Jamaica. Who, Sir, can suppose with serious confidence, that island could have long resisted a regular attack, supported by seventy-two sail of the line? Admiral Pigot, after his reinforcement from Europe, would have commanded a fleet of only fortysix sail, and it has long been acknowledged in this House, that defensive war must terminate in certain ruin. Would Admiral Pigot have undertaken at this time offensive operations against the islands of the enemy?-Those islands on which Lord Rodney, flushed with victory, could not venture to attempt an impression? Would Admiral Pigot, Sir, have regained by arms what the mi. nisters have recovered by treaty? Could he in the sight of a superior fleet, have recaptured Grenada, Dominique, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montserrat? Or, might we not too reasonably apprehend the campaign in the West Indies would have closed with the loss of Jamaica itself, the remnant of our possessions in that part of the globe ?

Let us next consider our situation in the east. A mere defensive resistance, however glorious, had entitled Sir Edward Hughes to the thanks of this House; but his success, if it may be termed a victory, had not prevented the enemy from landing a greater European force than we actually possess in India, and who at this instant are in conjunction with Hyder, subduing and desolating the Carnatic.

The prospect is by no means brightened when we look forward to the probable operations in the Channel, and in the Northern Seas, during the course of the ensuing summer. Thirteen new sail of the line would at that time have been added to the fleet of France; and the Dutch force, as it has been accurately stated, by a great naval officer, in this debate, would have amounted to twenty-five sail of the line. What accession the Spanish force would have received, is not sufficiently known. It is enough for me to state, the fleets of Bourbon and of Holland would have doubled ours in our own seas. Should we have seized the intervals of their cruize, and poorly paraded the Channel for a few weeks, to tarnish again, by flight, the glories of the last campaign? Or should we have dared to risque the existence of the kingdom itself, by engaging against such fearful odds?

* Commodore Keith Stuart.

What were the feelings of every one who hears me (what were my own feelings it is impossible to describe) when that great man Lord Howe set sail with our only feet; inferior to the enemy, and under a probability of an engagement on their own coasts ? My apprehensions, Sir, on this occasion, however great, were mixed with hope ; I knew the superiority of British skill and courage might outweigh the inequality of numbers. But, Sir, in another quarter, and at the same instant of time, my apprehensions were unmixed with a ray of comfort. The Baltic fleet, almost as valuable as Gibraltar itself, for it contained all the materials for future war, was on its way to England; and twelve sail of the line had been sent out from the ports of Holland to intercept them. Gibraltar was relieved by a skill and courage that baffled superior numbers: and the Baltic fleet was, I know not how, miraculously preserved. One power, indeed, the honourable gentleman has omitted in his detail:- But the Dutch, Sir, had not been disarmed by the humiliating language of that gentleman's ministry. They were warmed into more active exertions, and were just beginning to feel their own strength. They were not only about to defend themselves with effect, but to lend ten sail of the line to the fleets of France and Spain. Here, Sir, let us pause for a moment of serious and solemn consideration !

Should the ministers have persevered from day to day to throw the desperate die, whose successes had won us only abarren though glorious safety, and whose failure in a single cast would sink us into hopeless ruin? However fondly the ideas of national expectation had diffused themselves amongst the people, the ministers Sir, could entertain no rational hopes. Those columns of our strength, which many honourable gentlemen had raised with so much fancy, and decorated with so much invention, the ministers had surveyed with the eye of sober reason. I am sorry to say, we discovered the fabric of our naval superiority to be visionary and baseless.

I shall next, with submission to the right honourable gentleman who presides in that department, state, in a few words, the situation of the armý. It is notorious to every gentleman who hears me, that new levies could scarcely be torn, on any terms from this depopulated country. It is known to professional men how great is the difference between the nominal and effective state of that service; and, astonishing as it may appear, after a careful enquiry, three thousand men were the utmost force that could have been safely sent from this country on any offensive duty. But, I am told, Sir, the troops from New York would have supplied us with a force equal to the demands of every intended expedition. The foreign troops in that garrison we had no power to embark on any other than American service; and, in contradiction to the honourable gentleman who spoke last, and to that noble lord whose language he affects to speak in this House, no transports had been prepared, or could have been assembled for their immediate embarkation. Where, Sir, should they have directed their course when they were at length embarked, but into the hazard of an enemy's fleet, which would have cruized with undisputed superiority in every part of the western world.

No pressure of public accusation, nor heat of innocence in its own defence, shall ever tempt me to disclose a single circumstance which may tend to humiliate my country. What I am about to say will betray no seeret of state; it is known, for it is felt throughout the nation. There remains at this instant, exclusive of the annual services, an unfunded debt of thirty millions.—Taxes, Sir, the most flattering, have again and again been tried, and, instead of revenue from themselves, have frequently produced a failure in others, with which they had been found to sympathize. But here, Sir, I am told by the honourable gentleman who spoke last, other nations would have felt an equal distress. Good God! to what a consequence does the honourable gentleman lead us ! Should I, Sir, have dared to advise a continuance of war, which endangered the bankruptcy of public faith ; a bankruptcy which would have almost dissolved the bonds of government, and have involved the state in the confusion of a general ruin? Should I have ventured to do this, because one of the adverse powers MIGHT have experienced an equal distress?

The honourable gentleman who spoke last has amused the house with various statements, on the different principles of uti possidetis and restitution. The principle of those statements is as false as it is unexpected from him. Did his great naval friend acquaint him with the respective values of Dominique and St. Lucia? that lord, who in His Majesty's councile had advised, and perhaps wisely, a preference of the former ! The value of Dominique, Sir, was better known to our enemies; and the immense sums employed by them in fortifying that island, prove as well its present value, as their desire to retain it. That honourable gentleman has, on all occasions, spoke with approbation of the last peace : was St. Lucia left in our hands by that peace, the terms of which we ourselves preseribed ? or was St. Lucia really so impregnable as to endanger all our possessions at the commencement of the present war?

It would be needless for me to remind the honourable gentleman who spoke last of any declarations he had made in a preceding session : professions from him so antiquated and obsolete, would have but little weight in this House. But I will venture to require consistency for a single week, and shall remind him of his declaration in Monday's debate, “ that even this peace was preferable to a contínuance of the war." Will he then eriminate His Majesty's ministers by the present motion, for preferring what he would have preferred? or how will he presume to prove, that, if better terms could have been obtained, it was less their interest than their duty to have obtained them.

Was this peace, Sir, coneluded with the same indecent levity, that the honourable gentleman would proceed to its condemna. tion ? Many days and nights were laboriously employed by His Majesty's ministers in such extensive negociations ; - consultations were held with persons the best informed on the respective subjects ;--- many doubts were well weigbed, and removed ; and weeks and months of solemn discussion gave birth to that peace, which we are required to destroy without examination : that peace,

the positive ultimatum from France, and to which I solemnly assure the public there was no other alternative but a continuance of war.

Could the ministers, thus surrounded with scenes of ruin, affect to dictate the terms of peace? And are these articles seriously compared with the peace of Paris ? There was, indeed, a time when Great Britain might have met her enemies on other conditions ; and if an imagination, warmed with the power and glory of this country, could have diverted any member of His Majesty's councils from a painful inspection of the truth, I might, I hope, without presumption, have been entitled to that indulgence. I feel, Sir, at this instant, how much I had been animated in my childhood by a recital of England's victories :- I was taught, Sir, by one whose memory I shall ever revere, that at the close of a war, far different indeed from this, she had dictated the terms of peace to submissive nations. This, in which I place something more than a common interest, was the memorable æra of England's glory. But that æra is past : she is under the awful and mortifying necessity of employing a language that corresponds with her true condition : the visions of her power and pre-eminence are passed away.

We have acknowledged American Independence that, Sir, was a needless form: the incapacity of the noble lord who conducted our affairs; the events of war, and even a vote of this House, had already granted what it was impossible to withhold.

We have ceded Florida – We have obtained Providence and the Bahama Islands.

We have ceded an extent of fishery on the coast of Newfoundland - We have established an exclusive right to the most valuable banks.

We have restored St. Lucia, and given up Tobago-- We have regained Grenada, Dominica, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montserrat, and we have rescued Jamaica from her impending danger. In Africa we have ceded Goree, the grave of our countrymen; and we possess Senegambia, the best and most healthy settlement.

In Europe we have relinquished Minorca - kept up at an immense and useless expence in peace, and never tenable in war.

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