one of achieving wireless telegraphy,* for it is certainly not to the country's interests that any one company should have a monopoly of the practical experience required in long-distance work, in organising the traffic and staff, and in coping with the difficulties that arise in a new industry. Nor is it to the interest of that industry that any check, or even apparent check, should be put on development by lack of common opportunity. It has been stated that one or two wireless concerns have been more or less crippled in the past in the matter of capital, and therefore of staff, organisation, etc., due to the apprehension felt by financiers, that such a monopoly exists. Whether this apprehension is well founded or not it would be difficult to say at this juncture;† but it is satisfactory to note, from official assurances, that there is no prospect of any such monopoly now. During the initial Wireless' Enquiry of 1907, the writer strongly urged a policy of equality of opportunity'; and that was the policy adopted by the then Liberal Government, as by the Unionist, Government previously. Anything like a monopoly is obviously contrary to public interests as also to the interests of the scientific and industrial development of a new art.

It has for some time seemed that wireless telegraphy within the Empire should, if only for strategic purposes, be taken over by the State and kept under direct and complete Government control from beginning to end; and it is a matter for regret that the necessary staff, together with the necessary knowledge and organisation, has not yet been provided by the State to cope with its gradual development. The situation is one that must be faced, and the sooner the better, while the transition stage continues. Experimental work could well be included in the scope of such a department as is suggested,

* Probably the question which will be asked some years hence will be not which is the best 'system,' but rather which is the best transmitter and which is the best receiver; and these will be purchasable according to the needs of the case as separate articles, not necessarily associated with the same organisation.

+ That a monopoly has been widely feared is indicated by the number of patentees who have advertised their desire to dispose of rights or to grant licenses.

See Report of Select Committee on Radio-telegraphic Convention (Cd. 246), 1907.

just as it is with the United States Government.* All credit is due to Commendatore Marconi for the practical development of the art; all credit also to those who preceded him-Clerk Maxwell (mathematically), Heinrich Hertz (physically and experimentally), Sir Oliver Lodge (physically and experimentally), and others; but it is a great pity that invention in this field was not retained for the country in the first instance. Yet even so, if, when licenses were originally granted, it had been made a condition that full information should be supplied and the right of inspection recognised, whenever demanded, the State would have found itself in a better position to-day. Whereas, certain matters are most suitably adapted to private enterprise, others are not; and private enterprise in inter-imperial wireless telegraphy, which concerns the whole nation, should be pretty well limited to invention-towards which every encouragement should be accorded-and to manufacture.

Let us now consider the present relative positions of cable and wireless telegraphy as methods of communication with distant countries. Since there appears to be an impression that radio-telegraphy is likely to be more effective than cables from a strategic point of view, we will review the two methods from this standpoint. To begin with, the wireless method has an obvious and important advantage, in that communication can be directly effected with a fleet at sea, instead of merely with the nearest cable station and thence by wireless to the fleet itself. We have, however, to remember that a cable message (besides being certain to reach the other end) is far more strictly confined to the quarter for which it is intended. Indeed, it is at present difficult to foresee any strictly secret method of communication other than that provided by a cable, the two ends of which are under immediate control; though clearly wireless' must always be of great convenience to a fleet, as well as to the Admiralty, in peace times. It is often suggested that the use of a secret code or cipher covers all objections on the score of eaves-dropping. On the other hand, even if

6

To wireless' work outside the Empire full play should be given to British private enterprise and individual effort of all kinds.

radio-telegraphy now sufficiently adapts itself to code work on a large scale, it would be absurd to rely merely on the secrecy secured by codes; for it is well known that, provided a sufficient number of words are passing, any cipher yet invented can be deciphered. As a matter of fact even cipher codes are frequently discovered by surreptitious means. Moreover, coding and decoding take more time than war operations usually allow.

With a view to avoiding interference with wireless messages, different wave lengths are provided for different kinds of service.* It will, however, not be gainsaid that in wireless telegraphy a great deal of eavesdropping can go on. Thus, during their recent war with Italy, the Turks intercepted a number of wireless messages from the Russian warships to the Italian fleet, which corroborated the report of the 'Croyava' as to the number of ships and their position. Again, in the 'Titanic' tragedy, the wireless messages sent by the 'Carpathia,' and those to that vessel by ships and shore stations, were much interfered with by a large number of wireless stations. If low-power stations and ship stations, which are also of lower power, can interfere with high-power stations, it is obvious that high-power stations can still more easily do so. All that is necessary is to get the same wave length, and by that means, if desired, make communication more difficult. Indeed, if we were at war, our wireless service could be 'tuned out' at many different points. Even a two-hundred mile station might be able to drown our signals and render them unintelligible. Or, if it suited the enemy better, he might read them and make his own use of them.

Another strategic objection to wireless as compared with cable telegraphy rests in the fact that anyone having the requisite knowledge and facilities is in a position to send out messages without their source being readily detected by the receiver,† as was notably the case in the original false reports regarding the 'Titanic.' This argument in favour of the cable will be almost completely

* It remains to be seen how far this can be pushed without confusion between the increasing numbers of high-power stations in close proximity. This may be an advantage to the belligerent; but on the other hand it is equally likely to be the reverse.

discounted if and when wireless telephony becomes practically satisfactory for really long ranges; for in telephony one at any rate hears a human voice-of friend or foe-rather than mere telephonic signals. Apart from the cable being less open to eavesdropping than 'wireless,' the intentional betrayal of a message with the latter is far more likely to occur than with the cable; for in the latter case the transmission and reception of messages is limited to known individuals, whereas with wireless' a message may be betrayed from unknown and untraceable quarters. It is, indeed, impossible for the sender of a wireless message to tell who may, or who may not, be at the other end, or how many ends there are. In a word, radio-telegraphy is likely to prove a two-edged weapon in warfare; and a cable, the locality of both ends of which are known, is the only secure means of communication in a strategic sense. In fact, however marvellous and advantageous the new method may just now appear to be, had the order of the two inventions been reversed, and had we been as familiar with wireless telegraphy as we actually are with the cable, the cable would now be regarded as a new and wonderful boon, inasmuch as it enables us to confine our messages to the individuals for whom alone they are intended.

Turning now from the question of secrecy under normal conditions to that of interruption, the special advantage claimed for 'wireless' has always been that cables are readily cut. Shallow-water cables can of course be cut in time of war, and always will be. For this reason much may be said in favour of deep-water lines in the open ocean, far removed from foreign waters and from trade routes such as the Mediterranean Sea; and it is on these grounds that the Pacific route (approached from Great Britain by the Atlantic, where a similar State cable is, therefore, a necessity) should be regarded as eminently important for our communications with the rest of the Empire. It is not an easy, or a speedy, matter to tap or cut a cable, or interrupt a message passing through it, if it is laid in deep water.*

* Cable-cutting in great depths cannot well be managed without expert knowledge, experience and special implements. It often takes several weeks even to find a deep-sea cable, for under unfavourable weather conditions it is useless to attempt grappling for the line.