fighting value. The latter doctrine has been preached so long and loudly in this country during the last four years that it has found many converts here, and possibly also in Germany; but the naval authorities of that empire are not among the believers in that fallacy, and have given evidence again and again that they are not. They cherish no illusions, but fully recognise the enormous preponderance in power of the British Fleet, and it is folly to attribute to them the desire to provoke a conflict in the near future. We have reason to be ashamed of the wild talk which has been indulged in by some writers during the last few days, and for an assertion that 'unless the Government can be induced or forced . . . to lay down eight ships in the next few months, and to order that those vessels shall be pushed on night and day, our naval supremacy is doomed, and our national life, our Imperial existence, are worth little more than two years' purchase.' While the talk of a possible invasion of Great Britain by German military forces goes on here, in Germany the possibility of a repetition of the 'Battle of Copenhagen' and the destruction of the German Fleet by the British is troubling the minds of many people who sincerely desire the existence of friendly relations between the two countries. The writer speaks of what he knows in regard to German feeling, and regrets to add that the indiscreet utterances of some of our fellow-countrymen, whose position and knowledge render inexcusable what has been said by them, have given colour to the suspicions and fears of Germans. Is it not time that this unnatural and unnecessary irritation should cease? Germany and Great Britain must be rivals in industry, trade and commerce, and also in naval power; but there need be no reason for a permanently hostile attitude, which even now exists chiefly, if not exclusively, in the minds of a limited number of irresponsible but noisy persons on both sides.

One great aid to a better understanding would undoubtedly be found in discarding the stupid and provocative folly of secrecy which was adopted by our Admiralty in connexion with the Dreadnought and Invincible classes in 1905, and has been carried out since by Germany much more effectively. Surely there can be no reason for hiding, or attempting to hide, information as to the dates at which warships are ordered and laid down, or the proposed dates of completion. The German Navy Acts really contain this kind of information so far as the intended programme is concerned. If for any reason changes in that programme should be made, although there is no obligation on the part of the German Admiralty to make the facts known, there would undoubtedly be less chance of suspicion of ulterior purposes, or possible intention to accelerate progress, changes of plan were made openly. On our side the corresponding information as to the immediate future has been published and

discussed during the debate. On the German side there has been a semi-official communiqué. If it should happen in the course of the coming debate in the Reichstag that the German Government should decide to make known officially the present position of shipbuilding affairs, and its intentions for the coming year, the only ground for possible misapprehension would be removed, and the feeling of mutual confidence—which every right-thinking man must desire and pray for-would be re-established.

W. H. WHITE.

POSTSCRIPT.-The following facts for British and German warships, which will not exceed twenty years in age in the year 1912, were stated by the Prime Minister in the debate on the 22nd of March, after this article had passed into the printer's hands. It is a matter for regret that Mr. McKenna did not present the figures to the House of Commons at the commencement of the debate, and in advance of his comments on recent construction in Germany. If this course had been followed there would have been no approach to a 'scare.'

A considerable number of the British armoured cruisers are distinctly superior to some German battleships in offensive and defensive power. The British battleships have 152 12-inch guns in their armaments; the German battleships forty 11-inch. British cruisers carry sixty-eight 9.2-inch guns as against six 9-4-inch guns carried by the German cruisers.

When it is remembered that this mighty fleet' will be supplemented in 1912 by at least sixteen completed Dreadnoughts, and that twenty such vessels will be ready if the four 'contingent' Dreadnoughts are laid down, while Germany anticipates the completion of thirteen ships only by the autumn of 1912, it must be admitted that no true reason exists for anxiety as to our naval strength three years hence in comparison with Germany; or that the accelerated completion in that country of any possible number of Dreadnoughts by that date can threaten our superiority, since we can build as fast, and probably faster.

Some remarks made by the head of one of the greatest private firms in Great Britain since this article was written may also be

mentioned. Mr. Thomas Vickers, of Sheffield, whose authority and experience on the subject are exceptional, is of opinion that wild statements have been made in some portions of the public press regarding the possible output of the great shipbuilding and armament works of this country.' Mr. Vickers asserts in regard to that output that the United Kingdom need not fear comparison with any foreign country.' Mr. Vickers is personally well acquainted with the manufacturing resources of Germany, and his estimate of relative capabilities will be preferred by most people to those of amateurs, in or out of Parliament. W. H. W.

1909

A RUDE AWAKENING

LIKE Rip van Winkle, the country has awakened from a long sleep and has found things much changed. This sleep was recommended by the First Sea Lord about a year ago, and, trusting in the watchfulness of the Admiralty, the public dropped off with a sense of perfect security and absolute confidence. The feeling expressed in the formula, 'Anyhow, the Fleet's all right,' gave rise to a settled conviction that no danger was to be apprehended from any potential enemies by sea. The Army might be inefficient, the War Office might be rotten, but the Fleet! Fortunately, there was no doubt about that. But what an awakening and what a disillusion! A confession by the Government that they too had been sleeping and had failed in their duty as custodians of the national safety. Out of their own mouths they stand condemned. They confess that in last November they knew of the acceleration of the German programme and yet did nothing to counteract its effect. They acknowledge that they did not know, what everyone else knew, that this acceleration had been determined on six months previously. In addition, they based their advice to Parliament as to the number of Dreadnoughts which we ought to build on a false idea of the rate at which the Germans could turn out their ships. Could anything be more fatuous or show a greater disregard of the charge committed to them, whether they took this course through ignorance or in the interests of a popular Budget? Even now they refuse, presumably in deference to the Little Englanders in the Cabinet, to take the only steps which can remedy these unfortunate mistakes. In this respect I am confident they entirely misjudge the effect which these disclosures have had upon the public mind. Without going too deeply into technical details, the ordinary citizen has got it into his head that nothing less than the laying down of eight Dreadnoughts will give him that feeling of security which the revelations of the last few days have so rudely disturbed, and, what is more, he means to have them. The Government will find that this frame of mind is one not to be trifled with, and the sooner they recognise it the better. Mr. Asquith seems to forget, in his denunciation of the agitation that is going on in the country, that it is due entirely to his own speech on the 16th ult.

He admitted in that speech the serious position we shall be in a few years hence, and showed plainly that unless immediate steps were taken to counteract the accelerated programme of Germany our superiority in the North Sea would be in danger of disappearing. Yet he now refuses to take those very steps which, on his own showing, constitute the minimum of safety. Can he grumble if the country has taken him at his word? Can he be surprised if the country has made up its mind to have these eight Dreadnoughts at any price? And, above all, has the Government forgotten the question of 'cordite' which wrecked the last Liberal administration? It is all very well to say it is not a party question. I quite agree that it is a national question, and it is the nation that has taken it up and means to see it through.

There can no longer be any doubt that the public is genuinely alarmed at the statements made by the Prime Minister and Mr. McKenna as to the relative strength of the British and German navies in the near future. For the first time for two hundred years people are beginning to realise that our supremacy at sea is being challenged by a neighbouring Power. I have said the country is alarmed, and, I think, not a little angry too, with the Government for neglecting its duty and allowing a rival to steal a march on us. Yet I doubt if it even yet quite appreciates the menace to our national existence disclosed by the recent admissions of the Government. It is not merely the approaching equality in numbers of Dreadnoughts which makes the situation so serious, but the interior lines on which our rivals can work. This is an advantage from a strategical point of view which it would be difficult to exaggerate. While our battleships must of necessity be scattered all over the world, Germany will be able to keep hers concentrated, and will always have a preponderance in the North Sea. The limited coal-carrying capacity of her ships alone makes it obvious that they are built for service in home waters; besides which, Admiral Tirpitz has stated that the German fleet is for service in the North Sea. Then, again, the power of concentration which the Kiel Canal has given her is an advantage of the first importance. Taking all these matters into consideration, can it be wondered at that Germany rejected our somewhat undignified and childlike suggestions for mutual disarmament at the Hague Convention? An arrangement by which our supremacy would have been assured for all time could hardly commend itself to an ambitious and self-respecting Power. The advantages were all on our side, and it is hardly to be wondered at that the honesty of our intentions should be doubted and that an amused incredulity should have greeted our protestations of disinterestedness. In any case, we could hardly expect our powerful neighbour to acquiesce in an arrangement which, though it suited us admirably, must have been extremely galling to her. The challenge was bound to come