carrying the doctrine of selection into regions which Darwin left unexplored. But although from this point of view Weismann may be fairly described as an extreme Darwinian, there is another aspect of the matter in which, paradoxical as it may seem, he and Darwin are at opposite poles. To this we shall be brought by returning for a moment to Weismann's famous theory of heredity, which may be summed up in brief as the 'continuity of the germ-plasm.'

It is important that a clear distinction should be drawn between this latter question and that of the alleged transmission of acquired characters. The continuity of the germplasm, or reproductive material, from generation to generation, the bodies of successive individuals being regarded merely as buds from a perennial stock, is a theory devised to account for the observed facts of inheritance, and with our present means of research is hardly capable of direct verification. The onus probandi of such a theory undoubtedly rests with its propounder. The transmission of acquired characters, on the other hand, is not so much a theory as a simple question of fact. Does it happen or does it not? Here it would seem that those who affirm that it does happen are bound to show when it occurs and where. Those who deny it, like Weismann, are simply appealing to the universal experience of mankind. The Chinese infant at birth has well-formed feet; nor is a young fox-terrier born with its ears and tail ready cropped. But instead of producing their evidence, the Neo-Lamarckians now seem inclined to rely on the oftenrepeated assertion that 'Weismann has not proved his point.' It may be perfectly true that he has not proved his theory of the germ-plasm, the verification of which in any case must needs be a most difficult undertaking; but these critics are apt to forget that the transmission of acquired characters, though it would fall of itself if Weismann could prove not only the continuity but also the stability of the germ-plasm, is not established by his failure to do so. The transmission doctrine must either be proved by its supporters or must be allowed to go by default. The universal negative of Weismann could be met by a particular affirmative. Why is the latter not forthcoming? The scientific world still waits

for a single unequivocal instance of a character acquired by an organism in virtue of its individual plasticity, and passed on by inheritance to a succeeding generation.

We see, then, that Weismann's denial of the inheritance of acquired characters, though connected with his theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm, does not necessarily stand or fall with that theory. The common failure to distinguish between the two positions is answerable for a great deal of misunderstanding which might easily have been avoided. It may be suspected that another source of misapprehension is to be found in Darwin's use of the term 'pangenesis.' To many people who get their ideas on these subjects at secondhand, the expression 'theory of pangenesis' simply conveys the notion of a belief in the descent of all forms of life from a common stock. When, therefore, they hear it stated that the ultra-Darwinian Weismann's view of descent is diametrically opposed to Darwin's theory of pangenesis, they are naturally puzzled. The fact is that 'pangenesis' has nothing to do with the action of natural selection. The term is merely used by Darwin to express his conception of the relation of the reproductive material to the parent organism. According to Weismann, individuals are not manufacturers but only nourishers and carriers of the germ-plasm. This germ-plasm they have received from their ancestors; in due time they produce descendants,

'Et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt.'

In Darwin's view of the process of heredity the germ-plasm of the individual is not derived directly as such from the germ-plasm of the parent, but is constituted and reinforced by contributions from every part of the body of the individual itself: whence the term pangenesis. According to Weismann the germ makes the body; according to Darwin the body makes the germ. The opposition between these two views, which are sometimes spoken of respectively as 'centrifugal' and 'centripetal,' is obvious, as also is the fact that while the former theory is incompatible with the transmission of acquired characters, and therefore with the causes of transmutation alleged by Buffon and Lamarck, the latter may be

said to give an opening for the operation of those causes. These rival theories of heredity are thus seen to connect themselves with the respective attitudes of their authors towards the general question of evolutionary methods. As before, what is really at stake is the admission of the 'Lamarckian factors'; for whether one of these views is true or both are false, the principle of natural selection remains unaffected. Of the actual validity of this principle there can indeed be no reasonable doubt; though whether it is adequate to the production of all the results with which it has been credited is another question. Perhaps the most pressing need of evolutionists at the present time is to establish by quantitative methods a measure of the extent and rapidity of selective action. There is much to be said for the opinion of Professor Karl Pearson :

'It is not absence of explanations, but rather of the quantitative testing of explanations, which hinders the development of the Darwinian theory.' The problem of the near future is not whether Darwinism is a reality, but what is quantitatively the rate at which it is working and has worked.'

It is probable that as regards the mechanism of heredity we are on the eve of discoveries which will to a great extent supersede the conceptions on this point of both Darwin and Weismann. But to pursue the subject further, and especially to discuss the new views of inheritance now chiefly associated with the names of Galton and Pearson on the one side and of Mendel on the other, would involve an appeal to somewhat minute and technical detail. Nor is it necessary for the present purpose. Our aim has been to show that, together with a general agreement as to the fact of organic evolution, there has arisen a serious difference of opinion as to the methods by which it has proceeded. We have tried to indicate briefly, but not inaccurately, the manner in which both agreement and disagreement have been arrived at; and we have done our best to state, though necessarily in a form far from complete, the most important and crucial questions that at present divide evolutionists. The decision of these questions must of course be left to time. In the meanwhile

it may not be amiss to point out that harm has not infrequently resulted to the cause of religion by too much eagerness in accepting, as well-established facts, hypotheses on which science has not really said her last word. The history of the dogma of special creation is a case in point. The theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who taught the immutability of species were in a scientific sense quite up to date.' In course of time the scientific world found that it had made a mistake, and theologians were driven somewhat painfully to retrace their steps. Their deviation was natural, and perhaps unavoidable, but they would have done better in the first place not to forsake the guidance of St. Augustine. At the present time there is a tendency among apologists to look with special favour on the views of the Neo-Lamarckian school. It is not to be denied that the notions of an 'inherent tendency towards perfection,' of 'directed variation,' and the like, are highly attractive, and seem like new weapons in the hands of the defenders of theism. We are reminded of the avidity with which much the same notions in their Aristotelian form were caught at by the schoolmen. But even if these speculations should become part of the general scientific belief, which at present is not the case, the doubt must still be felt whether they will stand the test of time. We are far from saying that the teleological argument is useless in natural theology. On the contrary, we believe that the general acceptance of evolution has made it stronger than ever. But it must be grounded on a wider basis than Paley gave it, and it should be carefully preserved from even seeming dependence on views which the event of to-morrow may show to be without scientific foundation.

ART. III. THE RELIGIOUS CONDITION

OF ITALY.

1. Italy To-day. By BOLTON KING and THOMAS OKEY. (London: Nisbet, 1901.)

2. Battaglie d' Oggi: II. La Cultura del Clero; III. La Vita Cristiana sulla Fine del Secolo XIX. By ROMOLO MURRI. (Roma: Società di Cultura Editrice, 1901.) 3. Studi Religiosi. Rivista Critica e Storica. (Firenze e Roma, 1901, &c.)

THE Father of History, when he visited a strange country, never failed to inquire into its religion. Whatever else was interesting to him in its monuments, its politics, its traditions, he was always careful to study what it knew or thought about the gods and the way of serving them; and it was often from the priests that he received the most valuable information.

When the English traveller visits Italy his first concern is usually with the natural beauty of the country and its artistic treasures. Possibly he extends his studies to the literature of the land, and to some picturesque incidents in its political history, and he acquires some knowledge of Dante and the Medici and the Borgia. But he seldom thinks it within his province to inquire into the religion of the nation. He is more or less familiar with its soldiers of fortune, but he learns nothing about its saints, unless, like St. Francis, they belong as much to the poetry of the land as to its devotion. Yet the religion of Italy is of supreme importance. For many centuries it impressed its stamp upon the whole of Western Europe, and still the greater part of Christendom regards the occupant of an Italian see as in a special way the Vicar of Christ. The art of Italy was moulded by religious belief, and the chief Italian poem is a theological treatise. Nor should the English Churchman need to be reminded that the religion of Italy is, at root, his own-the same God, the same Creed, the same Sacraments-even if there be grave differences in the ways in which Italians and Anglicans apprehend the same truths.