Pagina-afbeeldingen
PDF
ePub

sustain new characters, and new relations; and infer new proprieties of conduct, and of consequence new measures. The conduct, which it would be proper for God to adopt towards a being, whose character and actions are unknown to him, must be also unknown. Every creature, whose character and actions are new, and different from any thing before known, or conceived, must, if he be properly treated, receive a treatment differing from any, before exhibited, or contrived. As voluntary beings are, in a sense, endlessly numerous, and exist throughout eternity; so their actions, being, according to the supposition, unknown to God before they exist, must, in a multitude of instances, literally endless, demand a new treatment, or new measures, repeated in a manner, also literally endless. Of course, not only in his views, but also in his disposition. and conduct, God must, according to this supposition, be the most unceasingly, and absolutely, changeable of all beings.

A being, whose conduct is, and must be, regulated by the actions of others, is plainly dependent on others, with respect to this prime part of his character. He cannot act, as he would originally, and absolutely, choose to act; but must act as their conduct requires him to act. God, therefore, being intimately, and inseparably, connected with all voluntary beings, is in this respect more dependent, according to this supposition, than any other being what

ever.

But, if God did know, originally, all the actions of voluntary beings, and did not choose to prevent their existence in any case; then they were, upon the whole, agreeable to his pleasure; or he chose, that they should exist, when, upon the whole, they were contrary to his pleasure. That he could have prevented the existence of any actions whatever, if he pleased, we certainly know; because he could have prevented the existence of the beings, whose actions they If they were upon the whole contrary to his pleasure, and he yet chose that they should exist; then he chose, that actions should exist, whose existence was upon the whole contrary to his choice; which is no other than a self-contradiction.

were.

Again; if God proposed infinite good as the end of all his conduct; and this end was infinitely dear to him, and is yet not certainly and completely accomplished; it must be because he is not able to accomplish it. This will not be pretended. But, if God does not foreknow the actions of voluntary beings, he cannot be certain of the accomplishment of this end. To the accomplishment of perfect and infinite good, it is plainly necessary, that every thing, pertaining to the system, should be in time, place, nature, and operations, exactly that, and only that, which contributes directly, as well as ultimately, its own proper efficacy to the promotion of this end. A perfect system plainly demands, that every part of it be necessary, and entirely fitted for the place, and operations, assigned to it; and that there be nothing contrary to, or aside from, the general purpose; nothing out of place, or time; nothing super

VOL. I.

3.2

fluous, and nothing defective; in a word, that there be just such means, and so many of them, as will perfectly accomplish the end, and that there be nothing more. But, in the case supposed, the actions of voluntary beings, unless accordant with the pleasure of God, can in no wise sustain the character of proper parts of a perfect system. Just so far, as they vary from this pleasure, they vary from the character specified. It will not be denied, that God is both able, and disposed, to plan a perfect system of good. It follows, therefore, that he certainly has planned such a system. Whatever accords not with his pleasure, upon the whole, accords not with this system; this being the thing, which is agreeable to his pleasure; but must be defective, or superfluous; out of place, or out of time; aside from, or contrary to, the perfection of the system. Consequently, if the actions of voluntary beings be not, upon the whole, accordant with the pleasure of God; he was not only unassured of the accomplishment of the end, which he proposed in creating and governing the universe; but he entered upon this great work without knowing, that it would be accomplished; and was originally certain, that the perfect good, which he proposed, would never exist.

Those, who deny this doctrine, are therefore, unless I am deceived, forced by their denial to acknowledge, that God is a limited, mutable, and dependent being; and that he orignally was, and ever must be, uncertain of the accomplishment of the great end, proposed in his works; or rather that he ever was, and will be certain, that it can never be accomplished. The magnitude of these difficulties I need not explain.

SERMON XV.

THE DECREES OF GOD.

JOB Xxiii. 13-But he is in one mind; and who can turn him? and what his soul de sireth, even that he doeth.

IN my last discourse I asserted, from these words, the following Doctrine:

That all things, both beings and events, exist in exact accordance with the purpose, pleasure, or, what is commonly called the Decrees, of God.

In discussing this doctrine, I mentioned, that I should attempt, I. To Explain it ;

II. To Prove it; and

III. To answer the objections, commonly made against it.

Under the first head, after having mentioned several erroneous opinions, and forms of phraseology, frequently adopted concerning this subject, I expressed my own views of it in this manner: What is commonly intended by the Decrees of God, is that choice, or pleasure, of the Divine Mind, eternally and unchangeably inherent in it, by which all things are brought into being.

Under the second head, I alleged several direct arguments in support of the doctrine; and then suggested several difficulties, which result from denying it. These, by proving the converse of the doctrine to be false, indirectly proved the doctrine to be true: according to the general axiom, that every proposition, or its converse, is true.

I shall now, as I proposed, attempt,

III. To answer the Objections, commonly made against this doc

trine.

These, I think, may be reduced to the following:

1st. That it is equivalent to the Stoical doctrine of Fate, or Destiny:

2dly. That it exhibits God as the Author of sin :

3dly. That it destroys the Free Agency of rational creatures: and,

4thly. That it discourages all the Efforts of mankind towards Reformation.

I will not say, that no other objections are brought against this doctrine; but I think of no others, which appear to be regarded, as material, by those who allege them; or which, if these be fairly obviated, would be supposed sensibly to affect the question in debate. These, therefore, I shall now proceed to consider in the order proposed.

1st. It is objected, that the general doctrine of this discourse, is equivalent to the Stoical doctrine of Fate or Destiny.

The Fate of the Stoics, as explained by Cicero, was of this nature. These Philosophers supposed a series, and it would seem an eternal one, in which each link of the vast chain was the effect of the preceding, and the cause of the succeeding, one: every link being alternately a cause and effect. These causes, so far as I understand the subject, (for it is not very clear, that we understand precisely what was the Stoical doctrine, nor that the Stoics understood, or united in, it themselves) were not considered by them as either intelligent, or voluntary; but as merely coerced by those which preceded, and as coercing those which followed. In other words, the doctrine was substantially the same with that of Atheists concerning an eternal series, which was exploded in a former Discourse. To the irresistible efficacy of this series of causes, the Gods, acknowledged by the Stoics, were absolutely subjected; and Jupiter himself, their supreme Ruler, was utterly unable to resist, divert, or at all change, the order of things, brought to pass by the compulsion of this Fate, or Destiny.

*

He, who can find any resemblance between this doctrine, and that on which the present discourse is founded, must find it by the aid of an ingenuity, to which I can make no claim. I freely own, that I cannot perceive any similarity between an unintelligent and involuntary series of causes, compelling by natural necessity, or coercion, the existence of their consequent effects, and controlling by inevitable necessity the actions of both Gods and Men; and the free, wise, and voluntary, agency of the infinitely intelligent and benevolent Mind, originally planning, and steadily executing, a system of infinite good, according to the dictates of his boundless wisdom, and perfect pleasure. I cannot perceive a similarity, sufficient to enable me to discern in what the professed difficulty lies; or what the real objection is, which I am required to answer. I shall take the liberty, therefore, of waiting until I shall find the objection so stated, as either to induce me to acknowledge its force, or enable me to attempt a refutation.

2dly. It is objected, that this doctrine exhibits God as the Author of sin.

To the phrase, Author of sin, very different meanings are annexed by different persons. In order to meet this objection, therefore, with any hope of success, it will be necessary, in the first place, to determine the true meaning of the phraseology. Some persons understand by it the immediate and efficient Cause of sinful volitions: others, not only mean the efficient, but the guilty, Cause of such volitions: others, still, such a Cause, as in any manner, however remote, lays a foundation for the existence of sin: and others, a Cause, supposed to be intelligent, which, when possessed of sufficient

* See Sermon II.

power to prevent the existence of sin, did not interfere to prevent it. When it is said, that this doctrine exhibits God as the Author of sin; I shall, for the present, consider the phrase, as used in one, or both, of the two first of these senses; and regard the objector as intending, that, according to this doctrine, God is either the guilty, or guiltless, immediate, and efficient, cause of sinful volitions in his creatures: In other words, that he constrains, or compels them to sin. That the doctrine, which I have defended, involves this consequence, I cannot perceive, nor admit.

To support the objection, it must be shown, that God cannot will, and accomplish, the existence of voluntary agents, who, acting freely, shall nevertheless act in exact accordance with what is, upon the whole, his pleasure; and who, in the circumstances in which they are severally placed, and with the attributes which they severally possess, will, with perfect freedom, contribute, each his proper part and efficiency, towards the promotion of the infinite good, originally proposed as the end of the divine system. But this, I apprehend, has never been, and never will be, shown. It must be proved, that in the infinite multitude of possible free agents, present to the view of the divine Mind, there were none, possessed of such attributes, and capable of being placed in such circumstances, as, while they acted with perfect freedom, would also perfectly accomplish the purposes of the divine pleasure. No man will, I presume, attempt to prove this position. If it be granted, that such agents were possible, and that the Infinite Mind discerned their nature and character; it must, in order to support the objection, be proved, that God, having these agents in full view, chose not to select them, and bring them into existence. But this, I presume, will not be admitted by the objector himself. Till this can be done, however, the objection cannot be maintained.

That Sin is in the world, and that the world, with all which it contains, is under the government of God, in some sense or other, must be acknowledged by the objector himself; unless, on the one hand, he denies the divine government absolutely, or, on the other, the distinction between moral good and evil. Sin has, therefore, entered the world in some manner or other, while it was under the divine government. There are three ways, in which men have attempted to explain the difficulty, involved in this fact. Some persons assert, that by his direct efficiency, God caused; others, that he permitted; and others still, that he could not prevent its existence.

That God could not prevent the existence of sin cannot be maintained. He has prevented it in the angels, who kept their first estate. He prevented it in the person of Christ; who in his human nature knew no sin. He has promised, that he will prevent it, and he will therefore certainly prevent it, in the spirits of just men made perfect in the heavens. Should it be said, that these beings, by their own voluntary agency, and without any interference or influence on the part of God, continue in a state of holiness; I an

« VorigeDoorgaan »