ceeded, I deny, that for the defign, the contrivance, the fuitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of inftruments to an use (all which we discover in the watch), we have any cause whatever. It is in vain, therefore, to affign a series of fuch caufes, or to alledge that a feries may be carried back to infinity; for I do not admit that we have yet any cause at all of the phænomena, ftill lefs any series of causes either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver: proofs of design, but no defigner.

V. Our obferver would further alfo reflect, that the maker of the watch before him, was, in truth and reality, the maker of every watch produced from it; there being no difference (except that the latter manifefts a more exquifite skill) between the making of another watch with his own hands by the mediation of files, laths, chifels, &c. and the difpofing, fixing, and inferting, of these inftruments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch already made, in fuch a manner, as to form a new watch in the courfe of the movements which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one set of tools, instead of another.

The conclufion which the firft examination of the watch, of its works, conftruction, and movement fuggefted, was, that it must have. had, for the cause and author of that conftruction, an artificer, who understood its mechanifm, and defigned its ufe. This conclufion is invincible. A fecond examination prefents us with a new difcovery. The watch is found, in the courfe of its movement, to produce another watch, fimilar to itself: and not only fo, but we perceive in it a fyftem of organization, feparately calculated for that purpofe. What effect would this difcovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as hath already been faid, but to increase, beyond measure, our admiration of the fkill, which had been employed in the formation of fuch a machine? Or fhall it, inftead of this, all at once turn us round to an oppofite conclufion, viz. that no art or fkill whatever has been concerned in the bufinefs, although all other evidences of art and fkill remain as they were, and this laft and fupreme piece of art be now added to the reft? Can this be maintained without abfurdity? Yet this is atheifin.

CHAP

CHAPTER III.

APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT.7

THIS is atheism: for every indication of contrivance, every manifeftation of defign, which existed in the watch, exifts in the works of nature; with the difference, on the fide of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean that the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, fubtlety, and curiofity of the mechanifm; and ftill more, if poffible, do they go beyond them in number and variety: yet, in a multitude of cafes, are not lefs evidently mechanical, not lefs evidently contrivances, not lefs evidently accommodated to their end, or fuited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity.

I know no better method of introducing fo large a fubject, than that of comparing a fingle thing with a fingle thing; an eye, for example, with a telescope. As far as the examination of the inftrument goes, there is precifely

the fame proof that the eye was made for vifion, as there is that the telescope was made for affifting it. They are made upon the fame principles; both being adjusted to the laws by which the tranfmiffion and refraction of rays of light are regulated. I fpeak not of the origin of the laws themselves; but fuch laws being fixed, the conftruction, in both cafes, is adapted to them. For inftance; thefe laws require, in order to produce the fame effect, that the rays of light, in paffing from water into the eye, fhould be refracted by a more convex furface, than when it paffes out of air into the eye. Accordingly we find, that the eye of a fish, in that part of it called the cryftalline lenfe, is much rounder than the eye of terreftrial animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this difference? What could a mathematical inftrument-maker have done more, to fhew his knowledge of his principle, his application of that knowledge, his fuiting of his means to his end; I will not fay to display the compafs or excellency of his fkill and art, for in thefe all comparison is indecorous, but to teftify counfel, choice, confideration, purpose ?

To fome it may appear a difference fufficient to defroy all fimilitude between the eye

and

the

the telescope, that the one is a perceiving organ, the other an unperceiving inftrument. The fact is, that they are both inftruments. And, as to the mechanifm, at least as to mechanifm being employed, and even as to the kind of it, this circumftance varies not the analogy at all. For obferve, what the conftitution of the eye is. It is neceffary, in order to produce diftinct vision, that an image or picture of the object be formed at the bottom of the eye. Whence this neceffity arifes, or how the picture is connected with the fenfation, or contributes to it, it may be difficult, nay we will confefs, if you please, impoffible for us to fearch out. But the prefent question is not concerned in the enquiry. It may that, in this, and in other inftances, we trace mechanical contrivance a certain way; and that then we come to something which is not mechanical, or which is infcrutable. But this affects not the certainty of our investigation, as far as we have gone. The difference between an animal and an automatic ftatue, confifts in this,-that, in the animal, we trace the mechanifm to a certain point, and then we are ftopped; either the mechanifm becoming too fubtile for our difcernment, or something

C3

be true,

elfe