Expeditions disproportioned to the nature of the service required were planned, and even these were so managed as to become a parade of weakness instead of strength. This is a humiliating picture, but it is true nevertheless; and it had the effect of stimulating the war spirit amongst the natives. The moral effects of this inglorious campaign were widely felt in the North island. Fresh spirit was diffused throughout the whole of Maoridom. Success had attended their appeal to arms. By adopting our definition of the quarrel they had put us in the wrong, and justified their acts of violence and rebellion; by standing resolutely at bay they had baffled and defeated our military leaders, dispirited the army, and extorted from the colony the concession of a truce, which left all substantial advantages on their side, and gave them time to recruit their strength and complete their plans of organization. They had done something even more than this (great as were these triumphs), because it appealed directly to their lust for plunder, which is the major passion of the Maori race. They had succeeded in despoiling a fair settlement, and obliterating almost entirely every trace of occupancy by civilized Homesteads were burned down, the settlers were driven into a little town within a few yards of the ocean by which they came, and their property had gone to reward the enterprise and valour of their assailants. This was a tangible result, which the least acute native could understand; and doubtless it has had its effect on the Maori people. Everything promised to become as it had been in New Zealand's palmiest days, when powerful chiefs led their naked warriors to battle and returned laden with spoil.

men.

The warlike prestige of the race was restored; and in one province at least, the power of the Crown and the colony had been unable to protect the settlers. Was not everything tending to that happy state of things, so admirably described in "Old New Zealand," when the pakeha trader paid the chief in whose settlement he was resident, for protecting him against friends and strangers? Truly this appeared to be the case, but on a larger and more magnificent scale than it had ever been seen in "the good old times."

Let us see how this conviction was brought home to the native mind. It will be recollected that we pointed out what we consider the great political blunder of the period, and showed how the evil effects of that mistake were strengthened by the unsuccessful conduct of the campaign in Taranaki. Instead of retracing our steps during the truce, the political blunder regarding the casus belli was continued. In fact it was made the base of the new pacification policy of the Government. Being totally beside the real question at issue, we are not at all surprised at the failure which attended that scheme. But as a main part of the means to the great end of peace, and the establishment of law and the supremacy of the Crown in the colony, this scheme is deserving a passing word of comment. It was by no means an original plan. There was not a single feature of novelty about it; but after all, there was a good deal more of honesty underlying the new policy than its opponents gave its authors credit for originating. It was based on the assumptions that selfishness is the great motive-spring of human actions, and that although this is undoubtedly true it is a dangerous experiment to appeal directly to human selfishness. A little management must therefore be resorted to if it is to succeed.

Doubtless the pleasure is as great

Of being cheated as to cheat,

when done on a large scale; and our political Solons were prepared to do an extensive business. They gilded the pill, therefore, with a spice of novelty-something to tickle the palate, to flatter the vanity, and minister to pretentious individual weaknesses. The pill was a simple bribe; the gilding, the new institutions. There was something for everybody. If all could not be assessors, many could be wardens or policemen; and those who could not carry the policeman's baton, or sit in the curule chair, might have seats at the runanga. For the sake of appearance, every male of the tribes who accepted the new institutions could not well be public pensioners; but to make up for that, was there not an army of Government officials appointed to dispense the gratuities of the colony? It was an excellent plan, based on a correct estimate of human nature, and might have succeeded in the end but for three conditions which had been overlooked by its authors. First, they shut their eyes to the real cause of the war, and proceeded on a false issue; second, they began their new system at a time when its triumph should have been assured, if tried at all; and third, the gifts which it was in the power of Government to bestow, were not equal in value to the plunder acquired in war by the "free lances" of the Maoris, nor was the novelty of judicial proceedings and noisy runangaing to be set in the same balances with the excitement of fight and the intoxication of victory. The new institutions failed in their object. We have explained why we think this failure was brought about; and we would not have adverted to the subject at all were it possible to overlook that pretentious plan, for the development of which the Imperial Government and mother country, as well as this colony, waited with remarkable patience for two years, and appropriated money with benignant complacency.

To the last moment, even after blood had been shed in the second Taranaki campaign, maugre the failure of the pacification scheme, the political leaders of the colony perpetuated the same gross political blunder about Waitara. They talked of Waitara, wrote of Waitara, almost wept over Waitara. Everything in their mind turned on Waitara; and the wily diplomatist Thompson, took advantage of this political infatuation and boldly challenged the Governor of the colony to recognise the supremacy of the King in return for his nominal interference in regard to Waitara. There was then a chance of the new policy succeeding. The interest in the game of diplomacy was at its height at that time; and our player, too intent on his own game, forgot to consider minutely the positions of his adversary. A concession is made; the King movement is not to be recognised, but it is not to be put down by force. It was, therefore, un fait accompli. The natives were masters of the situation, and soon acted as if they knew they were so. The Queen was held in check by the King's knight. The whole fabric of the new institutions suddenly crumbled to the dust, and the minions of the Maori potentate threatened the same fate for Auckland, Wellington, and Hawke's Bay that had befallen Taranaki. The supremacy of the Maori was nearly established; and, as we have said, even after blood had been shed in Taranaki, in May, 1863, in defence of the inviolability of Maori territory, with culpable infatuation on the part of the colonial authorities this bloodshed was set down to the account of Waitara.

Let us proceed more in the order of events, however, and go in imagination to Taranaki early in the present year, shortly after the unfortunate concession to the symbol of Maori sovereignty, mentioned above, had been made. The Governor, impressed with the conviction that he had won the day, instead of being circumvented by Thompson, as he really was, accompanied by the representative men of his Ministry, and the General commanding the forces in New Zealand, went down to that province to effect the reinstatement of the settlers. He proceeded cautiously, feeling his way as he proceeded. First, the Waireka hill was occupied by the troops, and a redoubt (Poutoko) built there by order of General Cameron. Next, a movement was made towards Tataraimaka, and on its southern boundary another redoubt was built and garrisoned by the troops. There was no opposition. It is true the political atmosphere seemed charged with combustible elements, but the portentous clouds might dissipate, and all be well. There was no positive resistance to the occupation of the Tataraimaka block, and the soldiers were at first welcomed by a few Maoris at the Kaitake river. The land held by conquest had been quietly ceded, it was said, and the air rang with the jubilant shouts of those who sang the triumphs of the "new" policy. All is well. The Governor wisely kept in the back-ground all reference to Waitara the unblessed. He spoke only of his own-of the lands held under Crown grants, from which the settlers had been expelled by armed bands of rebellious natives; and these blocks were occupied in the manner described. It was a military occupation, and so far it answered the purpose; but no settler would go upon the land. They saw the unsubstantial character of the proceeding. They felt that they could not recommence their labour of improving the soil, and creating capital in the districts out of sight of the military camps; and afterevents proved that in the vicinity of a camp life was unsafe.

For a time the Court bulletin was uniform in its tone: everything is going on as well as can be expected; but by-and-by the storm burst. It was necessary to cross a block of unalienated land to get upon the Tataraimaka block, and this violation of the sacred soil of Maoridom by the soldiers was resented by the massacre of the 4th of May last. And once more we are forced to refer to that crowning political blunder to which reference has been already made. It is the last act in regard thereof we will be compelled to mention. The massacres took place on the Oakura block, and our political Solons groaned "Waitara!" Without loss of time an apologetic proclamation was issued, confessing to the Maori people our fault in having had anything to do with the purchase, but giving a slightly different version of the document in English. Surely this will satisfy the Maori magnates! Has not the Governor confessed his sin and the sin of his predecessor; and has the confession not been countersigned by the Colonial Secretary on behalf of the colony? And again the spirits of the admirers of the "new" policy rose with the occasion, and the wisdom of the concession and its justice were duly extolled. That it was not a wise concession, we think will appear from what we have written; and that it was not an act prompted by a sense of justice is apparent from the time, the mode, and the terms, of the concession. It was the crowning act of political folly of this strange history, and it was committed with fear and trembling, to propitiate the bloodstained champions of Maori independence.

We need not pursue this subject further. Events are too recent to require detailed narrative; and we will only add that as soon as all ground of excuse for war on the score of Waitara had been removed by the surrender of our title to Waitara, the natives boldly threw off the mask, and avowed by acts an intention to maintain by force the advantageous positions they had gained in the first campaign, and subsequently confirmed by diplomacy.

The day of "Waitara" politics is now over. There are those who still cling to this Shibboleth of party with a fondness more to be pitied than blamed. Their affection is natural. On Waitara they rose to power, and floated on the treacherous stream; but as where its tide mingles with Ocean's wave, a swimmer would sink to rise no more, so they, when the conflicting forces met, which Waitara and Ocean aptly illustrate, disappeared from the political arena where, for a season, they played a conspicuous part. One word alone is needed to confirm our views regarding the aspect in which the hostile natives actually regarded Waitara. When we relinquished all right and title to the block, we left the native disputants, King and Taylor, as they were at the first. Taylor denies King's right to the block and holds possession, and the natives who fought against us, on the plea that King was an injured man, pay no further heed to the matter. Even King looks with an indifferent eye on the "bedroom" of his tribe, and aspires to be a magnate in the new kingdom south of the Waikato.

We have brought down our review of the events of the war for the subjugation of the natives, to a period when it is necessary to refer more particularly to the military operations of the second campaign in Tarauaki. For the sake of the continuity of the narrative we must occasionally refer to political matters as we proceed, as the action of the General commanding the forces has been influenced to a certain extent by the position taken up by the civil power. It will be recollected that as soon as the Governor resumed possession of the southern section of the Omata block, General Cameron gave orders for the construction of a redoubt upon that block. The Potouko redoubt was accordingly built, and a military post established. Our occupancy was unquestioned, because as yet we had not violated native territory; and it does seem strange at first sight, that the General commanding should establish a fortified post on a line which was not menaced by a foe, and at a time when the head of the Government of the colony led the country to believe there was no enemy to be feared. It was fortunate for the country, however, that the command of the army devolved on a veteran officer, whose vision was not obscured by the political haze which surrounded him. All might be peaceful, as was represented; but like a prudent soldier, he put on his own armour of defence, and calmly awaited the issue of events. After the occupation of Potouko, reinforcements arrived from Auckland, and the troops advanced through the Oakura block to Tataraimaka, which the natives claimed as territory conquered from the Crown during the first campaign. A redoubt was built on the southern boundary of this block, and the General, with admirable foresight, provisioned it for a month. But why, let us ask was this precaution taken by the commander of the forces, seeing that the natives welcomed the troops when they first appeared on the debateable ground? The friendly greeting by the natives filled the civil authorities with joy, and

the mercury in the peace thermometer rose to almost boiling heat. It was clear, however, that in that season of rejoicing there was one man who did not consider the aspect of affairs entirely satisfactory. As yet, no overt act was committed by the natives. The line of communication between New Plymouth and Tataraimaka was still open, and the military passed without interference. But this state of things was not of long continuance. The natives soon began to show signs of a determination to stand upon what they considered their rights, and preserve the inviolability of the King's territory. An ambush was laid on the Oakura block, to intercept any Europeans passing over that unalienated piece of land. The first ambush, the existence of which the Government affected to discredit, failed in its object; but a second ambush was more successful. The slaughter of Dr. Hope and his companions, on the 4th of May last, at the Wairau stream wrote in bloody characters the native manifesto, that they were prepared to do battle to the death in vindication of their territorial unity. The King's territory must be preserved inviolate.

We must look upon this bloody deed, not so much in the light of an ordinary capital felony, as an act of retaliation, the political significance of which the natives intended the authorities to understand. The ambush was laid on native territory, and the victims were armed soldiers of the Queen, passing over that territory without native permission, on military duty. We do not palliate the great crime of which the natives were guilty, but we contend that the action of the authorities, from March, 1860, up till that period, led the natives to conclude that their unalienated land should be respected; and as "the law of fighting" still continued in force in Taranaki, notwithstanding the truce, they knew no better mode of expressing their resentment at the trespass than by recourse to bloodshed. But the result of this action on their part was very different to what they might have anticipated from past experience. While the civil authorities hastened to humble themselves before the gory rebels, and apologised for having had anything to do with Waitara, General Cameron took possession of the Oakura block, and fortified a camp on a commanding eminence, which opened the line of communication to the outpost at Tataraimaka and menaced Kaitake, the hill pa of the rebels on the Tatara range, from which the party planting the ambush had descended to the plain.

We have seen the General preparing for a struggle, which his plan of operations, as developed, proves he had anticipated from the first. His work is now finished; his armour is buckled on; and he quietly bides his time to strike. We have also seen the authorities, on whom devolved the management of the affairs of the colony, act with irresolution, and make damaging concessions through the pressure of fear. On the one hand there is the spectacle of a wary soldier, more politic than the politicians; and politicians without a policy, grasping at every straw which appears on the turgid flood of social turmoil, in the vain hope that by such slender aid they could float themselves to a "fair haven" of repose and peace. It was in vain our politicians grasped at straws. The surrender of Waitara did not propitiate the natives. We have stated that the natives only pleaded Waitara as an excuse for their rebellion, because it was the excuse supplied them by the crassitude of colonial politicians; and now this truth is manifest. They do not thank the Government for