CHAPTER FOURTH.

OF JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION.

IT has been already remarked, that every man is, by the laws of his Creator, entitled to the physical results of his labor; that is, to those results which arise from the operation of those laws of cause and effect, which govern the material on which he operates. Thus, if a man form several trees into a house, the result of this labor, supposing the materials and time to be his own, are his own also. Thus, again, if if. a man study diligently, the amount of knowledge which he gains is at his own disposal; and he is at liberty, innocently, to use it as he will. And, in general, if a man be industrious, the immediate results of industry are his, and no one has any right to interfere with them.

But these are not the only results. There are others, springing from those laws of cause and effect, which govern the opinions and actions of men towards each other, which are frequently of as great importance to the individual, as the physical results. Thus, if a man have built a house, the house is his. But, if he have done it well, there arises, in the minds of men, a certain opinion of his skill, and a regard towards him on account of it, which may be of more value to him than even the house itself; for it may be the foundation of great subsequent good fortune. The industrious student is entitled, not merely to the use of that knowledge which he has acquired, but also to the esteem which the possession of that knowledge gives him among men. Now, these secondary and indirect results, though they may follow other laws of cause and effect, are yet as truly effects of the original cause, that is, of the character and actions of the man himself, and they as truly belong to him, as the primary and direct results of which we have before spoken. And, hence, to diminish the esteem in

which a man is held by his fellows, to detract from the reputation which he has thus acquired, is as great a violation of justice, nay, it may be a far greater violation of justice, than robbing him of money. It has, moreover, the additional aggravation of conferring no benefit upon the aggressor, beyond that of the gratification of a base and malignant passion.

But, it may be said, the man has a reputation greater than he deserves, or a reputation for that which he does not deserve. Have I not a right to diminish it to its true level?

We answer, The objection proceeds upon the concession that the man has a reputation. That is, men have such or such an opinion concerning him. Now, the rule of property, formerly mentioned, applies here. If a man be in possession of property, though unjustly in possession, this gives to no one a right to seize upon that property for himself, or to seize it and destroy it, unless he can, himself, show a better title. The very fact of possession bars every other claimant, except that claimant whom the present possessor has defrauded. So, in this case, if this reputation injures the reputation of another, the other has a right to set forth his own claims; and any one else has a right, when prompted by a desire of doing justice to the injured, to state the facts as they are; but where this element of desire to do justice does not enter, no man has a right to diminish the esteem in which another is held, simply because he may believe the other to have more than he deserves.

I

The moral rule, on this subject, I suppose to be this: We are forbidden to utter any thing which will be injurious to the reputation of another, except for adequate cause. say, for adequate cause, because occasions may occur, in which it is as much our duty to speak, as it is at other times our duty to be silent. The consideration of these cases will oe a subsequent concern. The precept, thus understood, applies to the cases in which we speak either from no sufficient motive, or from a bad motive. It is merely an extension of the great principle of the law of reciprocity, which 'commands us to have the same simple desire that every other man should enjoy, unmolested, the esteem in which

he is held by men, that we have to enjoy, unmolested, the same possession ourselves.

I do not here consider the cases in which we utter either wilfully or thoughtlessly, injurious falsehood respecting another. In these cases, the guilt of lying is superadded to that of slander. I merely here consider slander by itself; it being understood that, when what is asserted is false, it involves the sin of lying, besides the violation of the law of reciprocity, which we are here endeavoring to enforce.

The precept includes several specifications. Some of them it may be important to enumerate.

I. It prohibits us from giving publicity to the bad actions of men, without cause. The guilt here consists in causelessly giving publicity. Of course, it does not include those cases in which the man himself gives publicity to his own bad actions. He has himself diminished his reputation, and his act becomes a part of public indiscriminate information. We are at liberty to mention this, like any other fact, when the mention of it is demanded; but not to do it for the sake of injuring him. So, whenever his bad actious are made known by the providence of God, it comes under the same rule. Thus, I may know that a man has acted dishonestly. This alone does not give me liberty to speak of it. But, if his dishonesty have been proved before a court of justice, it then becomes really a part of his reputation, and I am at liberty to speak of it in the same manner as of any other fact. Yet even here, if I speak of it with pleasure, or with a desire of injury, I commit sin.

Some of the reasons for this rule, are the following:

1. The very act itself is injurious to the slanderer's own inoral character, and to that of him who lends himself to be his auditor. Familiarity with wrong diminishes our abhorrence of it. The contemplation of it in others fosters the spirit of envy and uncharitableness, and leads us, in the end, to exult in, rather than sorrow over, the faults of others.

2. In the present imperfect state, where every individual being fallible, must fail somewhere, if every one were at liberty to speak of all the wrong and all the imperfection of every one whom he knew, society would soon become intolerable, from the festering of universal ill-will. What would be

come of families, of friendships, of communities, if parents and children, husbands and wives, acquaintances, neighbors, and citizens, should proclaim every failing which they knew or heard of, respecting each other? Now, there can no medium be established between telling every thing, and forbidding every thing to be told which is told without adequate cause.

3. We may judge of the justice of the rule, by applying it to ourselves. We despise the man who, either thoughtlessly or maliciously, proclaims what he considers, either justly or unjustly, our failings. Now, what can be more unjust or more despicable, than to do that which our own conscience testifies to be unjust and despicable in others?

II. The same law forbids us to utter general conclusions respecting the characters of men, drawn from particular bad actions which they may have committed. This is manifest injustice, and it includes, frequently, lying as well as slander. A single action is rarely decisive of character, even in respect to that department of character to which it belongs. A single illiberal action does not prove a man to be covetous, any more than a single act of charity proves him to be benevolent. How unjust, then, must it be, to proclaim a man destitute of a whole class of virtues, because of one failure in virtue! How much more unjust, on account of one fault, to deny him all claim to any virtue whatsoever! Yet such is frequently the very object of calumny. And, in general, this form of vice is added to that just noticed Men first, in violation of the law of reciprocity, make public the evil actions of others; and then, with a malignant power of generalization, proceed to deny their claims, not only to a whole class of virtues, but, not unfrequently, to all virtue whatsoever. The reasons, in this case, are similar to those just mentioned.

III. We are forbidden to judge, that is, to assign unnecessarily bad motives to the actions of men. I say unnecessarily, for some actions are in their nature such, that to presume a good motive is impossible.

This rule would teach us, first, to presume no unworthy motive when the action is susceptible of an innocent one. And secondly, never to ascribe to an action which we

confess to be good, any other motive than that from which it proposes to proceed.

This is the rule by which we are bound to be governed in our own private opinions of men. And if, from any circumstances, we are led to entertain any doubts of the motives of men, we are bound to retain these doubts within our own bosoms, unless we are obliged, for some sufficient reason, to disclose them. But if we are obliged to adopt this rule respecting our own opinions of others, by how much more are we obliged to adopt it in the publication of our opinions! If we are not allowed, unnecessarily, to suppose an unworthy motive, by how much less are we allowed to circulate it, and thus render it universally supposed! "Charity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity." The reasons for this rule are obvious:

1. The motives of men, unless rendered evident by their actions, can be known to God alone. They are, evidently, out of the reach of man. In assigning motives unnecessarily, we therefore undertake to assert as fact, what we at the outset confess that we have not the means of knowing to be such; which is, in itself, falsehood: and we do ali this for the sake of gratifying a contemptible vanity, or a wicked envy; or, what is scarcely less reprehensible, from a thoughtless love of talking.

2. There is no offence by which we are excited to a livelier or more just indignation, than by the misinterpretation of our own motives. This quick sensitiveness in ourselves, should admonish us of the guilt which we incur, when we traduce the motives of others.

IV. By the same rule, we are forbidden to lessen the estimation in which others are held, by ridicule, mimicry, or by any means by which they are brought into contempt. No man can be greatly respected by those to whom he is the frequent subject of laughter. It is but a very imperfect excuse for conduct of this sort, to plead that we do not mean any harm. What do we mean? Surely, reasonable beings should be prepared to answer this question. Were the witty calumniator to stand concealed, and hear himself made the subject of remarks precisely similar to those in which he indulges respecting others, he would have a very