Special Interest Politics

Voorkant
MIT Press, 2001 - 364 pagina's

This landmark theoretical book is about the mechanisms by which special interest groups affect policy in modern democracies. Defining a special interest group as any organization that takes action on behalf of an identifiable group of voters, Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman ask: How do special interest groups derive their power and influence? What determines the extent to which they are able to affect policy outcomes? What happens when groups with differing objectives compete for influence?

The authors develop important theoretical tools for studying the interactions among voters, interest groups, and politicians. They assume that individuals, groups, and parties act in their own self-interest and that political outcomes can be identified with the game-theoretic concept of an equilibrium. Throughout, they progress from the simple to the more complex. When analyzing campaign giving, for example, they begin with a model of a single interest group and a single, incumbent policy maker. They proceed to add additional interest groups, a legislature with several independent politicians, and electoral competition between rival political parties. The book is organized in three parts. Part I focuses on voting and elections. Part II examines the use of information as a tool for political influence. Part III deals with campaign contributions, which interest groups may use either to influence policy makers' positions and actions or to help preferred candidates to win election.

 

Inhoudsopgave

Introduction
1
11 SIG Activities and Tactics
4
12 About This Book
14
Voting
39
Voting and Elections
41
21 Direct Democracy
42
22 Representative Democracy
53
23 Electing a Legislature
64
65 Educating Members
210
SIG Leaders with a Broad Mandate
214
Campaign Contributions
221
Buying Influence
223
72 The Allocation of Public Spending
231
73 Multiple Policy Instruments
233
74 Regulation and Protection
236
75 Bargaining
241

Groups as Voters
75
31 Turnout
76
32 Knowledge
87
33 Partisanship
95
Information
101
Lobbying
103
41 One Lobby
105
42 Two Lobbies
118
A More General Lobbying Game
136
Costly Lobbying
141
51 Exogenous Lobbying Costs
143
52 Endogenous Lobbying Costs
159
53 Access Costs
169
Educating Voters
183
61 The Election
186
62 Early Communication
192
63 Late Communication
199
64 Endorsements
208
Competing for Influence
245
81 The Politician as Common Agent
247
82 The Minimum Wage
254
83 Compensating Equilibria
263
84 Trade Policy
268
85 Redistributive Taxation
273
Good Thing or Bad Thing?
277
Influencing a Legislature
281
92 A Legislature with an Agenda Setter
289
93 Multiple Interest Groups
297
Contributions and Elections
317
101 Electoral Competition with Campaign Spending
319
102 One Interest Group
326
103 Multiple Interest Groups
337
References
345
Index
355
Copyright

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Over de auteur (2001)

Gene M. Grossman is Jacob Viner Professor of International Economics and Director of the International Economics Section at Princeton University. Elhanan Helpman is Professor of Economics at Harvard University, the Archie Sherman Chair Professor of International Economic Relations in the Eitan Berglas School of Economics at Tel-Aviv University, and a Fellow at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.

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