the East-India company, and the interest of the country, called for their most serious attention. The commerce of the company exclusively belonged to them; nor was it till the territorial acquisitions of the company became considerable, that the public claimed any participation in the advantages arising from the resources of those acquisitions, in the obtainment of which they had borne so large a share. The commerce to and from India, therefore, he meant to leave, where it ought to be left, in the management of the company.

It had, he remarked, been ever held, that commercial companies could not govern empires; but that was a matter of speculation, which general experience proved to be not true in practice, however universally admitted in theory. The East-India company had conducted its commerce, and governed a vast empire for years ; and it was to be remembered that the East-India company was no new establishment; it rested on charters and acts of parliament; those charters ought undoubtedly to be regarded, and, as far as possible, the rights exercised and enjoyed under them ought to be held sacred. But, as he had before observed, there were no rights, that by accident or time became fatal to the interests of the public, or to the safety of the state, which must not be touched. The matter was, how to connect the constitution of the company with the national interests: from that regard and attention to chartered rights which he ever should profess, and which every man ought to practise, he had been led rather to consider, whether it was not possible to model the old constitution of the company, so as to make it answer every view of the state, and every interest of the public, rather than to make a new one: not thinking it necessary to confiscate, annihilate, and destroy, where the purpose could be attained without proceeding to any such violent lengths.

In the measures to be taken for the future government of India, if they had the company's concurrence, it would surely be admitted that they took the safest line; that they had pursued the wisest course; and the measures he should propose, were such as the company agreed to. The control he had mentioned ought undoubtedly to remain where the constitution had placed all power, in the executive government of the country. The management of the commerce he meant to leave with the company. The patronage should be separate from the executive government: . but be it given where it would, he should propose regulations that would essentially curtail and diminish it, so as to render it as little dangerous as possible. The patronage, however, he would trust with no political set of men whatever. Let it be in India, it would be free from corruption then, and when exercised under the restrictions aud limitations he should propose, could, he flattered himself, be attended with no bad consequences.

He enlarged upon these points considerably; and then said, from what he had stated, the House would doubtless observe, that the bill he nieant to move for leave to bring in, was not different from former bills that he had stated to the House. The great point of it, as far as he had opened it, was the appointment of a separate department of board of control, to whom all dispatches should be transmitted, and who should be responsible for what they did, and for what they did not do; who should blink nothing; who should be obliged to act upon every question that came before them; who should not shew any indulgence or partiality, or be guilty of procrastination ; who should not have the plea of other business, or in fine, on any pretence, or in any other way whatever, put off or delay the duties of their office. This institution, though certainly new, was not charged with new duties; because the same powers of control had been given to the secretaries of state by various acts of parliament, but unfor. tunately they had never been exercised, having been suffered to remain dormant. He wished, therefore, to put it out of the power of that degree of laziness natural to office, any longer to defeat the public interest, by the institution of a board necessarily active and efficient. He was aware that many persons, who in general disliked, as much as he had done, the violence of the measures proposed in another bill, approved the idea of making the board of commissioners, to be instituted under the authority of that. bill, permanent. He was not of this opinion; sure he was, that

the permanency of such a board as that bill proposed to institute, would have added to the mischiefs of it. Such a board would have been in itself a deviation from the principles of the constitution, and its permanency would have involved it in contradictions to the executive government that must have been attended with great public inconvenience. Aninstitution to control the government of India must be either totally independent of the executive government of this country, or it must be subordinate to it. Ought the administration of the day to have no connection with what was going on? Let it be remembered that a permanent board might be hostile to those who held the government at the time; a view of it, which, he trusted, would sufficiently prove, that an actual independent permanency in any such board would be an evil. The existing government ought to be, to a degree, permanent; but the Indian department must not be independent of that : he meant, therefore, to give it a ground of dependence, upon which all the various departments had a natural and legitimate dependency ; viz. upon the executive government. Every government that had no other object than the public good, that was conscious of acting upon no other principles than such as were perfectly constitutional, that was swayed by no motives of a personal, an interested, or an ambitious nature, but which possessed a sufficient share of the confidence of the sovereign, of parliament, and of the people at large, would, from its conduct, be permanent; and the Indian government would be so of course. Having said this, he animadverted on the danger of once departing from the constitution, by appointing such a commission as the bill that had passed that House, but which had been rejected by the lords in the last parliament, authorised. He remarked, if the practice once obtained, there was no saying to what extent it might be carried, or how often the precedent might be multiplied: admitting it to pass in the instance of the late bill, they might have proceeded to separate and tear away all the departments from the crown, and put them one after another into so many parliamentary commissions.

With regard to the objections that had been started, and the

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reasons that had been urged to prove that the company's directors ought not to be excluded from an insight of the papers of the commissioners, he was willing so far to give way to the arguments of that nature, as to permit the court of directors to see the papers of the commissioners; but they were to have no power of objecting: the decision of the commissioners must be final and binding upon the directors. He meant also to invest the commissioners with a power to originate measures, as well as to revise, correct, alter, and control those of the company : but with regard to such measures as the commissioners originated, the company were to be obliged to carry them into execution. This, he observed, took nothing from the company; since, in fact, it was nothing more than the power to put a negative on their measures, and the power of altering them, acting in another way. With respect to the appointment of the commissioners, he said, it was meant to be the same as that of persons holding great offices, viz, at the nomination of the crown. It was intended that the board should consist of none but privy counsellors; but the board should create no increase of officers, nor impose any new burdens, since he trusted there could be found persons enough who held offices of large emolument, but no great employment, whose leisure would amply allow of their undertaking the duty in question. And this circumstance, he observed, would have a good effect for the future, in rendering it necessary for ministers, when, by way of providing for their families, they appointed to offices hitherto considered as sinecures, to have some other consideration of the ability of the person about to be appointed to fill it; a consideration that could not but occasion the description of offices to which he was alluding, to be well filled for the future. The principal powers of this board, he recapitulated, would consist in directing what political objects the company's servants were to pursue, and in recalling such as did not pay obedience to such directions, or be able togivevery satisfactory reasons to shew that circumstances rendered disobedience a virtue. The board would be strictly a board of control : it would have no power to appoint, nor any patronage; consequently it could have no motive to deviate from its duty.

Thus much, the House would see, related solely to the govern. ment at home. With regard to the government abroad, the first and leading ideas would be to limit the subsisting patronage, and to produce an unity of system, by investing the supreme government, to be seated in Bengal, with an effectual control over every other presidency, and by investing that supreme government with executive power, and with the disposition of offices in India; but to make it a matter less invidious, and to prevent the possibility of abuse, gradation and succession should be established as the invariable rule, except in very extraordinary cases; with a view to which, there must be lodged in the supreme government, as in every other executive power, a discretion, which every man must see was actually necessary to be vested in an executive power, acting at such an extreme distance from the seat of the supreme government of all, but which was nevertheless to be subject to the control of the board of superintendency to be established here at home, whose orders in this, as in every other case, the government of India must obey. Though Bengal was designed to be the supreme government, it was not to be the source of influence: that being as much as possible guarded against by the regulations designed to make a part of the bill. The officers of the government of Bengal were intended to be left to the nomination of the court of directors, subject to the negative of the crown; and the court of directors were to have the nomination of the officers of all the subordinate governments, excepting only of the commanderin-chief, who, for various reasons, would remain to be appointed by the crown. He said, it might possibly be argued, that if the crown nominated the commander-in-chief, and had a negative upon the rest of the appointments, all the patronage remained in the hands of government at home. This, however, was far from being the case; the patronage of great appointments not being the sort of patronage for the public to entertain a jealousy about, and the other patronage being diffused and placed in Bengal, the influence from it was considerably weakened and diminished; add to this, all officers going by gradation and succession, would be a forcible check upon the patronage, and tend greatly to its reduction.

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