difference is, that the loss is equalized. Ten men can more easily replace one hundred dollars apiece, who have nine hundred remaining, than the eleventh can replace his whole property of one thousand.

The rule in this case is simple. The insured is bound fully to reveal to the insurer every circumstance within his knowledge, which could in any measure affect the value of the risk; that is to say, the property must be, so far as he knows, what it purports to be, and the risks none other than such as he reveals them. If he expose the property to other risks, the insurance is void; and the underwriter, if the property be lost, refuses to remunerate him; and if it be safe, he returns the premium. If the loss occur within the terms of the policy, the insurer is bound fully and faithfully to make remuneration, precisely according to the terms of the contract.

As to the rate of insurance, very little need be said. It varies with every risk, and is made up of so many conflicting circumstances, that it must be agreed upon by the parties themselves. When the market in this species of traffic is unrestrained by monopolies, the price of insurance, like that of any other commodity, will regulate itself.

II. Next, where the equivalent is IMMATERIAL, as where one party pays remuneration for some service rendered by the other.

The principal cases here are these: That of master and servant, and that of principal and agent.

1. Of master and servant.

1. The master is bound to allow to the servant a fair remuneration. This is justly estimated by uniting the considerations of labor, skill, and fidelity, varied by the rise and fall of the price of such labor in the market. As this, however, would be liable to inconvenient fluctuation, it is generally adjusted by a rate agreed upon by the parties.

2. He is bound to allow him all the privileges to which moral law or established usage entitles him, unless something different from the latter has been stipulated in the contract; and he is at liberty to require of him service upon the same principles.

3 The servan is hound to perform the labor assigned

him by usage, or by contract (matters of conscience only excepted), with all the skill which he possesses, making the interests of the employer his own. If either party fail,that is, if the master demand service for which he does not render compensation, or if the servant receive wages for which he does not render the stipulated equivalent,-there is a violation of the right of property. Thus, also, there is a violation of right, if the master do not fulfil the terins of the contract, just as it was made; as, for instance, if he do not pay a servant punctually. When the service is performed, the wages belong to the servant, and the master has no more right to them than to the property of any one else. Thus saith St. James: "The hire of your laborers that have reaped your fields, that is kept back by fraud, crieth, and the cry is come into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth." And, on the contrary, the servant is bound to use his whole *kill and economy in managing the property of his master, and if he destroy it by negligence, or fault, he ought to make restitution.

2. Of principal and agent.

It frequently happens that, in the transaction of business, duties devolve upon an individual, which are to be dis charged in different places at the same time. In other cases, in consequence of the subdivision of labor, he requires something to be done for him, which another person can do better than himself. In both cases, either from necessity. or for his own convenience and interest, he employs other men as agents.

Agencies are of two kinds; first, where the principal simply employs another to fulfil his own (that is, the prin cipal's) will Here, the principal's will is the rule, both as to the object to be accomplished, and the manner in which. and the means whereby, it is to be accomplished. Secondly. Where the principal only designates the objects to be accomplished, reposing special trust in the skill and fidelity of the agent as to the means by which it is to be accomplished. Such I suppose to be the case .n regard to professional assistance.

The laws on this subject respect, first, the relation existing between the principal and the community; ana.

econdly, the relation existing between the principal and agent.

I. The principal is bound by the acts of the agent, while the agent is employed in the business for which the principal has engaged him; but he is responsible no farther.

Thus, it is known that a merchant employs a clerk tc receive money on his account. For his clerk's transactions in this part of his affairs he is responsible; but he would not be responsible, if money were paid to his porter or coachman, because he does not employ them for this purpose Hence, if the clerk be unfaithful, and secrete the money, the merchant suffers; if the coachman receive the money, and be unfaithful, the payer suffers. It is the merchant's business to employ suitable agents; but it is the business of his customers to apply to those agents only, whom he has employed.

An important question arises here, namely, When is it to De understood that a principal has employed an agent? It is generally held that, if the principal acknowledge himself responsible for the acts of the agent, he is hereafter held to be responsible for similar acts, until he gives notice to the contrary.

II. Laws arising from the relation subsisting between the principal and the agent.

1. The laws respecting compensation are the same as those already specified, and, therefore, need not be repeated. 2. The agent is bound to give the same care to the affairs of the principal, as to his own. He is another self, and should act in that capacity. The necessity of this jule is apparent from the fact, that no other rule could be devised, either by which the one party would know what justly to demand, or the other when the demands of justice were fulfilled.

Hence, if an agent do not give all the care to the affairs of his principal that he would do to his own, and loss occur, he ought to sustain it. If a lawyer lose a cause through negligence, or palpable ignorance, he ought, in justice, to suffer the consequences. He receives fees for conducting the cause to the best of his ability, and, by undertaking to conduct it, puts it out of the power of the client to employ

any one else. Thus, if he neglect it, and, by neglecting it, his client is worse off than if he had not undertaken it, he accepts fees for really injuring his neighbor. He ought to bear the loss which has occurred by his own fault.

A question frequently arises here of considerable importance. It is, When is he obliged to obey the instructions of his principal; and when is he obliged to act without egard to them? Although this question does not come under the right of property, it may be as well to notice it here as any where else.

The question, I suppose, is to be answered by deciding to which of the above specified kinds of agencies the case to be considered belongs.

1. If it be simple agency, that is, where the agent undertakes merely to execute the will of the principal, and in the manner, and by the means, specified by the principal, he must obey implicitly, (conscience only excepted,) unless some fact material to the formation of a judgment has come to light after giving the order, which, if known, would have necessarily modified the intention of the principal. This is the law of the military service. Here, even when the reason for disobedience of orders is ever so clear, and an agent disobeys, he does it at his own risk; and, hence, the modifying facts should be obvious and explicit, in order to justify a variation from the instructions.

2. When the agency is of the other kind, and the will of the principal is only supposed to direct the end, while the means and manner are to be decided upon by the professional skill of the agent, I suppose that the agent is not bound to obey the directions of his principal. He is supposed to know more on the subject, and to be better able to decide what will benefit his principal, than the principal himself; and he has no right to injure another man, even it the other man desire it; nor has he a right to lend himself as an instrument by which another man, by_consequence of his ignorance, shall injure himself. Besides. every man has a professional reputation to sustain, on which his means of living depend. He has no right to njure this, for the sake of gratifying another, especially when, by so gratifying the other, he shall ruin himself also.

A physician has no right to give his patient drugs which will poison him, because a patient wishes it. A lawyer has no right to bring a cause into court in such a manner as will ensure the loss of it, because his client insists upon it. The professional agent is bound to conduct the business of his profession to the best of his ability. This is the end of his responsibility. If it please his client, well; if not, the relation must cease, and the principal must find another agent.

A representative in Congress is manifestly an agent of the latter of these two classes. He is chosen on account of his supposed legislative ability. Hence, he is strictly a professional agent; and, on these principles, he is under no sort of obligation to regard the instructions of his constituHe is merely bound to promote their best interests, but the manner of doing it is to be decided by his superior skill and ability.

ents.

But, secondly, is he bound to resign his seat, if he differ from them in opinion? This is a question to be decided by the constitution of the country under which he acts. Society, that is, the whole nation, have a right to form a government as they will; and to choose representatives during good behavior, that is, for as long a time as they and their representatives entertain the same views; or, set ting aside this mode for reasons which may seem good to themselves, to elect them for a certain period of service. Now, if they have chosen the latter mode, they have bound themselves to abide by it, and have abandoned the former, If they elect him during pleasure, he is so elected. If they, on the contrary, elect him for two years, or for six years, he is so elected. And, so far as I can discover, here the question rests. It is in the power of society to alter the tenure of office, if they please; but, until it be altered, neither party can claim any thing more or different from what that tenure actually and virtually expresses.

22