faction to the British nation, which has dearly paid for the omission; the first was, that of the article which provided for a full and complete indemnification of the illustrious house of Orange, for their losses in Holland. By a secret article of the treaty, Holland had shifted off this indemnification from herself; and France who was to give nothing, procured for that purpose some miserable districts in Germany totally disproportioned to the extent of its claims; and for which England was called upon by government on the commencement of hostilities, to burthen herself with an annuity of 60,000l. to supply the deficiency. The other, that part of the second article, which stipulated for the payment of the sums due by France for the maintenance of prisoners of that nation in England during the war, which amounted to more than two millions sterling. On these subjects however, as there do not appear to have been either demand or remonstrance at any moment, from the period of the signature of the peace of Amiens to that of the renewal of hostilities, no discussion did, nor could exist. We are therefore obJiged unwillingly to state, that the grounds for arming, as declared in the act of the English government, which issued for that purpose, are hot, from any documents that appear, sufficiently established; and that some motive, not judged prudent to be brought forward, influenced the ministers in their determination on that important and eventful measure. That motive can alone be found in the news of the detention of the Cape having reached (though not through the official channel, but from sources equally to be depended upon) the ears of government, on the 6th of March; the message was determined on the 7th, as appears by lord Hawkesbury's dispatch of that date; and on the 8th was brought down to parliament, in order that the country might be placed in a warlike attitude, previously to the act of hostility, which had been committed at the Cape of Good Hope by their authority, being made public at Paris ; and which in the mind and temper Bonaparte was known to possess, would probably produce such a ferment, as might occasion consequences the most to be dreaded, in the then unprepared and reduced state of the military and marine force of Great Britain. As the ill-judged precipitation of ministers had induced this act of infraction of the treaty of Amiens, at the Cape; so did they commit themselves in the affair of the message, with equal temerity.-Armaments were now set on foot—the militia called out contracts of every nature, incidental to warfare, entered upon and even the message, independently of every other cause, was likely, from its conveying a direct challenge to Bonaparte, at the express moment when negociation was proffered, to excite in him a degree of resentment, which would plunge both countries into irretrievable hostility. A very few days convinced the English government of its too great precipitation; the official account of the detention of the Cape, was rapidly followed by another of the surrender of the colony, under the instruction contained in the counter-orders, which, from circum stances stances not unusual in such latitudes, though not dispatched til alter the intervention of a month, arrived on the heels of the former. The message and its effects would now have been gladly withdrawn, but it was too late; ministers were pledged to prove the existence of armaments, to an alarming extent, and of "important discussions," at Paris, as the cause of the message, which by arming the country had disturbed its tranquillity, encreased its expenditure, and had given the most serious cause of offence and complaint to France. Toeffect this, was however, a task, which even the confidence of numbers could not inspire ministers with the hope of effecting, to the satisfaction of parliament and the country. In this dilemma, they directed their utmost efforts to induce the late minister to take an active share in the administration. Under the protection of his great name, with the assistance of his pre-eminent talents and abilities, whatever were the issue of the present negociation, whether it were peace or war, behind his shield they would have conceived themselves invulnerable. For a considerable period of time, it was well known that the concert and good understanding which had originally subsisted between the late and present ministers, had gradually lessened, and had, at length, totally ceased: the moment of necessity, however, now approached, and overtures were made to regain that co-operation and assistance which, in the hour of boastful confidence, was either neglected or unsolicited. The origin, progress, and termination of the negociation for this purpose, we have already detailed.* During its continua tion, repeated adjournments of parliament at home, kept discussion at a distance; whilst, at Paris, the different modifications of the original proposition of retaining Malta in perpetuity, were successively and. anxiously tendered for the acceptation of the French government. We have seen, that although the firmness of the first consul never gave way on the point of Malta remaining in British hands, yet his wish to avoid war, in his present unprepared state, induced him to make every concession that could be considered as demanded or even imposed by the English government, in consequence of Sebastiani's report. The integrity of the Turkish empire was to be secured; Malta, the great object of dispute and jealousy, Bonaparte offered to place in the hands of Russia, Austria, or Prussia; even the doctrine of the right of compensation and equiva lent to Great Britain, for the acquisitions of France, was not attempted to be denied or evaded; and a convention, for that express purpose, would, if demanded, have doubtless been conceded. From the disposi-· tion manifested by the court of Russia, its mediation might have been confidently looked to, at the moment when the negociation abruptly concluded; and which it accepted, in all human probability, had averted the scourge and evils of war The entire failure however of the attempt to induce Mr. Pitt to return to office, was decisive upon the conduct of ministers. As the treaty Che mode alone remained, by wiver (ney could hope to obviate the are guest vocets of such an investigaat and the peremptory last ultinon was consequently dispatched o Paris. If Bonaparte gave way, a umportant acquisition of Malta, coing with the natural wish for poace, would give government a degree of popularity, sufficient to Goy them through the inquiry, with some degree of credit; on the contracy, should he remain firm, tien, in the event of war, (which must inevitably ensue, from the tenor of their last communication to the French government,) they might hope, that the apprehension in many, of lessening the energies of the country, or of distracting its councils by political acrimony at a moment when unanimity and vigour was become so essential from the nature and importance of the contest, would shield them from that censure in which they well knew enquiry into their conduct stace the period of the treaty of Amiens, would lead the new opposition to endeavour to involve them. This reasoning of the administration was fully borne out by the event. Popular indignation and resentment were too strongly excited, by the series of aggression, insult, and hostility, which appeared to have marked the conduct of Bonaparte since the peace, and which were elaborately and connectedly detailed in his majesty's declaration, not to call eagerly for war, without dwelling upon the weakness, in ensistency, and irresolution of those counsels, which had suffered them to attain to such an height, as left no alternative save hostile measures. And in parliament Mr. Pitt and those who acted with him, not only supported the principles on which the war had commenced; but when investigation of the conduct of ministers had produced the dreaded motion of censure, they opposed going into their merits or demerits, as tending to promote disunion, at a crisis so momentous. For the opinions of the best informed and most enlightened of the statesmen of Great Britain, on all the subjects connected with this chapter, we beg to refer our readers to the proceedings in parliament, detailed at sufficient length in the early part of our "History of Europe;" some of which our limits would not here allow of a more minute relation; such, were the improvident reduction of our flect and army, during a period, when France was straining every nerve to put both those establishments upon the most extensive footing.—The relative insignicance of Lampedosa*the inconsistency and folly of clogging the negociation at Paris, with Lampedosa is a small uninhabited island, between Malts and the coast of Tunis, belonging to the crown of Sicily. It feeds a few sheep and goats; and a frigate may with tolerable security anchor in its roads. conditions conditions for the king of Sardinia; of whom no mention had been made in the treaty of Amiens, and in wise cause ministers had, more than once since that period, formaly di claimed any interest.The alarming deficit in the public revenue—the unconstitutional and dangerous conduct of concealing from parliament the real state of the country-and the delusive asstirannos of peace, constantly held out to tem public, at a time when tue e aumiation of tranquillity was, it not morally impossible, at least extremity problematical. The Ocial Corre pondence" appanded hereto, will afford every requisite degree of supplemental information, on the subject of the causes of renewed hostility. 64 From the manner in which we have descanted on the conduct of the EngEsh government, during a short and feverish interval of peace, it must ot be supposed that we do not think the war commenced with France, abstractedly considered, as just and necessary. It ever there existed one to which both those epithets could be applied with scrupulous propriety, the present is that one. The series of unprovoked insults and injuries offered by France to Great Britain; and her alarming and despotic interference in the affairs of the rest of Europe; however they might have been passed over by a too timid or 109 concihating administration; are not the less the legitimate objects of British resentment and British vengeance. Our end and aim have been (and in which we beg not to be mistaken) independently of the narrative of the leading events which tail within the limits of our volume, to point out the evils which must ever arise to a great nation, froni having its concerns entrusted, in times of danger and difficulty, to the guidance of weak and wavering councils-from the abandonment of those principles of sound policy which have come down to posterity, sanctioned by the practice of the wisest nations-from the adoption of a temporizing system, and doctrines founded on momentary expediency-from the ceding the minutest point in debate to a powerful and ambitious rival, by which alone national honor could be compromised, without providing for national security-in fine, from that pusillanimity which, become apparent in trivial concessions, must merely tend to produce farther and more important requisitions. Had the determinations of the existing government of Great Britain, since the peace, been governed by principles such as these; we are confident that either Bonaparte would have been forced to recede, long since, from his unjust and tyrannical projects; or that England would have recommenced the contest, with a veteran and numerous military establishment;→ a well-equipped and increasing marine;-the conquests of the last glorious war in her possession ; —steadfast and powerful allies: altogether forming an aggregate of natural and acquired strength,with which,(under providence) weil directed, she might reasonably have hoped to secure the liberties, and avenge the injuries of Europe. From the consequences to be apprehended from the very opopsite line of conduct pursued, may that providence be her protection! That no degment on this most important subject may be wanting to our readers, the addition apers" shall be inserted in the following volume. CHAP. " - 1 AP. XIX. nions thereon-State of both Countries Warfare which each naturally resolves French West India Islands by England etend her conquests on the continent.te army of General Mortier-Operations there mz occupied by the armies of the French republic.— a vessels in the Elbe and Weser impeded-Blockade y al “pa of the mouths of those rivers.-Farther violation e by the French.-Preparations of Denmark susmies invade Naples and the territories of the Pope. entum occupied by them at the same time.-French zug Great Britain-Preparations therefor-Means of er power.-Holland and the Italian republic compelled engage in the war.-Unjustifiable detention of all the ers residing in France.-Great national exertion and British nation.-Volunteers.-French and Dutch colonial Soms attacked.-St. Domingo lost to the French.-St. Lucie and taken.-Gallantry of the British force.-Demerara and Isse475 /czxon.—Present views of Bonaparte.-Situation of France and end at the conclusion of the year. N the 18th day of May his maΟ jesty's declaration against Fence was laid before both houses of parlament; the reasons therein as sgoed were very universally allowed to be sufficient grounds of war, had the ministers of Great Britain done their duty: there were many how ever, who asserted, that if, instead of a teeble and inefficient administration, the country had possessed one every way worthy to direct the energies and resources of a great empire, and support its national character, the aggressions of France might have been early prevented by timely remonstrances, and hostilities averted. Those who thus thought attributed that accumulation of injury, which rendered the war inevitable on the part of Great Britain, at least as much to the incapacity of the existing government, as to the encroaching spirit of France, and the restless ambition of her ruler. In whatever causes it might have originated, or in what manner it might have been avoided, were questions however, which respected more the responsibility of the English ministers, than the necessity of commencing war: and it was universally allowed, that the uniform system of hostility, aggression, and insult, exercised by the French government for the last twelve |