standing, even in the highest quarters. Thus Admiral Tirpitz maintains in private conversations that the only suggestion or proposal ever made by England was that Germany should restrict her Navy. On the other hand, the Germans are incensed at the manner in which, according to them, their official assurances concerning the realisation of their programme are ignored by British Ministers. It is apparently impossible to get German naval circles to realise, or, at least, to admit, the justice of the British standpoint, as set forth by Sir Edward Grey, that in this vital question England cannot afford to take any risks. Germany having, by persistent and systematic effort, become the second naval Power in Europe cannot be expected to permit either France or Russia to recapture that position. Consequently all her promises are necessarily contingent upon the action of others, as, indeed, Rear-Admiral Weber, of the Navy League, frankly admitted to me when speaking of the exaggeration of Prince Bülow's statement that Germany would not add a single ship to her programme if England were to build a hundred Dreadnoughts.

It is clear, from this unanimous German refusal to consider the possibility of a naval understanding, that England will be obliged to continue the defensive policy which she has hitherto pursued. This conclusion is confirmed by the following statements made to me, which are in close agreement with others which I am not at liberty to publish. All show that the few isolated voices raised in favour of an understanding on the real issue which divides the two peoples are in a hopeless minority for all effective Parliamentary purposes.

I

REAR-ADMIRAL WEBER, one of the most prominent officials of the German Navy League, began by observing that an understanding of the kind proposed by Sir Edward Grey on the basis of British naval superiority was impossible between two great peoples. Prussia had once been reduced to such a position after the peace of Tilsit, when France forced her to limit her army. That was, however, at the close of a disastrous war. That two great nations like England and Germany should come to such an understanding in time of peace was quite out of the question, as that would always keep one of the two weak and incapable of defending its own interests, while the other would always be in a position to impose its will. For Germany to agree to any such arrangement would be to stamp herself as a second-rate Power. As Prince Bülow had explained in the Reichstag, Germany's aim was to have such a fleet as would make even a stronger Power think twice before attacking her. If Germany had too small a fleet she would always be at the mercy of England. The naval programme was adopted by Parliament eleven years ago, and every one knew exactly what Germany was doing. Mr. Asquith's statement

was erroneous and unfounded. The promise to give the construction of ships to two firms was made purely with the object of securing better terms, and did not in any way hasten the construction.

Admiral Weber then dealt with the practical objections to Sir Edward Grey's proposal. He denied that an agreement fixing the number of battleships to be built by Germany at, say, one-half or one-third of that of England would guarantee peace. He was convinced that the same people who now assert that German armaments are directed against England would then contend that Germany was constructing stronger ships than was provided for by the agreement. It would be impossible effectively to refute that assertion, which would find ready credence in England. It would be alleged that Germany was deceiving England, and a constant state of mistrust on both sides would be the result. Thus the attempt to avoid complications would cause still more serious difficulties. It was England who began to build Dreadnoughts, and but for her example Japan, the United States, and France would not have constructed such vessels. At present they were being built by all States, and Germany could not help doing likewise, nor content herself with a weaker type of ship. Up to 1906 Germany had only built ships of 13,000 tons. In that year England constructed the first Dreadnought, while at the same time she had ten other ships of 16,000 tons.

Admiral Weber was convinced that the erroneous statements made by Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna were based upon false information, probably derived from an Argentine or Brazilian source. He further contended that Germany could not build a battleship in less than thirty-six months, while England only requires twenty-four months. In addition to the thirty-six months spent in constructing a German battleship several more were needed for trial trips. He admitted, however, that if the German yards made an effort they could complete a battleship within thirty-six months, but as a matter of fact they had not done so up to the present. At the very best he did not consider it possible for the German yards to equal the rapidity of their English rivals. The crux of the question was the assertion that if Germany continued to build as rapidly as she was now doing, she would have a total of seventeen Dreadnoughts and Invincibles in 1912. That was not the case; Germany would then have only ten Dreadnoughts and three Invincibles. At the present moment they had four Dreadnoughts launched, but they were not yet completed; and one Invincible, also incomplete, which was launched in the latter half of March. That is to say, for actual fighting purposes Germany had at the present moment not a single Dreadnought or Invincible at her disposal.

After expressing his astonishment at the last six months' agitation, and at the invasion scare, Admiral Weber said he found it impossible to reconcile the attitude of the British Admiralty some three or four

years ago, when it declared the German Fleet to be of little value, and the recent alarmist assertion by British statesmen and prominent British officers that the German Navy was a great danger for England. His association, the German Navy League, regarded the former statement as correct, as at that time, apart from the Braunschweig and Deutschland class, Germany had comparatively few good ships.

The Germans had also read history, and recognised that England had never tolerated any other naval Power of a strength approaching her own. Spain, Holland and France were examples to them of the necessity of being on their guard against that English jealousy. Up to the death of the Emperor William the First, German foreign trade was but a trifle compared with its present extent. Until late in the 'eighties the Navy was under the control of generals, and General Caprivi, for instance, grudged every farthing spent on the Navy, considering that it was taken away from the Army. It was only at the end of the 'nineties that a serious attempt was made to develop a fleet proportional to the growing foreign trade and the colonial possessions of the country. That fleet was intended exclusively for the protection of trade, and not for aggression. He was surprised at the manner in which English suspicions were directed almost exclusively against Germany. France had had a fleet of cruisers capable of inflicting heavy damage on British commerce, and yet there was no apprehension in England on that score. The fact that Germany had so few cruisers (eight at present, and twenty in all on the completion of the programme) showed that Germany had no aggressive intentions against England.

An understanding between England and Germany, which he strongly favoured, should not take the form of a treaty, but consist rather in a conversion of public opinion to more reasonable views, so that those circles now engaged in sowing mistrust between the two peoples would promote a better understanding between them and help them to realise that there was room enough in the world for both nations. After some remarks upon the extraordinary way in which, in his opinion, the English public sometimes flames out into a sudden rage and then subsides into comparative tranquillity without a reason, Admiral Weber pointed out that the burdens of Germany, arising from her constantly extending provision for the poor, rendered it impossible for that country to indulge in any excess in the way of armaments. As to a maritime war, the growth of German industry rendered it necessary to pay a heavy insurance, in the form of a navy, against such a risk. The significance of war for Germany was made evident by the terrible loss inflicted on the whole country by the cessation of trade at Hamburg through the cholera in the middle of the 'nineties. The practical closing of that port for a few weeks cost Germany 260,000,000 marks. It was easy to conceive what the result would be if all the German ports were blockaded.

Admiral Weber, however, does not anticipate that England will ever attack the German Fleet, as a war between the two countries would inflict heavy loss upon Great Britain. Yet, added Admiral Weber, a certain section of the British Navy contends that war should be declared against Germany as soon as possible in order to keep the chance of victory on the British side.

In the further course of his remarks the Admiral observed that the German Naval Law must be developed in accordance with circumstances. When that programme was begun Germany built small vessels, but on England's setting the example in the matter of Dreadnoughts she was obliged to construct ships of the same type. While retaining the number of ships set down in her programme originally, she increased their strength, tonnage and propelling force. The development of that programme depended upon the progress made by Germany's neighbours. She could not afford to remain behind, but, in the opinion of the leading naval officers of the Empire, no increase in that programme was to be anticipated, except under pressure from outside. Prince Bülow's statement, however, that Germany would not add a single ship to her programme even if England were to build a hundred Dreadnoughts was clearly a rhetorical exaggeration. They considered their two fleets, with the additional four ships, as a material reserve,' making thirty-eight in all, sufficient to render it dangerous for any foreign Power to attack them. Although England's suggestion that Germany should limit her fleet was equivalent to a suggestion by Germany that France should not increase her Army, the Germans admitted that England's insular position and her Colonial Empire rendered it necessary for her to maintain a large Navy. But they could not agree that they themselves should build so small a fleet that the German Empire might at any moment be presented by England with an ultimatum, sanctioned by the threatened destruction of the German Fleet and German commerce. It was, he added, highly desirable that some understanding should be come to, but unfortunately he could not see how it was to be brought about.

The relative depreciation of the value of the British Fleet was due to the English policy of building Dreadnoughts, a fact now recognised by English experts. Admiral Weber, however, was far from agreeing with the idea expressed in Mr. Wyndham's characterisation of the bulk of the British Fleet as a casual collection of vessels, which cost the State much money but merely tempted foreign Powers to attack it. For his own part he was disposed to think that an exaggerated importance was attached to the tonnage and character of the ships, and too little to the fighting quality of the officers and crews. In his opinion the victory of Tsushima was due rather to the high training of the Japanese officers and crews than to any superiority in their vessels. (I may add that I have heard another distinguished naval officer, the representative of a foreign Power, express the opinion that

so far as the ships were concerned the Russian vessels at Tsushima were actually superior to the Japanese. He quite agreed with the view expressed by Admiral Weber that the Japanese victory was due to the superiority of the highly trained veteran crews.)

II

COUNT ERNST ZU REVENTLOW, also a retired naval officer, who has acquired a considerable reputation among his countrymen and abroad by his contributions to this problem in the German Press, characterised the idea of abandoning the capture of merchant vessels in time of war as Utopian. Commercial rivalry and jealousy was, to his mind, one of the main causes of the ill-feeling between England and Germany. He himself was convinced that a similar feeling existed in England against the United States, but that Englishmen intentionally avoided giving expression to it for political reasons, and owing to the close racial relationship between the two peoples. British Chambers of Commerce had frequently, by reports from the Far East, aroused apprehensions of German competition, while advocates of Protection had argued that Germany was building a fleet with British money-that is to say, the profits derived from ousting Englishmen from their own markets. As a matter of fact the Germans considered themselves to be constantly menaced by England. As to the suggested discussion concerning a limitation of armaments, he did not see how it could be submitted to the Reichstag. He believed it could only be brought forward in the form of an ultimatum, or as a consequence of a victory by one State over the other. The idea was unpractical, and would be undignified for the State to whom the proposal was addressed. It was impossible to imagine how it could be carried into effect.

It would be a different matter if an effort were made to bring about a rapprochement in the political sphere without any limitation of armaments. For instance, it might have been possible during the past twelve months for the two Powers to have worked together in the Balkans instead of having opposed each other throughout. In the Bagdad Railway question and generally in the Anglo-German rivalry at Constantinople an understanding might have been, or perhaps still might be, possible. England, who had already come to an arrangement with Russia, might conceivably work with Germany in matters in which the navy would not be called in question. Count zu Reventlow believed that British public opinion was now far more favourable to the idea of compulsory military service than it was five years ago. That matter had attracted comparatively little attention in Germany. It was, in his opinion, a noteworthy circumstance that the greater anxiety manifested by England concerning the progress of the German Fleet dated from the winter of 1905, when