supported the King of Holland in his refusal, and in the strained relations between the Germans and the French this still more exasperated men's minds in Germany. The political tinkers in Germany were already talking of all kinds of imaginary compacts said to have been made between William the Second and the Duke of Orleans to conquer Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, and, by spreading wild reports of this nature, added no little to the gravity of the situation. The king in vain sent General Nepveu, one of his aides-de-camp, to Berlin. No understanding could be arrived at, and the Prussian envoy at the Hague, Count Lottum, openly announced that he would soon leave Holland with the whole of his embassy. Just at that time the King of Prussia, Frederick William the Fourth, went to London to be present at the baptism of the Prince of Wales. His intention had been to travel by way of the Hague, but in view of the political circumstances he changed his route in a very marked manner, and went through Brussels. In these critical circumstances William the Second saw there was nothing left but to appeal to the friendship and personal feelings of Frederick William. He resolved to seize the opportunity of the King being in London without any ministers, and far from the men who daily represented to him that the national honour was wounded, to awaken his reminiscences of old friendship and sympathy. Early in January 1842, he sent one of his most trusted councillors and ablest statesmen, Mr. Rochussen, at that time Minister of Finance, to London, to hazard a last effort. It was crowned with success. After two conferences at the residence of the Prussian Ambassador in London, in which the King himself took part, all difficulties were cleared away. All the obstacles which political interests had raised were removed by the personal friendship of the two monarchs. A new treaty was concluded. The Prussian envoy, who had given offence at the Hague by his hasty action, was superseded by another diplomatist. The King of Prussia himself came to the Hague on his homeward journey to shake hands with William the Second; and it is related that Frederick William on that occasion exclaimed, with tears in his eyes, Jetzt habe ich meinen lieben Wilhelm wieder!' But it is upon the common sense of the peoples of Germany and of Holland, even more than upon the historical ties between the reigning houses, that we rely for the future. Princes may depart from the traditions of their houses under the temporary influence of all kinds of circumstances, but civilised and enlightened nations do not so soon lose all self-control and calmness. The manner in which the most gifted representatives of German science have spoken of Holland has more value for the Dutch than the crude articles of a few German newspapers and periodicals. And in Germany, too, it will be understood that what is said or written in Holland under the influence of exaggerated alarm or susceptibility must be taken as a passing phenomenon. Although it may seem out of place at the present moment, whilst the snow on the Balkan is red with the blood of thousands of dead and wounded, to talk of the pacific aspirations of Europe, yet we believe that Germany knows too intimately the meaning of war to wish for it without good reasons. And yet without war Germany would never be able to get possession of Holland. The Rhine would flow back to the St. Gothard before Holland would of her own accord throw herself into the arms of the German Empire. Although that German Empire is nominally one whole, it is not yet so in reality. Several generations must pass away before that unity will be complete. Any one who is acquainted with the state of affairs in Bavaria, and especially in Würtemberg, will know it is still very premature to talk with the German poet of 'Ein einig Volk von Brüder.' Germany-with Poles, Danes, and Frenchmen already within its borders-is too sensible to wish for three millions of discontented subjects always on the brink of rebellion. The harmless vicinage of a peace-loving nation must suit her far better. For, whatever people in Holland may think of Germany or any other power, the government will always retain a lively perception of the fact that the maintenance of strict neutrality is Holland's first duty. A Dutch Cabinet which wished to enter upon an adventurous foreign policy, or to ally itself with one of the great powers against others for the attainment of imaginary advantages, would not, if its policy were known, keep its place twenty-four hours. It would have to yield to the outspoken voice of the national representatives and of public opinion. The general feeling in Holland is wholly averse to such machinations. Yet it would equally oppose every attempt to sacrifice the national independence to the empty glory of forming part, under whatsoever name, of a great empire. For the small powers of Europe only one policy is henceforward possible-namely, to maintain with discretion and circumspection a strict neutrality. On the agitated stage of European politics they play the part of supernumeraries; yet even in that humble sphere they may fulfil a noble calling. If they appear on the sanguinary battlefields of Europe, they come not with the newest weapons that man's lust for slaughter can devise, but under the neutral flag which displays the red cross on a white ground. If they fit out costly expeditions, it is not to extend their territory, but to further the investigations of science amidst the ice of the polar seas or under the burning sun of the equator, or to bring the blessings of civilisation to savage nations. I do not think they are the less happy on this account. What A Dutch scientific expedition is at this moment exploring the interior of Sumatra, whilst a Dutch North Pole expedition will set out this summer. Frederick the Great, in his bad French, wrote to William the Fourth of Orange, still remains true: Les mains ensanglantées qui ceuillissent des lauriers sont souvent detestées pour le mal involontaires qu'elles font et par ces veuves et ces orphelins qui demandent leur père et leurs parents. Il n'y a que les mains pures qui ceuillissent l'olive, qui recoivent les bénédictions d'autant plus sincères qu'elles s'employent réellement pour le bonheur de l'humanité.' W. H. DE BEAUFORT. NOTE. IN the December number of the Nineteenth Century Mr. Dicey makes charges of misgovernment against the Khedive of Egypt, a sovereign whose goodwill and alliance it is important for England to retain. Assuming his charges to be proved by the statements and figures he brings forward, Mr. Dicey advocates the assumption by England of the practical sovereignty of Egypt in the interests of our Empire and of the people of Egypt. Mr. Dicey's charges, however, are based on erroneous figures and statements, and in common justice to the Khedive, who, whatever mistakes he has committed, has undoubtedly devoted his life to the improvement of his country, these mistakes of Mr. Dicey's ought to be corrected. The first charge is that during the reign of the present Khedive he has received over 100,000,000l. sterling more than he has accounted or ever can account for. This result is brought out by showing that he has received in fourteen years 140,000,000%. of revenue and 40,000,0007. net from foreign loans, while his administrative expenditure has been only 4,000,000l. a year, or 56,000,000l., and his outlay on public works 22,500,000l., or say 24,000,000l., together accounting for only 80,000,0007. out of 180,000,000l. received. As a matter of fact, instead of an average of 10,000,000l. a year of revenue, the Khedive's reign began with only 4,250,000l., and up to 1871, before the Moukabala redemption of future taxation began, only reached 7,600,000l. In 1874 the estimated revenue reached 9,600,000l., and the highest estimate that has been made reached the figure of 10,800,000l.; but the experience of the present commissioners gives reason to believe that 10,000,000l. is about the maximum of revenue that has ever been actually received. The period during which the finances were controlled by the Khedive was only thirteen years, namely from 1863-4 and 1875-6 inclusive, the average revenue receipts in that time being certainly not more than 7,500,000l. per annum, giving a total receipt of 97,500,000l. instead of Mr. Dicey's 140,000,000Z. The net receipts from foreign loans Mr. Dicey estimates at 40,000,0007.; but although he has allowed for discounts and commissions, he has forgotten to include interest and sinking fund paid out. The actual net result to the Khedive, esti. mating the 1873 loan to have yielded only 11,000,000l. cash, as stated by Mr. Cave, was about 43,000,000l. But the interest and sinking fund repaid to the lenders amounted to the end of 1876 to no less than 34,000,000l., leaving just 9,000,000l. received from this source. Mr. Cave's estimates give even a smaller result. Adding this to the amount received from taxation, we have a total of only 106,500,000. instead of Mr. Dicey's 180,000,000%. This brings up Mr. Dicey's error on the receipt side to 73,500,0002. On the expenditure side Mr. Dicey has forgotten several large items, such as the debt existing when the Khedive came into power, about 3,000,000l., the tribute to Turkey (not including private black-mail), 8,300,000l., the cost of irrigation canals, telegraphs, bridges, roads, lighthouses, &c., payments for the Halim and Mustapha estates, investments in sugar-plantations, mills and machinery (6,000,0007.). He also estimates the cost of the railroads at only 3,200,000l., whereas they stand in the books of the Egyptian Government, according to Mr. Cave, at 13,361,0007. Mr. Dicey may think this too high a figure, but Egypt is not the only country where railways have cost more than they are worth, and the charge made by Mr. Dicey is that the Khedive cannot account for moneys received by him. Moreover, Mr. Dicey's estimate of the cost of the railways and equipment, 4,000l. per mile, is as impossibly low as the charge in the government's books is unquestionably too high. The following is a fair statement of the items on the expenditure side, derived mainly from the report of Mr. Stephen Cave, but confirmed also from actual knowledge of what has been done. Debt previous to Ismail's succession. £3,000,000 Administration (Mr. Dicey's figures) 13 years at 4,000,0001. 52,000,000 Railways, 1,210 miles. 13,300,000 Suez Canal, harbours, improvements, arms and accoutre- 18,400,000 Purchase of Halim's and Mustapha's estates. 3,000,000 Thus the items of receipt and expenditure on which we have any trustworthy information show an excess of expenditure of 5,500,000l., but there remained a floating debt of about 18,000,000l., as estimated in 1876, which would carry the balance to the other side. How much of this 18,000,000l. consisted of usurious charges, while it was being piled up, it is impossible to estimate, nor can we tell how much the Khedive was required to send privately to Constantinople in addition to the public tribute; but any impartial person would find little difficulty in accounting for the small balance without accusing the Khedive of any financial deficiency whatever. In any case, the charge of having received 100,000,000l. that he has never accounted and never can account for is entirely unsupported by the facts. The next and perhaps the gravest possible charge made against the Khedive is that, to gratify his own greed for land (in Mr. Dicey's own words, the restless greed of power which led him to conceive the ambition of becoming the owner of the land of Egypt and of letting no blade of grass grow in Egypt without his permission'), the Khedive has dispossessed and destroyed the homes of one million of the peasant population, and thus obtained for his own private estates one million acres of land; that he has thereby reduced the productive power of his country, because, as Mr. Dicey shows, large estates can never produce so much as small properties cultivated by the owners. Now, as a matter of fact, the whole estates of the Khedive, according to the report made by Mr. Sandars in 1877, amount to 485,000 acres, of which 170,000 acres have never yet been cultivated, or only to a trifling extent, and 118,000 acres are let to farmers, so that only 197,000 acres, instead of a million, represent the land owned by the Khedive and farmed by himself. But the charge of having dispossessed small proprietors fails even to this comparatively small extent. Mr. Dicey has forgotten or left unnoticed the fact that the greater part of the Khedive's lands were bought from two other large proprietors, Mustapha and Halim Pashas, one being paid 2,000,000l. and the other 1,000,000l. cash and 2,400,0007. in annuities-these two purchases alone representing something like 200,000 acres of good land. The Khedive was also himself a large landed proprietor before his accession, and thus his whole estates and those given to his sons can be accounted for without any dispossession of peasant proprietors whatever. But Mr. Dicey has also forgotten to mention the amount of land reclaimed from the desert by the present Khedive. Mr. Cave found from the Public Register of Egypt: Increase of cultivated land in the reign of the Khedive 1,373,131 Thus the Khedive, so far from taking a million acres away from working proprietors into his own greedy hands, does not retain in his hands more than oneseventh of the cultivated land he has added to the country. To do this he has constructed two main irrigation channels 145 miles in length and 112 minor channels, some 900 miles in all, with 426 bridges. Mr. John Fowler estimates that the irrigation canals excavated in the present reign have involved the excavation of 65 per cent. more material than the whole Suez Canal.' These, with telegraphs, lighthouses, sugar-mills, roads, and large bridges, are classed by Mr. Dicey with the worthless 'follies and caprices of the Khedive'! As regards the productiveness of Egypt we have the following evidence that the Khedive's reign has not diminished it. (Omitting the year 1862, when the high price of cotton only apparently swelled the exports). Within the limits assigned to this note it is impossible to answer all Mr. Dicey's allegations as to the treatment of the fellaheen, represented to be much worse than that under the Khedive's predecessors. Nevertheless Mr. Dicey's representations are not consistent with the facts. However badly the fellah may be treated now, he was treated much worse in past times, and the present Khedive was the first sovereign to endeavour to abolish the corvée system. ALEXANDER MCEWEN. |