their origin which this theory affords. Including under the word "fenfe" the organ and the perception, we have no account of either. How will our philofopher get at vifion, or make an eye? How fhould the blind animal affect fight, of which blind animals, we know, have neither conception nor defire? Affecting it, by what operation of its will, by what endeavour to fee, could it fo determine the fluids of its body, as to inchoate the formation of an eye? or, fuppose the eye formed, would the perception follow? The fame of the other fenfes. And this objection holds its force, afcribe what you will to the hand of time, to the power of habit, to changes, too flow to be observed by man, or brought within any comparison which he is able to make of past things with the prefent: concede what you please to thefe arbitrary and unattefted fuppofitions, how will they help you? Here is no inception. No laws, no course, no powers of nature which prevail at present, nor any analogous to these, could give commencement to a new fenfe. And it is in vain to enquire, how that might proceed, which could never begin.

I think the senses, to be the most incon fiftent

fiftent with the hypothefis before us, of any part of the animal frame. But other parts are fufficiently fo. The folution does not apply to the parts of animals, which have little in them of motion. If we could fuppofe joints and muscles to be gradually formed by action and exercife, what action or exercise could form a fkull, or fill it with brains? No effort of the animal could determine the clothing of its skin. What conatus could give prickles to the porcupine or hedgehog, or to the sheep its fleece?

In the last place; What do these appetencies mean when applied to plants? I am not able to give a fignification to the term, which can be transferred from animals to plants; or which is common to both. Yet a no less fuccefsful organization is found in plants, than what obtains in animals. A folution is wanted for one, as well as the other.

Upon the whole; after all the struggles of a reluctant philosophy the necessary resort is to a Deity. The marks of defign are too strong to be got over. Design muft have had a de. figner. That defigner must have been a perfon. That perfon is God.

CHAP.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF THE NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE

DEITY.

T

Ir is an immenfe conclufion, that there is a God; a perceiving, intelligent, designing Being; at the head of creation, and from whofe will it proceeded. The attributes of fuch a Being, fuppofe his reality to be proved, muft be adequate to the magnitude, extent, and multiplicity of his operations: which are not only vaft beyond comparison with those performed by any other power, but, fo far as refpects our conceptions of them, infinite, because they are unlimited on all fides.

Yet the contemplation of a nature so exalted, however surely we arrive at the proof of its exiftence, overwhelms our faculties. The mind feels its power fink under the fubject. One confequence of which is, that from painful abstraction the thoughts feek relief in fenfible images. From whence may be deduced the ancient, and almost universal, propensity

to

to idolatrous fubftitutions. They are the refources of a labouring imagination. Falfe religions usually fall in with the natural propen-> fity: true religions, or fuch as have derived themselves from the true, resist it.

It is one of the advantages of the revelations which we acknowledge, that, whilst they reject idolatry with its many pernicious accompaniments, they introduce the Deity to human apprehenfion, under an idea more perfonal, more determinate, more within its compafs, than the theology of nature can do. And this they do by representing him exclufively under the relation in which he ftands to ourselves; and, for the most part, under foine. precise character, refulting from that relation, or from the hiftory of his providences. Which method fuits the span of our intellects much better, than the univerfality which enters into the idea of God, as deduced from the views of nature. When, therefore, these representations are well founded in point of authority, (for all depends upon that,) they afford a condefcenfion to the ftate of our faculties, of which, thofe, who have reflected most upon the fubject, will be the first to acknowledge the want and the value.

Nevertheless,

Nevertheless, if we be careful to imitate the documents of our religion, by confining our explanations to what concerns ourselves, and do not affect more precision in our ideas than the fubject allows of, the several terms, which are employed to denote the attributes of the Deity, may be made, even in natural religion, to bear a sense, confiftent with truth and reason, and not furpaffing our comprehenfion.

These terms are, omnipotence, omniscience, omniprefence, eternity, felf-existence, neceffary existence, fpirituality.

"Omnipotence," "omniscience;" infinite power, infinite knowledge, are superlatives ; expreffing our conception of these attributes in the ftrongeft, and moft elevated, terms, which language fupplies. We ascribe power to the Deity under the name of " omnipotence," the ftrict and correct conclufion being, that a power, which could create fuch a world as this is, muft be, beyond all comparison, greater, than any which we experience in ourfelves, than any which we obferve in other visible agents; greater, also, than any which we can want, for our individual protection and preservation, in the Being upon whom we depend. It is a power likewife, to which we