of the agent; and, consequently, no more guilt can attach to a man for performing vicious actions, than for contracting ophthalmia or cholera morbus. On that supposition, the moral sense is a mere bias, predisposition, or feeling, as independent of reason or reflection as the sensation of hunger or of heat and cold. But we feel and believe that there exists a difference between human actions, one class of which we approve and another we condemn. Whence does this difference arise? The organic formation is independent of the volition of the sentient being. Is morality, then, wholly independent of volition? According to this system, it must be. The developement of the particular organ is no more an act of individual volition than it is an act of our will to be born; and where the organ is not developed, there can be no moral sense, no discrimination of actions, no "knowledge of good and evil." Will it still be maintained that a man is responsible for his actions? Is a man guilty of a crime in dying of inanition, when he lacks wherewithal to procure sustenance? Who ever thought of blaming a man struck with palsy for not feeling pain from the sharp instrument that lacerated his insensible flesh? No more is he criminal for committing or omitting certain actions, for the avoi avoiding or performance of which Nature has accommodated him with no organic developement. What, then, is morality? Dr Spurzheim tells us that those actions are good which God has commanded, and those are of an opposite character which he has forbidden. Mr John Horne Tooke came to the very same conclusion from tracing the laws of Etymology! Let us assume that both are correct in this definition of morality, (a point, be it remembered, which we concede only for the sake of argument,) then what signifies the command of Heaven to those who want the particular developement which the command presupposes? To those who have been so fortunate as to be "constituted" with the requisite organ, the command is unnecessary: to those who want that organ, the command is useless, senseless, insulting. On either view, it is difficult to conceive of what possible use a positive command, or, in other words, a direct revelation from heaven, can be to a human creature so situated.

"Thou shalt do no murder," says the law. But a man has the organ of "Destructiveness:" what, then, becomes of the command if this organ predominate? It must inevitably be violated. But the same Being who utters the command created the organ; that is to say, God calls on a human and responsible creature to do that which it is physically impossible he should ever be able to perform! But if it be alleged, in opposition to this tremendous conclusion, that there exists in the mind a controlling, regulating, and balancing power, wer, by which the tendency of a particular organ may be counteracted at the will of the agent, there is, in that case, an end to the system which Dr Spurzheim advocates, for we are merely conducted back to a tenet which, though incompatible with his organic developements, has formed part of the received creed of mankind in all times and nations. If, again, it be denied that one organ can exert any control over another, the eye over the ear, or the organ of morality over that, for ex ample, of "Philoprogenitiveness;"what, let us inquire, is the meaning which the Phrenologist attaches to the term GUILT? A command supposes a power, or capacity, of obedience, Where is that power lodged? Is there a special organ developed on purpose? How is that organ connected with others, and what is the particular link that binds them together? If there be no organ, there can be no such power; if there be a power, there must, according to the principles of Phrenology, be an organ: the Phrenologist cannot assume the existence of any power till he has discovered its organ. No more can he assume, without proof, that one organ can influence or control another. What is the result of all this? It is this, that the moral sentiments of men depend on the pre-existence of a particular organic configuration. If this be not Fatalism, we shall be happy to be favoured with a new and more correct definition of that term.

But farther. In opposition to the doctrine of Spurzheim, we hold that all our moral determinations, so far from being the result of organization, are nothing more or less than the inferences deduced from a process of reasoning. Sometimes that process is rapid and almost intuitive; at other times it is the result of a more length ened train of induction. But the highest truths in Geometry, elaborated by the most intense and profound cogitations, are no less firmly believed than the most elementary propositions. The infinite approximation of the hyperbola to its assymptotes, or the description of equal areas in equal times by the radius vector of a planet revolving in an elliptical orbit, may be rendered as palpable to the understanding as the equality of the radii of a circle. It is just so in Morals. Some of the truths lie on the surface, as it were, and solicit the inspection of all men, and impress themselves on the minds of all. Others, again, are the result of lengthened processes of reasoning. In every action, or series of actions, in which men engage, there is a right and a wrong-there is a moral fitness and an unfitness-there is, in short, always an alternative left open for the choice of the agent. But how are the right and the wrong to be discovered, but by abstracting, comparing, weighing, and selecting-in a word, by reasoning? If morality consisted merely in feeling, this could never be the case, nor could our moral sense any more than our sense of vision be affected by the dictates of the understanding. It is no objection to this that we feel approbation and blame according as our attention is directed to virtuous or vicious conduct. Is it possible to apprehend what is right, without being conscious of this feeling? The latter is, we conceive, a necessary consequence of the former. Morality, as we have already said, does not consist in the feeling, but the feeling is the natural, not to say necessary, consequence of the antecedent morality or immorality of a particular action. It is impossible to know, a priori, that a good action will afford pleasure: in the order of time, the action must have been first performed; therefore it is impossible, that the character of goodness or virtue can consist in the feeling of approbation, which is the consequence of the prior performance of a good action. To give an illustration; when Pythagoras discovered that the on the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle was equal to the sum of the squares described on the sides containing the right angle, he ran into the streets in an ecstasy

of wild delight, vociferating, " I have found it, I have found it!" Now, the pleasure which this beautiful discovery afforded the Patriarch of taciturn philosophers, was surely very different from the truth discovered. So it is in morals. The qualities of an action do not depend on human sentiment, though they influence it. Human sentiments vary. Child-murder is no crime in China: prostitution is not only tolerated, but applauded, in Otaheite: in France and Italy people laugh at cicisbeism and adultery. But are infanticide, prostitution, and adultery, less criminal on that account? In whatever the essence of virtue may consist, there can be no doubt that it implies more than a simple feeling, or, as Dr Darwin would say, " a result of sensible configuration." The feeling is a mere adjunct, exerting as little influence on the abstract morality of the action, as the ecstasy of Pythagoras on the truth of the proposition in elementary geometry, which he was so fortunate as to discover. The great characteristic of virtue, indeed, has been long ago specified by Tully. "Etiamsi a nullo laudetur naturâ est laudabile." For more ample information on this interesting subject, we beg leave to refer the reader to Dr Price's Review of the most important questions in Morals, a book which may fail indeed to produce conviction, but which yet remains unanswered.

A system of education which involves the doctrine of Fatalism must, in our apprehension, be inconsistent with itself. It is true, that Dr S. admits the improveability of the moral, as well as the intellectual faculties; but the cultivation which he admits as possible, is that which results from habit alone, in the same manner as the sight of an Indian is rendered more acute, and the sense of feeling in blind people more delicate, from the constant habit of attending to the distinct intimations of these respective senses. Upon this principle, therefore, education can do nothing in the way of reclaiming those under an evil influence; these must remain in a state of hopeless exclusion and reprobation; susceptible of being usefully impressed by no ameliorating principle; and capable of being delivered from guilt only by annihilation. Now, although we believe with Dr S. that there is a great original difference (in degree)

between men, we cannot possibly admit that there is the same original diversity in the capacity of moral judgment. All men are nearly upon a level in their primitive perceptions of right and wrong. Their understandings may, indeed, be confined, and their fancy obtuse and dull, but benevolent nature has provided, that they shall be more on a level in appreciating the rule of conduct. For this, we apprehend, there is a very sufficient reason. It is not necessary that all men should be great philosophers or great poets; but it is necessary that they should all, if possible, be good men. Hence the equality in moral perception for which we are contending. On any other supposition, it is impossible that punishment could either be just in itself, or cor

misconceived the drift of that system, which, we will candidly confess, appears to us, at present, so repulsive. Our readers will perceive, that we have studiously avoided all reference to the religious tendency of Craniology, a forbearance which we think amply justified by the sincere religious, and moral feeling, under the full influence and ascendancy of which the book before us appears to have been composed.

As a specimen of the author's style, we select the following observations on the unprofitableness of commencing a course of polite education with the study of the classics.

"The most tedious study for children, is certainly that of the dead languages. I am convinced, that thereby many children are disgusted from learning things to which

that men have erred knowingly, and wilfully, with a full anticipation of all the consequences of their actions, and an adequate power to eschew them. It is chiefly on this principle, too, that, to use a strong word, we assert the omnipotence of education. Dr S. has admitted, that ""common people, when tempted, easily yield." Hence it happens, that the greatest violations of the laws are generally committed by persons of this class. Amongst the higher orders of every country, we never almost find instances of robbery, burglary, swindling, forgery, pickpocketing, &c.; and to what is this to be ascribed, but the influence of education? Nature has created no aristocracy of virtue. Were we to illustrate still farther the effects of self-denial and education, we should quote the story of Socrates and the physiognomist, and refer to the ancient Stoics, as a proof to what a pitch of moral grandeur human nature may be raised, even when disciplined according to a system far short of perfection. Upon the Phrenological System of institution, no such a consummation, however devoutly to be wished, is practicable. According to the "New Philosophy," that which is good already may be made somewhat better, but that which is evil is irreclaimable, and to attempt its renovation would argue both folly and ignorance. This, we believe, is a fair inference from what has been already stated; but it will certainly afford us real pleasure, to find that we have

had they been taught them in their own language in a practical way. Many others are drilled by indefatigable pains to become classical scholars, and nevertheless fail to distinguish themselves. Some good Latin and Greek scholars, when they come to practical business, are left behind by fellow students, who at school were undervalued. The quantity of Latin words crammed into the heads of the students, does not give them the primitive power of reflection, nor does it serve to cultivate at

tention. On the contrary, that constrained and yawning study, renders their conceptions slow and indolent.

"The spirit of the ancient languages, however, is declared to be superior to that of the modern. I allow this to be the case, but I do not find that the English style is improved by learning the Greek. It is known, that literal translations are miserably bad, and yet young scholars are taught to translate, word for word, faith

to their dictionaries. Hence those who do not make a peculiar study of their own language will not improve in it by learning, in this manner, Greek and Latin. Is it not, then, a pity to hear, what I have been told by the managers of one of the first institutions of Ireland, that it was easier to find ten teachers for Latin and Greek

than one for the English language, though they proposed double the salary to the latter? Who can assure us that the Greek orators acquired their superiority by their acquaintance with foreign languages? or is it not obvious, on the other hand, that they learned ideas and expressed them in their mother tongue ?

"It is farther said, that it is interesting to know Latin and Greek, in order to understand the etymology of modern languages. This is true; but, with this view,

11

and the great Lord Mansfield of the latter. Is it really certain, as Dr Spurzheim assumes, that boys will learn science more readily than parsing, and show less reluctance to angles and alkalis than to longs and shorts? We think not.

We conclude with earnestly recommending, both to the scholar and the general reader, this able and easily accessible work.

THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE.

"If you don't find him black I'll eat him; He said then full before their sight Produced the beast, and lo! 'twas white!"

MR EDITOR,

We are eager to persuade ourselves that we live in a free and enlightened age, and are apt enough to bless our stars that we were born under a system, the refinements of which, as we suppose, may justly entitle us to exult over the delusions which misled the judgments of our forefathers. Every period of the world has, no doubt, had its own peculiar notions of right and wrong; and by these notions, whether ill or well founded, mankind have ruled both their actions and opinions. It has, however, been left to the present age to be visited with a plague, which has strangely affected the understandings of menand which has imparted its own tinge to the native springs of mind,-and this to an extent, perhaps, hitherto unparalleled.

What I allude to is PARTY SPIRIT, whose essence we may conceive embodied in a prowling Cerberus, having three heads, WHIG, TORY, and DEMOCRAT, one or other of which barks and howls incessantly at every traveller on his voyage to preferment. Like Satan of old, walking to and fro over the earth, this Cerberus seems now permitted to roam free and unrestrained over our island. Yet we would fain address to it the words of Hamlet, "Rest, rest, perturbed spi

rit."

The intrusions of party spirit are become almost universal, and its howlings are heard everywhere. In former times they were chiefly confined to the important movements of the helm in state affairs; but now its influence extends throughout,

VOL. IX.

and pervades all classes and descriptions of society. Let us take a desultory view of the effects arising from its ill-starred agency.

When, in time of war, a general is to be appointed to the command of an army, if the candidate's notions of political wisdom chime not in strictest unison with those of the party in power, he has no chance of success, although, to the most consummate knowledge of military tactics, he united the intrepid perseverance of the first general of antiquity.

If, either in war or peace, a Chancellor of Exchequer is wanted, the qualifications for office are magnified, or underrated, according to the prevalence in the cabinet of Whig or Tory principles; and if a man's knowledge of all the intricacies of finance were drawn from demonstration, as palpable as the simplest problem in Euclid, he must succumb to a weaker candidate, if supported by the stronger party. The same all-trying question of Whig or Tory, that leveller of all other pretensions, determines, alike, the election of every member in the cabinet, and magistrate in the borough.

If a professor is to be elected to a university, or a teacher to an academy, his political creed, not his scholastic acquirements, must now become the passport to office. It is of no importance, that the lessons to be taught lead not to the remotest glance at politics. It may, and it does sometimes happen, that the humble candidate for office has interfered so very little with politics, that he has no distinct idea of the difference between Whig and Tory. But did his humble ambition aspire to no higher office than that of a ringer of bells in St Giles's steeple, his success will depend on his penchant for Whig or Jacobite airs, or upon the political tenets of those who back his pretensions.

But further, if even a newspaper is to be admitted into a family, the question is not asked, with what ability is it conducted? or, with what industry and judgment does its Editor cull his selections from all that is passing in the world? No, the most important criterion for its choice, or rejection, is, whether do its columns support the Whigs or the Tories?

One might, indeed, imagine, that our sacred religion would exempt its

C