neral Terms; but when we come to particular Facts, we fhall fee it vanifh, or fall into Inconfiftence and Contradiction: let us put it to a Trial.

:

Upon Mr. Locke's Scheme, it is evident that Hunger must be the Effect of a Reflection made on the Benefit or Pleasure of Eating; that when a Man has filled his Belly with good Grapes, and the Pleafure of eating them or of eating any Thing else is fresh on the Memory, he will then have the greatest Appetite; and that in proportion to the Time he is fafting, and that the Idea of the Pleasure has been receding off his Memory, the Appetite for them muft decrease it also follows from this Scheme, which fuppofes the Love to follow from the Perception of Pleasure, that before young Men or Women fall in Love, it is neceffary they fhould lead impure Lives; confequently that no Perfon in a Virgin State could feel the tender Paffion; and that after the nuptial Happiness, the Ardours and Defires of Lovers fhould increase; all of which are contrary to Fact, and demonftrate that our Paffions and Appetites do not arife from our Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain; on the contrary, there is nothing of which we have a clearer Knowledge than that the Enjoyment, instead of giving Birth to the Appeite, or raifing it, tiates us, and that the Appetite is juft laid when we have eat or drank to our utmost Satisfaction, while yet the Pleasure is freshest on the Memory, which is utterly inconfiftent with Mr. Locke's Scheme.

3. In fact it is manifeft, that it was the utter Repugnance of the Truth to his Scheme, that made him mifs the Truth when he came fo near to it as to acknowledge, that it was not the Idea of the greateft pofitive Good, or of the greatest Evil, that determines the Will or creates Defire, but the present Uneafiness: for if Good, Happiness, Pleasure, Self-love, or Self-intereft, (for he has thifted thro' all thefe Changes) be the ruling Principle of Man ;

by

by what Logick or Reasoning can it be fuppofed, that the leffer apprehended Good determines the Will more powerfully than the greater, which may not ferve to prove that Two Pounds are heavier than three Pounds, and that Twelve Inches are longer than Twenty-four Inches; when he faw clearly that the greatest acknowledged pofitive Good, and the greatest Evil did not determine the Mind, but the. greatest present Uneafinefs: it was then very natural to afk the Queftion, What other Confideration, befide the greateft pofitive Good and Evil, forms the prefent Uneafinefs? the Answer is readily found; the present Uneafinefs is formed by the prefent Paffion or Appetite; and confequently Good, Pleasure, Happiness, Self-Love or Self-Intereft, are not the ruling Principles of Man, or the Springs. of the Paffions and Defires.

It had been happy for Man, if Pleasure and Pain formed the Spring-Head of his Actions, and the Memory of Good and Evil directed him through Life; but the human State is governed in a very different Manner: our Inclinations and Appetites impel us with Tyranny, and the Returns they make us in Pleasure, are inadequate and trifling; we see and acknowledge the Emptinefs and Vanity of our Pursuits, we know with the clearest Conviction that they are not worth the Trouble; and yet when the Inclination or Appetite calls upon us anew, we fly, and obey it with Paffion and Alacrity.

SECT. II.

Of the Words Motive, Impreffion, and Subftance, applied to the Mind.

I. If Men had been originally in a lonely and disjointed State, they must at their first Advances to Society and to a common Language, have struggled with almost infinite Difficulties, to make each other comprehend what Ideas they annexed to their Words.

It was easy to fix a Name or Expreffioh for any vifible Body or for any Attitude that often occurred and could be readily pointed out. It was not difficult to get a Child to call this a Chair, that a Table; to call One Motion Running, another Walking, and a third Stooping. It was allo easy to establish Names for Paffions, whofe Spmptoms are ftriking and manifeft to the Eye or Ear; fuch as Anger, Grief, Joy; or for thofe Inclinations that determine us to familiar Actions, and towards familiar Objects; fuch as Hunger and Thirft; but how fhall a Man distinguish by Words the flighter Emotions of the Mind, whofe Symptoms are tranfient and hardly difcernible, and that terminate in no particular visible Object, fuch as Reflection, Apprehenfion, Disturbance, Difguft, &c.

2. This Difficulty, however, the Invention of Man got over, and to unravel the Manner of doing it we must recur to a peculiar Power in the human Mind, of discovering at a Glance Analogies, Similitudes and Likeneffes in the moft diftant Objects: This fine Faculty I fpeak of, is perhaps the Spirit of Poetry in the human Bofom; at least Poefy derives from it, the Whole of its creating Power and Enchantment; fuch as its Similitudes, Metaphors, and Invention; and this fubtle and remarkable Faculty it is that affifts us to exprefs intelligibly the flightest and most latent Emotions of the Mind. We may fuppofe proper Expreffions found for the vifible Motions of the Body, and for the Circumftances of our Appetites: Thefe being fixed and known familiarly, we are enabled, by our quick Senfe of Similitude, to apply to every Emotion of the Mind, however delicate and tranfitory, the Denomination of any fenfible Motion or Circumftance that bears an Analogy thereto, however distant in other Refpects: for Inftance, imagine, reflect, apprehend, adhere, difturb; which Words, and their proper Ideas, are actual Hieroglyphics of

the

the internal Emotions of the Mind, and become Substitutes, by much the fame Kind of Artifice by which a Painter, in order to exprefs a Paffion, paints a Face with certain Distortions. The Painting of the Operations of the Mind, which do not come under the Cognizance of the Senfes, by Words borrowed from Objects of Senfe, is called Metaphor. It is eafy to apprehend from what I have faid, that Metaphors fhould be for the most Part taken from Objects of Vision, from Motion, and Light, whofe Ideas are most lively and diftinct, which is agreeable to Fact. From thefe Obfervations it follows, that the Words imagine, reflect, apprehend, disturb. &c. were not made Ufe of, because Nature in the naming of Things, fuggefted unawares, that fenfible Ideas are the Origin of all human Knowledge, as Mr. Locke feems to think; but because the Ideas of Intellect, although equally real, known, and felt with the Ideas of Senfe, cannot be diftinétly and clearly pointed out to a Perfon who is learning Signs or Language, unless they be thus reprefented by fenfible Ideas, that readily occur, and bring along with them to the Imagination, the Analogy that ferves to interpret the hieroglyphic.

3. The Word Motive, applied to the Idea that determines the Mind; and the Word Motion, applied to the Refolution taken, are Metaphors; and the Analogy extremely remote. We fee that one Body ftriking against another, communicates its Motion to that other; the fanciful and vifionary Imagination juft catches an Allufion, between this fenfible Effect and the Determination of the Mind by an Object that affects it. But the Moment attempt to contemplate the Analogy or Similitude between the Collifion of Bodies, and the Manner in which Motives affect the Mind, it difappears wholly, and you lofe it; for the Idea did not roll along, nor change Place in the Mind; it was there, but it did not impinge on it, nor was the Mind put

you

out

out of its Situation by the Stroke; the Idea, which is a real diftinct Effence or Being, having its own proper Qualities, has neither Solidity nor Extenfion; it has not Length, nor Breadth, nor Refiftance, nor Motion, nor a Capacity for moving any Thing. You have an Idea in a Dream, or you recollect People long dead; these Ideas tho' real, are not material, nor are they capable of moving any material Being by impinging on it: neither are Ideas homogeneous with the Mind, as Bodies are that obtrude against each other; an Idea is evanefcent, and its Effence, as a great Writer obferves, confifts in its being perceived; but the Soul is not transitory, and it becomes fenfible of its own Exiftence, by perceiving. Whence it appears, that the Analogy between the Collifion of Bodies, and the Determinations of the Mind, is fo extremely fhadowy and remote, that the Moment you defire to fix upon it as an Object of View, and endeavour to find the Analogy or Point of Likeness, it recedes from your Apprehenfions, and is utterly loft; and that when Materialists or Fatalists draw Arguments from the Words Motive, or Impulse, to fhew the paffive or material Nature of the Mind, they lofe Sight of their Subject, and have not the Nature or Properties of Mind in Contemplation, but the Qualities which paffive, inert Matter, difcovers in its Concuffions and Motions.

4. The Word Impreffion, when applied in a proper Senfe to Mind, is equally inadequate and illufive. An Impreffion on Paper, or a Pedestal, is most legible and plain when new made; it is of a confiderably permanent Nature, but when obliterated, its Existence is no more: but the Impreffions on the Mind, however vivid, are, by changing the Difcourfe, or by the Wandering of the Imagination, immediately obliterated, and a new Impreffion fucceeds; the new vanishes in turn, and leaves a Charte blanche for a third Impreflion; thofe that

2

are