Attentive

five hundred imperfectly understood *. reading, frequent reflection upon whatever is read, and application of it to business, are the only guarantees of distinctness of thought and recollection. "As reason," says Lord Coke, "is the soul of the law, it cannot be said that we KNOW the law, until we apprehend the reason of the law; that is, when we bring the reason of the law so to our own reason, that we perfectly understand it as our own; and then, and never before, we have an excellent and inseparable property and ownership therein, so as we can neither lose it, nor any man take it from us: and we shall be thereby directed very much, the learning of the law being chained together in many other cases. But if by his study and industry the student makes not the reason of the law HIS OWN, it is not possible for him to retain it in memory for though a man can tell the law, yet if he know not the reason thereof, he will soon forget his superficial knowledge; but when he findeth the right reason of the law, and so bringeth it to his natural reason, that he comprehendeth it as his own, this will not only serve him for the understanding of the particular case, but of many others: for cognitio legis est copulata et complicata; this knowledge will long remain with him.+"-Let the student, on discovering any leading case, devote his utmost efforts to the mastery of it, in all its particulars-and make fre

"One book," says Phillips, "well digested, is better than ten hastily slubbered ever."-Stu. Leg. Ra. 188.

+1 Inst. 394 b.-183 b.

quent reference to it, in order to test the accuracy of his recollection of it. Let him keep a list of such cases always beside him, and frequently inquire of himself thus: Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 B. & Ald.-what did that decide?-Guarantee must contain consideration for promise.' Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R.-Carrier, consignor and consignee-general principle that the latter must sue carrier for loss.' 'Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. No right of stoppage in transitu as against bond fide assignee of consignee,'-&c. &c. The great advantage of this will be very soon discovered by the student. If he knows a leading case well, all he has to do, on an emergency, is to turn to it in the list of cases in some approved treatise or digest, and he will find it surrounded by all its kindred and more recent cases. Pursue a similar course with reference to statutes. Select those which are of leading practical importance, such as the statute of Wills-of Uses of Entails-of Frauds; and having carefully weighed all the most material parts of them, and considered the questions that have been raised, and interpretations that have been put upon them, minute down in a note book, the substance of each section, as nearly as possible in the words of the act. This will require, however, the very greatest care. Very serious omissions have been made even by those most skilled in abridging and condensing statutes.*

* "A remarkable instance of the necessity of using caution in abridging statutes occurs in the abridgment of the Factor's Act,

If any young reader should consider such labours as these excessive and unnecessary, let him try to state accurately the substance of some of those cases and statutes with the names and titles of which he is most familiar and he may be less disposed to undervalue the importance of the hints now offered. It is impossible here to do more than thus call the student's attention to the necessity of uniform vigilance and circumspection, in order that he may early acquire the habit of reading and thinking with calmness and deliberation. "This study being built upon the per

6 Geo. 4 c. 94, in Abbot on Shipping. This abridgment has always been considered so well executed, that it has been adopted, with but little variation, in every succeeding treatise; and yet one short phrase is omitted, which materially alters the sense of the entire enactment. Lord Tenterden's abridgment, in the work in question, is as follows: "A person entrusted with and in possession of a bill of lading, or any of the warrants, certificates, or orders mentioned in the act, is to be deemed the true owner of the goods described therein, so far as to give validity to any contract or agreement made by him for the sale or disposition of the goods, or the deposit or pledge thereof [AS A SECURITY FOR ANY MONEY OR NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-omitted] if the buyer, disponee, or pawnee, has not notice by the document or otherwise, that such person is not the actual and bona fide owner of the goods." The reader would imagine, from Lord Tenterden's abridgment, that the enactment was meant to give validity to any boná fide deposit, or pledge of goods by any person possessing those indicia of property enumerated at the commencement of the section. He will therefore be a little surprised at finding that in Taylor v. Kymer, 3 B. and Adol. 337. it was held by the Court of King's Bench, that a person with whom goods had been pledged as a security for India warrants, which he had entrusted to the factor who pledged them with him, was held not to be protected by them!-See Leg. Exam. vol. iv. p. 339-340.

fection of reason, requires a constant and serious meditation; and what we apprehend altius quotidiana meditatione figendum est, that being fastened in our minds, and the reason thereof fully considered, habitus fiat, quod est impetus-that bringing it within the verge of his own reason, he may, upon the least summons, find the result thereof *."

SECTION VI.

IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING THE NAMES OF

LEADING CASES.

A READY recollection of the names of cases is a great object with the practical lawyer. What is meant by this is, not the recollection of the name, only, of an important case, and the volume of the Reports where it is to be found-but of the substance of the decision; so that one may be able, at a moment's notice, aptly to cite it in court, or elsewhere. The name of the case and the number of the volume will suffice-as the page can of course be easily found, without burthening the memory with it. Suppose the question under consideration is one concerning the distinction between a penalty, or liquidated damages—the experienced lawyer instantly thinks of Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bingham

Stud. Leg. Ra. pp. 53-54.

-a recent decision, in which all the older ones are discussed, and on the margin of which, perhaps, he discovers his own Ms. notes of several approximating and later cases. He thus gets at once to the heart of his subject-le siège des difficultés-and speedily and satisfactorily disposes of it.

Readiness in thus recollecting and quoting cases is not a less showy than valuable accomplishment-and is therefore sometimes attempted by those who are quite unequal to the task. They can sport, perhaps, the name of the case, and the right volume of the Report; but either wholly forget or misunderstand, and consequently misrepresent, the subject-matter of the decision. An instance of this, equally painful and ludicrous, was given in a previous page*. "And here," says Mr. Raithby," it must be obvious, that the exercise just now recommended, will be particularly necessary to the legal student, who, in the course of his future practice, cannot but have frequent occasions for the use of his memory in the statement of some case or opinion, recollected at the moment, by which his argument may be supported, or his positions enforced with a peculiar brilliancy of effect and illustration. No after-labour can supply adequately the want of this particular power of memory. A man may fill the back of his brief with extracts, quotations, and cases, and yet may omit one that would be more serviceable than all the

* Ante, p. 428.

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