurate statement of the force which can be opposed to us: The Russian fleet, in the Baltic, consists of 13 sail of the line with several heavy frigates. The Danes have one ship of the line, and the Swedes eleven sail. The Dutch have agreed, by a recent treaty, to furnish nine sail of the It is impossible to lay down any precise line to France. These are all the ships rule as to the extent to which it may be they have; and no doubt they will find expedient to carry an establishment of great difficulty in fitting and manning armed troop-ships: but your lordships are them for active service.-France has, in aware that, in the memorandum to which the Scheldt, ten sail of the line, whose I have already alluded, I suggested that at crews, though not nearly complete, are present, and probably at all times, the esta- (as far as they go) composed of various blishment should not be less than adequate nations. She has also two sail at Cherto the conveyance of 24,000; which al-burgh, and, in the ports on the Bay of lowing two tons to a man, would require 48,000 tons of shipping. Now, if I am correctly informed, which I believe I am, in stating the tonnage of the British navy at about 800,000 tons, let me ask your lordships whether any man, competent to form a judgment on the subject can entertain a doubt that, if ships to the extent of 48,000 tons were to be appropriated for the conveyance of troops, the remainder would not be more than amply sufficient for every naval service for which our fleet can possibly be required. If any embarrassment should arise from such an appropriation, it would be attributable only to an injudicious ar rangement and distribution of our force. In illustration of this position, I would request your lordships to advert to the fact, that, in 1800 and 180!, the number of troop ships and armed transports, that were employed, amounted to 50 sail, and their tonnage to about 50,000 tons; which troopships and transports we had no hesitation in employing at that time, notwithstand ing the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, amounted to about 100 sail of the line But the justice of this observation admits of being still more for bly shewn, by a comparison of our present naval strength with that of all the other powers Biscay, ahout 12 sail of the line, most of which are at Rochefort. France has also in the Mediterranean 13 effective ships. Upon a recapitulation it therefore appears, that the Russian, Swedish, Danish, Dutch, and French, force, amounts collectively to only 71 sail of the line, while there are 105 sail of the British tine now in commission. It must immediately occur to your lordships that I can have no such precise information respecting the force of our enemies as to be certain of the perfect accuracy of the account I have given. From his official information the noble lord, lately at the head of the board of admiralty, can of course set me right if I am proceeding upon a misapprehension; but any trivial inaccuracy is of no moment as to the general conclusion; for, if I am nearly correct, (of which I entertain no doubt,) it is obvious that all the maritime powers of Europe combined are not, even in a numerical point of view, adequate tọ contend for the sovereignty of the ocean with the naval force of Great Britain; and I need scarcely observe that this mode of stating the question is the most disadvantageous for my argument, because it supposes, contrary to the known fact, that the ships of our enemies are manned and equipped, so as to be upon a par with an equal number of our own. In truth, my lords, I argue this part of the question with more confidence, because, although I am perfectly ready to yield my opinion to a more correct view of the subject, I am strongly impressed with a conviction, that the naval establishment of the country is now upon a scale considerably exceeding what in wisdom, in sound policy, and on every principle of economy, it ought to be. In order to make my ideas in this respect more intelligible to your lordships, I shall detail hypothetically what I con'ceive to be not an improbable distribution of our naval force, as applicable to the extent and existing positions of the fleets, that are, or may eventually be, opposed to us. | Good Hope and North America, the whole force requisite for European and foreign service, would amount to 91 sail of the line; a force which I consider amply sufficient for every probable demand. On those distant stations it is certainly expedient to employ a number of frigates, and smaller vessels of war, both for the protection of our own trade and the annoyance of that of our enemies; and we possess ample means of making such an appropriation of this description of force. I have reason to believe that France and Holland have not, together, more than 30 frigates. I trust your lordships will believe that I should be one of the last men to recommend that our naval establishment should be put upon a footing of doubt or nice balance with the force of the enemy. Our superiority ought at all times to be decisive and commanding; but I am sure I am reasoning soundly, when I contend that, considering the scarcity of naval timber and the high price of naval storės of every description, this is not a moment when the country ought to give way to a wasteful, ostentatious, and prodigal, expenditure. And such I consider an unnecessary number of ships in commission, if they be either detained in our own ports or sent where they are not likely to meet with an enemy. I do maintain that, circumstanced as the country now is, we The force appropriated to watch the move-ought to husband our navy, particularly ments of the French ships in the ports in the Bay of Biscay may be considered fully adequate, until the fleet returns from the Baltic, when one half of the ships, as they may be refitted, will be disposable for the blockade of those ports, and the other half to aid in the blockade of the Texel, Scheldt, &c. during the winter months. Upon the whole, therefore, even with a view to the contingency of Sweden being opposed to us, and to the service of Spain and Portugal, 81 sail of the line would appear to be perfectly sufficient for European service. France having now no port in the Charibbees, and of course no means of keeping up any permanent naval force in that quarter, very few ships of the line can be required for the West-India station; and, under the present circumstances, I am not aware that any considerable number of ships of the line can be requisite in the East Indies. If, therefore, ten ships of the line were allotted for the East and West Indies, Portuguese America, the Cape of our ships of the line, in order that we may keep as many as possible sound and entire, to meet future exigencies, when the increased strength of our enemies may render the equipment and employment of a larger force essential to the preservation and the safety of the empire. 1 These are sentiments which I have long entertained, and they are not declared at the present moment for the purpose of supporting a favourite proposition; still less with any intention of either idly or factiously censuring the administration of the country. It will always give me pain when I cannot concur in the measures of those to whom his Majesty may think proper to entrust the administration of public affairs; and it is peculiarly painful to me to criticise the administration of a department over which I once presided. I am aware of the imputations to which such a line of conduct is liable, and nothing would induce me to undertake such a task, but the conviction I entertain that in some very important particulars his Ma jesty is not well advised on the naval and military interests of the country. But to return to the subject: I have stated that, in the opinion I entertain respecting an unnecessary expense of naval establishment, I am not urging an opinion which I have lightly or lately adopted. Immediately after the glorious and unparalleled victory of Trafalgar, I had occasion, in answer to a communication from Mr. Pitt, to write two letters to him; in both of which, but more especially in the latter, I took occasion to express opinions similar to those I am now pressing upon your lordships. After stating the ideas which I entertained upon the pleasing and essential change in our naval affairs, arising out of the glorious victory of Trafalgar, and the brilliant success of the squadron under sir Richard Strachan, I represented to him that I hoped the reports then given in the daily papers, of an intention, on the part of the board of admiralty, to repair forthwith and to put into commission the ships taken by sir Richard's squadron were unfounded, as I entertained a belief that the results of those victories were so decisive as to render the naval force of the enemy incapable of making any stand against the fleet of this country during the remainder of the war. I therefore suggested that, instead of putting the captured ships into commission, they should receive such repairs as they might be in need of, and be laid up; that such of our own ships as could be spared should be gradually paid off, repaired, and laid up, and that no more new ships should be commissioned, but that, as soon as they were launched, they should be laid up, conceiving it to be the best policy that measures should be taken to preserve our ships, so as to enable us to bring forward such a fleet as might, eventually, be capable of meeting and of vanquishing all the naval powers of Eu rope. 1 likewise recommended that, under the existing circumstances, more time should be given to the merchant builders than had been allowed by the conditions of their contracts, in order that the timber might be better seasoned, and that the ships which they were then building might thereby be rendered more durable and efficient; and I added that, considering the scarcity and consequent difficulty of procuring an adequate supply of naval timber, no ship should be allowed to be broken up until it should be clearly as certained that she was totally unfit for any farther service whatever.* *The following are copies of these letters: Copy of a LETTER from Lord Melville to "My dear Sir; The guardian angel of Great Britain never fails to interpose at moments the most critical, and where such interposition is least looked for. Never was that observation more verified than in the communications which were accompanied by your note of last night; the disasters on the Danube required some antidote more powerful than we had almost ever required at any former period, and the one which has arrived exceeds what the most sanguine wish could have almost hoped for. The effects to Europe in general, and in Europe, I hope will be great; but, to the separate interests of our own country, the consequences are beyond calculation. The fleets of our enemies were advancing faster than they ought to have done, consistently with our maintaining a superiority such as we possessed during the later periods of the last war, indeed from the time of lord Howe's victory. That victory had the effect of baffling all the naval exertions of our enemies during the remainder of the war; this victory will have precisely the same effect: they cannot recover it; indeed, unless they have got great supplies of naval stores in the ports of Spain, since the time I left the admiralty, I do not see how they can re. pair the crippled ships that have made their escape to Cadiz. "In such a moment you will not think me a croaker if I most earnestly recommend to you not to allow any diminution of our naval exertions to take place in consequence of this great event; and, although new ships must be progressively coming forward, I am sure you will feel the necessity of resisting every attempt to break up any of our ships of war, however old, while they can, at any expence not immoderate, be kept in a state fit for any service. The scarcity of naval timber renders this at present, more than at any former period, a consideration of deep importance; and, if it was possible to allow the indulgence of any sentiment of regret in the contemplation of such brilliant success, it would be on account of the necessity there was for destroying or abandoning so many of our prizes. They would |