Representation and the Mind-body Problem in Spinoza

Voorkant
Oxford University Press, 1996 - 223 pagina's
This book offers a powerful new reading of Spinoza's philosophy of mind, the aspect of Spinoza's thought often regarded as the most profound and perplexing. Michael Della Rocca argues that interpreters of Spinoza's philosophy of mind have not paid sufficient attention to his causal barrier between the mental and the physical. The first half of the book shows how this barrier generates Spinoza's strong requirements for having an idea about an object. The second half of the book explains how this causal separation underlies Spinoza's intriguing argument for mind-body identity. Della Rocca concludes his analysis by solving the famous problem of whether for Spinoza the distinction between attributes is real or somehow merely subjective.
 

Inhoudsopgave

Introduction
3
Parallelism and Individuals
18
The MindRelativity of Content
44
Holism and the Causal Requirement on Representation
68
The Essence Requirement on Representation
84
Falsity
107
One and the Same Thing
118
Spinoza Opacity and the MindBody Problem
141
Attributes and Identity
157
Notes
173
Bibliography
207
Index of Passages Cited
215
General Index
219
Copyright

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Over de auteur (1996)

Michael Della Rocca is at Yale University.

Bibliografische gegevens