merits of lord Collingwood.-The motion breach of privilege had been reported by was then agreed to nem. con. a committee, the House had felt it neces [MR. C. W. WYNN'S RESOLUTIONS RES- sary to pronounce its judgment upon that PECTING PRIVILEGE.] Mr. Charles Wil-report, and for the benefit of posterity, to liams Wynn, pursuant to notice, called the record on the journals, that the facts there attention of the House to the situation in stated did constitute an offence. Cases which its privileges were placed, by the might, indeed, be found, where the House actions lately commenced against their had, for different reasons, thought it inexSpeaker and Serjeant, by sir F. Burdett, pedient to inflict any punishment; but, and the proceedings which had taken even there, they usually stated by a reso place on that subject. lution, their sense of the offence committed, and their reasons for inflicting no punishment upon it, in the particular matter before them. Such was the case of lord Castlereagh, in the very last session of parliament. Here the House had passed over the whole transaction, as if it was a legal, allowable, and laudable course which had been pursued. He had delayed, as long as possible, to bring this question forward, in the hope that it would have been taken up by some member of greater experience and ability; but as that had not been the case, the sense which he entertained of the absolute necessity of some step being taken, rendered it his imperious duty to submit to the House, his view of the true state of the question. By the notice which had been delivered to the Speaker by Mr. Ellis, attorney to sir Francis Burdett, it was expressly declared, that this action was commenced against him for an act done by him as Speaker. This, in itself, constituted the highest breach of privilege, of which an individual could be guilty. Yet what had been the proceedings of the House upon it? They merely entered the Notice on the Journals, and then referred it to a Committee. That Committee reported, "That the bringing these actions against the Speaker and Serjeant, for acts done in obedience to the orders of the House, is a breach of privilege.-That it appeared, that in several instances of actions commenced in breach of privilege, the House had proceeded by commitment, not only against the party, but against the solicitor, and other persons concerned; but that the commitment wonld not necessarily put a stop to the actions.-And that, though the House should think fit to commit the solicitor, or other persons concerned in commencing these actions, yet it would be expedient, that the House should give leave to the Speaker, or Serjeant, to appear to the said actions, and to plead to the same, for the purpose of bringing under the knowledge of the court, the authority under which they acted." Here were, in effect, three distinct resolutions of the Committee, upon which the House was called to declare its opinion; yet, of these three, they had noticed only the last, leaving the other two without any comment whatever. - In every former instance, where a VOL. XVII. The country was bound to presume, as things now stood, that the House of Commons did not consider the action which had been commenced as any infringement of its privileges. The silence of the House, in this instance, constituted an abandonment of all such privilege, and it would become difficult, perhaps impracticable, to resume it upon any similar occasion in future. Could the House, with any colour of justice, hereafter proceed against any solicitor, who should again serve such a Notice on the Speaker? What was to prevent Mr. Gale Jones, or any other person who had incurred the displeasure of the House, from adopting the same course? Or why should any attorney, to whom they might apply, hesitate to undertake their suit? Suppose him, having done so, called to the bar of the House: might he not, for his justification, refer to the journals, and state, that the parliament of 1810 had full cognizance of the whole progress of such an action, and that, though a Committee had reported it to be a breach of privilege, the House had studiously avoided agreeing to that report, or taking any step to interrupt the course of such an action, and had, on the contrary, recognised its legality and propriety by directing the Speaker to plead to it? It had been urged, on the other side of the House, that this case was similar to those where a Habeas Corpus had been sued out, by persons committed by the House; and it had been asked, whether the Solicitor employed to obtain it had ever been punished? The cases were widely different. There the solicitor might not know under what authority the prisoner was committed, until a 2 L mit them to. The only rule which could preserve the independence of each House of Parliament was that which the wisdom of our ancestors had established: "that each shall possess a separate, complete, and exclusive judicature, upon all matters affecting its own privileges." return had been made to the Habeas | between these two branches of the legisCorpus. The House had no know-lature would be destroyed for ever, and the ledge that any solicitor, was employed Commons would retain no privileges, but to sue out the Habeas Corpus. In fact, what the Lords should, by their judgments none need be employed; for, by law, on different occasions, think proper to ad❤ the gaoler was bound to apply for it on the requisition of the prisoner. Here the knowledge, that the solicitor was fully aware of the nature of the action, was forced upon the House by the terms of the Notice. They could not shut their eyes to it. Many instances there undoubtedly were, where common prudence and good sense would induce the members of the House to pass over offences altogether. Of such a nature, perhaps, in the opinion of many, was the paper of Mr. Gale Jones, when it was originally complained of; but when it had been once regularly noticed, and by a formal complaint forced on the attention of the House, no member could doubt any longer as to the course to be pursued, or could hesitate to concur in the vote which the House finally passed upon that occasion, however he might have been disinclined to the original agitation of the question. Two of his Majesty's ministers (Messrs. Yorke and Perceval) had declared, that the question was now before a tribunal, whose decision would set it at rest. Did they mean to contend then, that if the opinion of the King's judges should be adverse to the privileges of this House, such a decision could destroy them? Or did they intend, that, in such a case, the Commons should carry the question, by writ of error, before the other House of Parliament and that they should humbly sue for their privileges at the bar of the House of Lords? No persons could be so short sighted, as not to perceive, that whatever might be the decision of the King's Bench, it could not be final. It could not set the question at rest. The question must again be brought before the Lords, either by the House of Commons, or by those who resist its privileges. Perhaps it might be said, as in a former instance, that the Lords would be as careful of the privilege of the Commons as their own. On the contrary, it appeared from history, that it was from the other House of Parliament that the privileges of the Commons had experienced the most frequent and severe attacks; and if it should once become established, that the commitments of the House of Commons can, by appeal, be brought under the judicature of the Lords, the equality which has hitherto subsisted This principle, which for ages had been the foundation and bulwark of privilege, the House was now advised to abandon. It was now invited to believe, that those privileges, without which it could not exist, might safely be allowed to rest altogether on the decision of the judges of the courts of law in Westminster-hall, From the respect which was due to the legal and constitutional knowledge of those high and distinguished magistrates, there could be little doubt, perhaps, that their opinions would be found favourable to the privi leges of the House of Commons: yet could it be concealed, that men of great eminence in the profession of the law, persons who had already filled, and might again fill, the highest situations, had declared an adverse opinion? Suppose them upon the bench hereafter, and such a question brought before them, what must then be their judgment, and what would be the situation of the House under it. If the House allowed these actions to proceed, they must now determine, what step they would take, with respect to any judge who should deny their privilege of commitment. Would they impeach, and so submit the question, in another shape, to the judicature of the Lords; or would they be reduced to the necessity of committing the judge by their own authority? He had, himself, no doubt whatever, that if the House should be placed in such extreme difficulties, the latter would be the only course which it could be safe for them to pursue: and great as their reluctance must be to take such a step, it was fit that the House should be prepared to go this length, in order to meet those difficulties, which must unavoidably result from the course they were now pursuing. Furthermore, he dreaded the precedent now sanctioned by the House, and its effect hereafter. The judges might affirm the present commitment by the House of Commons and yet might entertain a ques tion and discussion of the grounds upon which such commitment had been made; and would they not thus establish a precedent for revising the decisions of the House, in questions of privilege, as effectually as if they should formally decide in favour of sir Francis Burdett? Should this once be established, the consequence was obvious; there would be a stop put to all the principal functions of the House. Its inquisitorial power would be set at defiance, when every witness who refused his attendance, or prevaricated in his evidence, might bring his action against the Speaker, and appeal to two other tribunals, either of whom might differ from the determination of the House, and thus annul its proceedings. was, that which is stated in the report of the Committee, viz. that it was expedient to bring under the knowledge of the court of King's Bench, upon record, the fact, that these actions were instituted, for the purpose of questioning acts done officially, under the authority of the House of Commons, and not in any individual capacity. In adopting this resolution, the House had, perhaps, gone too far, but certainly to the utmost limits of safe and reasonable concession. The Speaker had pleaded, and the court was fully informed of the nature of the action. This then is the latest moment for the assertion of our pri vileges. What, then, is now to be done? Recur to that principle, which governed It had been triumphantly asked, whe-the practice of your ancestors, the princither the commitment of the Solicitor would be sufficient to stop the progress of the present actions? To this it was sufficient to answer, that the dread of such punishment had hitherto been found sufficient to prevent all persons from commencing, or being concerned in maintaining similar suits; and that it was somewhat early to say, that those measures which had always hitherto proved efficacious for the defence of our privileges, would, if now resorted to, be wholly insufficient. ple, that the proceedings of the House of Commons, in matters of privilege, shall not be questioned by any other tribunal. For the preservation of this vital principle, new measures must be taken, if new measures are necessary: and who, in such a case, would hesitate to make a precedent, if it were true that none could be found. He referred to the cases of lord Newburgh, in 1669; the Middlesex justices, in 1716; the commitment of the messenger by the lord mayor, in 1771: in all of which the House had ordered the records of the inferior courts to be laid on the table, and had directed the obnoxious proceedings to be there taken off the file, and destroyed. Here, however, your own Journals will point out to you a course which has been repeatedly pursued in former times, by He should, not, however, propose, that which the House had cancelled proceedthe House should now immediately pro-ings derogatory to its dignity or privileges. ceed to commit the solicitor; for although he had already stated, that this would, in the first instance, have been the properest course, yet after passing over the original offence for so long a time, it might now appear harsh and severe to visit it with the most rigorous exercise of the power of the House. He should, therefore, move a resolution, similar to one which he found on the Journals of the 26th January 1703, declaring the commencement of any action, for acts done by the order of the House, to be a high breach of privilege; and afterwards another, stating sir Francis Burdett's actions against the Speaker and Serjeant to be of this description. If, after the House had given this public notice, these actions should be further proceeded in, it would undoubtedly be necessary to commit every person concerned in carrying them on. He felt himself here compelled to admit, that he had himself, though with extreme reluctance, consented to the resolution, permitting the Speaker and Serjeant to appear in the present actions. The only ground upon which he so consented. It was an additional recommendation of this mode of acting that it obviated all possibility of contest with the court of King's Bench; though even the certainty of such a contest would not be a consideration to deter him from any steps, which might be necessary for the preservation of privilege. Many persons there were, however, who thought that these measures were indeed the proper course, but not the most prudent; that they were too strong for the present moment; and that we should now conciliate. The opportunity, however, of giving weight to these considerations, seemed to have been suffered to go by. As soon as the original complaint made to the House had been adopted by it, the country could not be deceived by any pretences to conciliation; nor would they have attributed such a conduct to any other motive, but those of unworthy cowardice. one, and he trusted that his spirit would this night hover over them, and inspire their decisions. For himself, whatever might be the determination of the House, he was desirous to be able to state to his constituents, that he had endeavoured to his utmost to preserve uninjured and unimpaired, those pri Was it likely, that those persons could be conciliated, who had directed their attacks against the House of Commons, simply because they thought that, at the pre-vileges, which they had entrusted to his sent moment, this was more valuable than either of the other branches of the legislature? They would laugh to see the House affect moderation, by abandoning what for ages, had been its only guard and defence. hands, which he felt to be the privileges not of that House only, but those of all the Commons of England. He concluded by moving the following Resolutions : 66 1. That whoever shall presume to "commence or prosecute any action, in"dictment, or prosecution, against any person for acts done in obedience to the "orders of this House, such person and persons, and all attornies, solicitors, "counsellors, and scrjeants at law, soliciting, prosecuting, or pleading in any such case, are guilty of a high breach of the "privilege of this House. 2. That it appears to this House, that "the actions commenced by sir Francis "Burdett, baronet, against, the right hon. "Charles Abbot, Speaker of this House, "and against Francis John Colman, esq., Serjeant at Arms attending this House, "are for acts done in obedience to the orders of this House. 3. That the proper officer of the court "of King's Bench do to-morrow attend this House with all records and proceed"ings in the said actions." It was much the same sort of pledge of conciliation and peace, which a great country was formerly called upon to give to its enemies, by surrendering the whole of its fleet. The moment of conflict was not that for concession, even if concession were, on other grounds, advisable, instead of being ruinous and destructive. If the House wished to be respected by the reflecting part of the community, it must respect itself. The House of Lords and the court of King's Bench could not defend it, if it wanted courage to vindicate its own rights. These were times, when it was necessary to rise above the dread of temporary unpopularity. The House should" recollect the great man, whose loss, they all had so lately deplored, who pursued his course firm and undeviating, frequently" in direct opposition to the prevailing clamour; who, when the spirit of the nation was sunk to the lowest ebb of degradation, when the populace had actually drawn in triumph a French general through the streets of London, had stood forward, almost alone, and raised their spirits by his own. To the stand then made by that illustrious person, and the small phalanx which rallied round him, it was to be attributed, that the ancient fortitude of the country was restored; that during seven years of war which had since occurred we had heard of no petitions for peace, no unmanly complaints of the heavy and unparalleled burthens which it had been necessary to impose. Were his lamented friend now here, it would have been unnecessary for any other person to have brought forward this question. To imitate the strain of eloquence with which he would have enforced it, the felicity of illustration with which he would have adorned it, was impossible; but to emulate his determination and intrepidity was in the power of every The Chancellor of the Exchequer rose to oppose it, he could not see the necessity of it, and contended that it would be a very inconsistent proceeding after the House had agreed to plead, to punish those persons concerned in prosecuting that action to which they had resolved to plead. With respect to what had fallen from his learned friend, as to the alleged embarrassment in which the House would be placed in the assertion of their privileges, if the judges decided against their privileges, he did not see why the learned gent. should go out of the way, and presume that the court of King's Bench would not do justice; it was a presumption on which they had no right to argue; in case, however, that justice should not be done, a presumption which he repeated it was by no means fair to make, still in that case he knew of no precedent where the House committed a chief judge for such a decision, he being at the time of committal & judge. If lord chief justice Ellenborough should decide contrary Mr. C. W. Wynn. He is a peer. The Chancellor of the Exchequer. A peer! exclaims the hon. gent. irregularly across the table; but, whether or no, if his lordship or other judges should decide contrary to the law of the land, he presumed, that the proper mode to remedy that violation of the duties of their station would be by impeachment. There was no instance of a chief justice being committed who was a lord of parliament, nor of a judge who was so at the time he was committed. He would infinitely prefer the impeachment of a judge for exceeding the line of his duty, to the measure of committing him, to the stoppage of all the law business of the court in which he presided. The hon. gent. would then say, but where was the impeachment to be tried? It must be tried before the House of Lords, and then they are to decide on the privileges of the House of Commons. The House ought not to make an assumption that the tribenals would act contrary to the law of the land. Having taken their course, and in part authorized the attorney general to piead, if the hon. gent. would wish to proceed in a contrary direction, he should go higher, and move to rescind the resolutions, for he was now endeavouring to overturn all that has been done. He hoped to have seen a right hon. gent. sitting near the hon. mover (Mr. Ponsonby) who on a former occasion entered most fully into this subject, and came to a decision, that the House ought to adopt no other course than what is now pursued. Had that right hon. gent. been present, he must, consistently with his former speech, have opposed the present motion. He conceived that the House should do no more than it had done, in the present session. As to any impression of fear or timidity, they must recollect that they had been before accused of rashness; he however apprehended that they had acted consistently throughout. The best way was for the House not to take the question in its own hands, but bring it under the consideration of another court. Mr. Adam observed, that though his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby) now absent from sickness in his family, had said that the Speaker ought to be permitted to plead, he had, at the same time, maintained that something ought to be entered on the records of the House to maintain its privileges. Mr. Adam added, that Mr. Perceval had on a former occa sion (viz. when the Second Report of the Committee was brought up) insisted that Mr. Ponsonby had pledged himself, in his speech, to support the propriety of the course taken to this, Mr. Adam had replied, that Mr. Ponsonby was likewise on that occasion absent; that Mr. Adam hadafterwards thought it proper to state to Mr. Ponsonby privately, the allegation of Mr. Perceval, when Mr. Ponsonby, in consequence of that statement, told him (Mr. Adam), that on the occasion referred to, he (Mr. Ponsonby) had expressed (as he entertained) a clear decided opinion, that an assertion of the privilege should be made in the first instance, though it might become necessary to authorize the Speaker to appear and plead. Mr. Adam contended, that as the Journals now stood, the privileges of the House appeared to be abandoned. An action brought had been ordered to be defended; this, standing by itself, would justify the presumption that an action would lie, and the privileges of the House would be rooted up. The ordinary business of the House could hardly proceed if the Speaker were thus to be liable to perpetual processes.-Consider, Sir, (he said), that there is not a day passes, in which, according to this admission as it appears upon the Journals, and by the course which has been taken, in which you are not liable to actions for the warrants issued by the order of the House.Mr. Adam then adverted to the alleged analogy of the proceeding by writ of Habeas Corpus. He said it was an ex-parte proceeding-a writ of right (in this case not under the statute, but at common law) of which the House could have no notice till the judge had remanded the prisoner in consequence of his commitment by the Commons. Was this to be compared with an action against the Speaker, with a formal notice served on the Speaker, which had been entered on the Journals-the first time that such a thing had ever happened? After admitting that the courts below might incidentally decide on the privileges of the House, as in case of murder ensuing, or other injury, he said that the whole matter amounted to this: a notice of an action against the Speaker had been delivered to the Speaker; no entry had been made on the Journals that this was a breach of privilege; but the first and only step had been to declare, that, as an action had been brought, it must be defended. Could any interpreta |