battleships constructed were of about 13,200 tons displacement, each costing (inclusive of armaments) about one and a quarter millions sterling. Ten of these were laid down from 1900 onwards and are now on service. When the Dreadnought was laid down in 1905, and heralded as a type that made all previous battleships'obsolescent' if not obsolete, the German authorities thought it worth their while to improve upon that vessel, and so made a start in that competition which has so much exercised, of late, the minds of the British Parliament and people. Consequently, in 1906, a new law was passed under which the cost of German battleships was increased by about 50 per cent., and six large armoured cruisers were decided on as rivals to our ships of mystery '-the Invincible class which were ordered in 1905. Then in July 1907 the British Admiralty presented to Parliament a return of warships, in which nine out of twenty existing German battleships were officially classed as obsolescent.' The German authorities responded by another Navy Act (1908) reducing the agelimit of their battleships from twenty-five to twenty years, and provided for laying down in each of the years 1908-11 four large armoured ships instead of three previously arranged for. German resources had proved capable of coping with the previous programme of shipbuilding, but the latest developments-including the introduction of the rivals to our Dreadnoughts and Invincibles-made necessary great extensions in the means of manufacture of heavy guns and their mountings, of armour and shipbuilding materials. This demand has already been met to a large extent, and in the writer's opinion-formed and expressed before the recent agitation began-there should be no serious difficulty as matters stand in carrying out the programme as amended in 1908, except as regards guns and gun-mountings. Of course, the greatest care and forethought are required on the part of those who are responsible, in order to carry through successfully such a vast undertaking, and, as one whose experience in that kind of work is extensive, the writer can sympathise with the men now bearing the burden in Germany. On the other hand, he feels confident that of late far too much credit has been given in the British Parliament and Press to German industrial resources and possibilities.

One feature of the Dreadnought class is the greatly increased demands it involves for heavy guns, their mountings, and the machinery for working and loading the guns. For instance, a vessel like the Nassau is said to carry twelve 11-inch guns. If they are mounted in pairs, as is usual, each ship will require six sets of heavy gun-mountings and machinery. One of her predecessors of 13,200 tons would have carried four 11-inch guns and have required only two sets of mountings, &c. That is to say, each of the German Dreadnoughts needs as many heavy guns and mountings as would have sufficed to equip three of her predecessors; and there are to be four new ships of the modern type laid down annually instead of three of the preceding class. Con

sequently, twenty-four sets of mountings and forty-eight guns (excluding reserves) are now needed for each year's ships as against twelve guns and six sets of mountings for the earlier annual programme. The demand upon the manufacturer has been quadrupled. Here lies the crux of the output of warships in Germany at the present time, and Admiral von Tirpitz practically admitted it to be so in the Reichstag last December. Armour may also be rather difficult to obtain at times, but probably it does not cause serious hindrance.

In Germany Messrs. Krupp have a practical monopoly of the manufacture of armour as well as of heavy guns and their mountings. According to the Times (the 23rd of July 1908) the firm obtained a loan of two and a half millions sterling during the first half of 1908, primarily for the purpose of constructing new workshops for armaments. It was then stated that Berlin banks had provided the whole sum in advance, so that the German Admiralty had probably determined that these extensions were essential to the fulfilment of their enlarged programme not later than April of last year. It is highly improbable that the whole of this new capital was designed to be employed on extensions of factories for guns and gun-mountings, and it is obvious that the construction of buildings and the provision of machinery and equipment on the large scale contemplated would in itself require a considerable time for completion, before the full effect on output could be secured. Mr. McKenna informed the House that the acceleration of the German programme was ordered in October last and was known to the Intelligence Department within a week or two, so that the Admiralty and the Government became aware of the 'new fact' in November. The Times statement shows that this is not a complete account of the transaction, and that the enlargement of Krupp's works was known months before. Mr. McKenna, when questioned further, stated that the Admiralty had information of what was done in July, but his original statement hardly conveyed that impression, and his hearers certainly took November as a critical date.

In this country the manufacture of items corresponding to those of which Krupp has a practical monopoly is undertaken by many establishments-such as Armstrong and Whitworth, Vickers, Beardmore, the Coventry works, and Woolwich Arsenal. We have also five great armour-plate and gun-steel works; while firms like Firth and Hadfield furnish projectiles and steel. No one more admires the great organisation at Essen than does the writer, and he has been made welcome there: but he considers that this country has a distinct superiority over Germany in the scale and distribution of the aforesaid manufactures. He is also of opinion that Mr. Arthur Lee was mistaken in the assertion made during the recent debate that Krupp's present 'output of guns, gun-mountings, turrets, and other essentials of that kind exceeded that of Armstrong, Vickers Maxim, the Coventry works, Woolwich Arsenal, and, in fact, the whole of

our national resources put together.' It would be interesting to hear what the heads of these and other British firms capable of undertaking this class of manufacture would have to say in regard to Mr. Lee's assertion. The authority for such a statement ought to be given, as it is well known that Mr. Lee has not the technical knowledge requisite to form a trustworthy estimate. Similarly, his assertion that during the last twelve months Messrs. Krupp have increased the numbers of their employés from 68,000 to 98,000 needs examination and verification. Even if it be true, which appears doubtful, one would require to know in which of the many departments of that vast undertaking the increase in numbers has been made. Mr. McKenna was more modest in his estimate of Krupp's capability; including recent extensions it was supposed the firm could supply the component parts of eight battleships in one year': the context showing that the reference was to a possible output of 'guns, armour and mountings.' Mr. Roberts (of Sheffield) during the debate read a letter from a correspondent in Germany to the effect that the German Emperor has an arrangement with Krupp, and that if necessary that firm could make the complete armaments of ten battleships in one year, of course giving them a few months in which to collect the materials.' Mr. Roberts did not authenticate this statement, but said that he knew Krupp's factory was far greater than was needed for Germany's present needs.' In the writer's opinion, even allowing for extensions, Krupp's capacity will be fully drawn upon in meeting the large requirements of the annual programme now in process of execution.

Considerable weight has been attached by Mr. Stead, and by other persons, to the fact that building slips capable of receiving Dreadnoughts have been multiplied during recent years in Germany. Mr. McKenna stated, as if it were an important item in warshipbuilding capability, that Germany already possessed fourteen such slips, and would soon have three others; for this country the corresponding number of slips was said to be seventeen. This was an obvious under-statement of our resources, and attention was soon drawn to the matter by a member (Mr. Renwick of Newcastle) familiar with the subject. The numbers given could only have been arrived at on the basis of some arbitrarily chosen conditions; a much larger number of slips are to be found in private yards, which already are or could readily be made fit for building Dreadnoughts, and Mr. McKenna subsequently admitted as much. This question, however, has no real importance in connexion with the output of battleships in either country. The limit is not fixed by the possible production of hulls or propelling machinery, but by other items above mentioned, and especially by the output of armour, guns, and gun-mountings. Moreover, no country could expect to have orders for seventeen battleships simultaneously, even if it could undertake the work. In

short, this is one of many instances where German capability has been exaggerated. The First Lord introduced into his speech a tribute to the 'extraordinary growth of the power of constructing ships of the largest size in Germany' during recent years; and the fact is undoubted. But when he went on to say that the present productive power of Germany 'will tax the resources of our own great firms if we are to retain the supremacy in rapidity and volume of construction' he did our firms less than justice. To their enterprise and courage in developing resources, not merely for shipbuilding and engineering of all kinds, but for the manufacture of specialities, such as guns, gunmountings and armour, the nation owes a deep debt. In Germany recent expansion has been largely due to the encouragement given to private firms by the receipt of extensive Government orders; and our firms can fairly expect, if they do not claim, similar help; for, after all, these great private establishments are based on commercial considerations, not on patriotic or philanthropic principles.

Recent discussions in Parliament and outside it have brought into prominence once more the question of the relative rates at which warships are or can be built in Great Britain and in Germany. Apart from financial considerations, which often control the rate of advancement in the royal dockyards, or from labour troubles, there is probably little difference between the time now required by leading firms in both countries to build a single ship, each firm doing its best. Other considerations, of course, come into play when a large number of ships have to be built simultaneously, and in that case we undoubtedly have a great advantage as yet. As a matter of fact and experience, apart from the considerations mentioned, British practice in recent years has probably involved somewhat less time than German. Some remarks on this subject made by the writer in this Review for December last may be read by those interested in the subject; and further facts can be found in an able article on 'German Naval Policy' contributed to the last Navy League Annual. In connexion with strikes the following remarks are made in the latter article :

Essen is a hotbed of trade unionism, even though Krupp is regarded as a model employer. In the event of a strike occurring among the many thousand men employed in those huge foundries, the German naval programme would receive a severe check. . . . We therefore arrive at the conclusion that upon the goodwill of the national labour party depends to no inconsiderable extent the materialisation of Germany's maritime ambitions.

Details are also given in that article of strikes which have recently occurred in leading German shipyards, and the author dwells upon the demonstration they have afforded of the power exercised by workmen's organisations. Facts such as these should not be overlooked when estimates of progress in warship construction in Germany or comparisons with British performance are made. It is wise, no

doubt, always to make an allowance in favour of a competitor, in order to be on the safe side, but that allowance should not be unreasonably large. Another quotation from the same article will illustrate this remark:

German shipbuilders have been credited [by the English Press] with perfectly supernatural attainments, and we have even seen it stated that the improved Nassaus are to enter commission eighteen months after the laying of the keel-plate. The most superficial acquaintance with the provisions of current German naval estimates is sufficient to expose the fallacy of such a declaration. As a matter of fact, the German Navy Act contemplates an average period of construction of three years, and it will be remembered that the recent communiqué to the Cologne Gazette confirms that view. Certainly a less period will suffice here, and the Admiralty now fix about two and a third years from date of order as a proper time to be allowed for the largest ships.

Readers unfamiliar with shipbuilding operations may understand better the points at issue if explanations which were given by the writer three years ago in this Review are summarised. Phrases such as laying down,' ' period of construction' and 'dates of completion have been used repeatedly in recent discussions, but not always in the same sense. When a warship is ordered by the Admiralty from a private firm the period of construction' (or contract date for delivery) is usually estimated from the date at which drawings and specifications are received by the builders. A large amount of preliminary work has then to be done in preparing orders for materials, obtaining them from manufacturers, putting together framing, plating, &c., forming parts of the structure, preparing the building slip, and other matters precedent to commencing erection. Three or four months are usually occupied in these preliminaries, and the 'laying down' of the vessel-i.e. the commencement of the erection of her structure on the building slipis later by that period than the date of order. If a ship is built in a royal dockyard similar considerations hold good, but not unfrequently sufficient information and drawings are sent to enable the preliminary stages to be passed through before the complete design-drawings are furnished to the dockyard. The extent to which the work of preparation is carried before a ship is laid down' on the building slip may be, and often is, considerably varied. In some instances this work has gone on for several months, and many hundreds of tons forming parts of the structure have been put together and made ready for erection before the keel is officially laid. In some cases, indeed, a considerable amount of erecting work has been done on the slip in the royal dockyards before the keel was nominally laid. In these circumstances, obviously, erroneous ideas may be formed of the time really necessary for building a ship-taken from the date when the design-drawings and specifications are supplied-if the