mark upon Mr. Woodbury's proposition to make at least all the banks employed by the Treasury liable to bankruptcy. We cannot conceive how such a plan was ever for a moment thought of— much less how it could have been deliberately committed to paper, by any one claiming as his authority the words of the Constitution granting power "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies."

We next turn to the question of the expediency of making corporations liable to bankruptcy. Cui bono, after having proved its unconstitutionality? some one may inquire. Of course it cannot be expedient to do that which the Constitution forbids; or, what amounts to the same thing, that which it gives neither the direct or implied power to do. But some, perhaps, may still have doubts in regard to the constitutional question; and to them we would address a few words, premising that several of the arguments which we have already used, seem to have, apart from their force in that connexion, great weight in determining this point of expediency. We shall not stay to point out their obvious bearing.

What would, probably, have been the present condition of our country, had a bankrupt-law, such as the one contemplated, been in operation at the time when all the banks throughout the Union recently stopped specie-payments? Can we suppose that the Executive would have let slip this opportunity of crushing the Bank of the United States-the monster, which had risen from its grave to "fright from their propriety" those who had once been happy in the thought that even its ghost would never haunt their troubled dreams of crushing it, though every bank in the country perished with it? Does the history of the past teach us that we could have hoped for Executive indulgence? The people have not experienced it; how much less would it have been granted to the banks? Their stoppage has been the main subject of ribaldry and abuse in the Administration journals; though, perhaps, with the object of hiding, under the color of indecent exultation, real chagrin at the failure of the great currency-experiment. Is it said that Congress could have interposed its protection, as several of the State legislatures have done in the recent emergency? Not to say any thing concerning the probable disposition of the majority in either the Senate or House of Representatives, we need only observe that Congress is a much more unwieldy body than the State legislatures: it cannot be convened as summarily, it cannot act as promptly, as they. The mischief would have been done-the business concerns of the country would have been in almost inextricable confusion before relief could have been extended. Again, is it said that the bankrupt law could itself provide for such an extreme case? It might pro

vide for this case, and leave many others unprovided for. It is contrary to the genius of laws that they should argue from particulars to generals; or, to state a little broader principle, it is impossible to foresee every concatenation of circumstances, which may render the operation of a law destructive of the public good.

It seems to be a necessary inference, from the language of the Constitution, and the circumstances of its adoption, as well as a dictate of sound sense, that no unnecessary powers, even though expressly granted, should be exercised by the General Government; in other words, that the rights of legislature should be left to the States in all cases which do not require the interposition of Congress. Now, we are in favor of a bankrupt law, such as we think was intended by the words of the Constitution-a law applicable to individuals only; to what, or whether to any particular class of individuals, we will not at present inquire. We think that the evils of our present varied and conflicting systems of jurisprudence, in regard to bankruptcies, call for the establishment of uniform laws on this subject throughout the Union. But the evils to which we allude do not exist in the case of corporations-especially in that of banking companies. To be satisfied of this fact, we need only ask what these evils are. Let us look at the most prominent of them, and examine whether they are not confined to the ordinary State bankrupt systems, which operate on individuals or natural persons only.

It has been judicially decided that a State cannot make bankrupt or insolvent laws, which shall operate upon contracts entered into in any other State, or even within its own bounds, with a citizen of a sister State. It has, indeed, been doubted whether any contract can be discharged thereby, since the Constitution forbids State laws to impair the obligation of contracts. The unfortunate debtor, then, though rescued from imprisonment at home, is liable to it if he passes the boundary line of his own State. Though discharged from his debts to his fellow-citizens of Pennsylvania, he is yet bound to satisfy those contracted in New-York, or with its citizens. Had these points been otherwise determined, still the evils which would arise from the separate legislation of each State on this subject are various, though the enumeration of them here is unnecessary. Now, corporations, as we have before remarked, cannot be imprisoned; and in almost every case-invariably in that of banks after the distribution of their effects, any further proceedings against them would be useless, and therefore never attempted; or, if attempted, could injure no one but the person instituting them. Congress, certainly, could not claim the right of making the stock-holders of a bank personally responsible for its debts. Even

granting that it has the right to make corporations--such as it finds them, created by the State governments--liable to bankruptcy, and to distribute their assets, the doctrine of implication, in its most unbounded extent, could never embrace a power to change entirely the nature of these bodies-to make them partnerships instead of corporations.

An evil growing out of that which we have just mentioned is, that individuals being thus liable on account of foreign debts, notwithstanding their discharge from domestic claims, pay the former, and then take the benefit of a bankrupt or insolvent law at home, when they have nothing left to satisfy the latter; thus defrauding a large body of their creditors. As we have just shown, banks would have no such motive for giving a preference to any particu lar class of creditors.

Again, a State bankrupt law may, perhaps, require domestic to be preferred to foreign debts. Of course, from the nature of banknotes, no distinction of this kind can be made in regard to their redemption. And any attempt to give a preference to particular stock-holders, in the distribution of a surplus, cannot be reasonably feared, since such a law, in its operation, would recoil against the interests of the State, by preventing all besides its own citizens from becoming stock-holders in its institutions. As regards other debts, we remark, that one State may protect itself, in a good degree, from the unequal operation of the laws of another, by attachment and distribution of the effects and credits of the foreign bank, within its own precincts, which would generally bear a larger pro. portion to the corporation's debts within the same than is usual in the case of insolvent traders. The want of proper notice to creditors of other States is considered an evil in the operation of State bankrupt systems; but banking affairs are necessarily much more notorious than the circumstances of individuals. The intelligence of a bank's insolvency is carried on the winds to every part of the Union-of the commercial world. But we may conclude this matter by observing, that there is at present little danger of any State's adopting such a narrow policy-a policy as injurious to its own interests as to the rights of sister States.

We think that we have proved that the measure recommended to the consideration of Congress is unconstitutional, and even if it were otherwise, inexpedient. But we cannot close this paper without noticing the inconsistency of the recommendation with the course of the past and present administrations, and with the context of Mr. Van Buren's recent Message. The Executive distributed a large surplus revenue among a multitude of State banks, encouraged them to increase their issues and accommodations, and

proclaimed, with the greatest confidence, the entire success of the experiment all this to show that a bank of the United States was unnecessary. The first adverse breath prostrated these Government pets-the United States Bank is accused, not of producing, but of being unable to relieve from the difficulty, and a bankrupt law is proposed as a just punishment for the general default. But why a uniform bankrupt law for corporations, if bank-notes are no longer to be received in payments to the United States? If such a measure were brought forward as a preliminary to establish these paper issues as a lawful currency, we should at once see the object. But now, it seems rather like a gratification of vindictive feeling than the result of sharp-sighted policy. We might have supposed that the bankrupt law was intended for the protection of the people-indeed the recommendation speaks of it as an "effectual remedy given to the citizen;" but then, the open avowal in other parts of the message, of the doctrine that Congress has nothing to do with the people's distress, but should occupy itself wholly in relieving the embarrassments of the General Government, precludes such a supposition.

We close our remarks by quoting the words of Mr. C. H. Wil. liams, a Representative for Tennessee. "I entreat this committee," said he, "to pause, and calmly take into consideration the grand schemes of relief as proposed by the organs of the President in this house. First, we are called upon to postpone until doomsday the fourth instalment, under the deposite law of June 23d, 1836; secondly, to give indulgence on the merchants' bonds; thirdly, to cut loose the Treasury from all banks, and rush into the golden age, and make the pockets of your officers your Treasury, which would increase, by the President's own showing, the already enormous expenses of the government sixty thousand dollars per year; and, fourthly, (as if conscious that the measures proposed would produce universal bankruptcy,) a bankrupt law, as a winding. sheet for the deposite banks, is called for-an apt and appropriate provision on the catalogue of relief proposed by the Executive."

TO MISS C. E****.

FEW forms are fairer, lovelier than yours

Few cheeks more glowing with health's luscious hue, But think of Age, as father Time endures

And kills your friends around you, robbing you.
My fancy sees you sit, when years betide you,
Uncertain ear, cracked voice, and sightless eye,
Asking a little child who stands beside you,
Who is that aged man that totters by ?--

Ah! now I see you proudly sitting here,

On vine-clad balcony, with lovers plenty;

But nothing will, in your old age appear,

To match the bright star and the rose, of twenty. And let me answer-for I love the task,

And none can answer you so well as I, The question then my fancy hears you ask,Who is that aged man that totters by?

His form was straight enough in olden time,
That now decrepit is, with palsied limb;—
He was not handsome, even in his prime,

But loved sincerely, and a few loved him:
With his old cane you hear his cautious tread,
As if he feared the ground away would fly;
I wish you could but see his hoary head,—
That weary, aged man that totters by.

Oh, would some learned alchemist might bring
His youth again, with all the hope it gave,
The happy thought and vigor of his spring-
Then he was Passion's unresisting slave,
And you would see the worship in a look,
And hear the homage only in a sigh,
He offered to the girl, who him forsook,—
That weary, aged man that totters by.

The bard's prerogative he loved, and woke
The willing lyre to, now and then, a strain
In praise of her, but she, she never spoke
Word in reply, or sang to him again.

And winter after winter silvered o'er

His locks, but he forgot not her bright eye, And dreams, perhaps, of her, as your old door, With his frail staff, he feebly totters by.