Art. 16. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

In his fascinating book 'Rasplata,' or 'The Reckoning,' Commander Semenoff told us of the Russian fleet's long and slow voyage to the culminating battle of Tsushima. It took twenty-two months for the German High Seas Fleet to make a start on May 31 last; and it was back again— or what was left of it-by the next morning. The reason for this proceeding was given in advance by its former chief, Grand Admiral von Köster, in a lecture delivered at Kiel early in February 1915. He pointed out that, if Germany lost ship for ship, she would be left without a fleet, and her coast would be seriously menaced by invasion. Whatever, then, may have been 'the enterprise directed north,' it is certain that the German Admiral was resolved to keep his fleet'in being.'

Sensitiveness to criticism from a public which has been taught to expect much from the Navy is probably responsible for the attempts of the Germans to conceal their losses. There is always, however, an aftermath of evidence, for, apart from what is gleaned by neutral travellers, a battle may rage near some great fishingground; and survivors, picked up from lost vessels, find their way to neutral countries. In this way certain facts have come to light, in addition to those drawn from German official sources. The first official wireless, circulated all over the world, gave only the battleship Pommern' and the new cruiser Wiesbaden' as lost, and the cruiser Frauenlob' and some torpedo-boats as 'not yet returned to port.' Later the new cruiser Elbing' was added; and finally the battle-cruiser Lützow' and the new cruiser 'Rostock.' The loss of the two last ships was only given out on June 8, when the Reichstag had adjourned until Sept. 26, having voted a credit of 600,000,000l. the previous day; and after it was said in Hamburg that these ships, as well as the battleship 'Westphalen,' had been lost. It is still asserted that only five torpedo-boats failed to return, a statement which may be contrasted with that of Admiral Beatty, when he told his crews that the Germans had lost 'destroyers so numerous that we have not managed to count them.' This speech is confirmed by the three survivors of V48 landed at Aarhus. They said that

the German losses were colossal, and they believed that twenty torpedo-boats were destroyed. The survivors, however, refused to give any further information.' The enemy officially acknowledge the loss of one battleship, one battle-cruiser, four cruisers and five destroyerseleven in all. We acknowledge the loss of three battlecruisers, three armoured cruisers, one destroyer leader and seven destroyers-fourteen in all. We estimate that the Germans lost three battleships, one battle-cruiser, five light cruisers, six destroyers, and one submarine. It is also believed that one battleship and one battlecruiser, together with three destroyers, were so severely damaged that it is doubtful if they could reach port. This table is more in keeping with the sober utterance of the Director of the Navy Department in the Reichstag, Rear-Admiral Hebbinghaus, who said that some of the German ships have been considerably damaged, but the greater portion of the fleet had returned to harbour.'

With every sympathy for the Admiralty, we decline to believe that Admiral Jellicoe's telegraphic report, received on the Friday afternoon (June 2), bore much resemblance to the statement issued in the last editions

of the evening papers. The second communication, made about midnight, showed a sense of perspective which was lacking in the first. We recall how, in the darkest period of the war, the Prime Minister appealed for unlimited patience and a proper sense of perspective. As for the latter, the appeal must be re-addressed to the Admiralty; and, as for our patience, it was strained to the breaking-point when Mr Churchill was brought in to sit in judgment on the report of the country's trusted Admiral, and to publish his criticism through the Press Bureau. One is tempted to apply to the Admiralty, on that Friday when it issued its statements, Pepys' own description of it on the occasion of the Dutch raid in the Medway: This put us at the Board into a tosse.' It is fairly obvious that the German wireless would have itself given the Admiralty a hint of the truth, if they had not been in a panicky mood, when Imagination frames events unknown In wild fantastic shapes of hideous ruin.' The German report began by stating the objective as an enterprise directed north.' The fact was patent, that it had been

stopped less than a hundred miles from its startingpoint. The subsequent part of the message suggested the next point to make, namely that the German fleet had been driven back to its refuge; and it was equally certain that our fleet was still scouring the open sea from which it had driven the enemy. A few hours later, the Admiralty announced these facts.

While the preponderance of the Allied Navies is something like three to one, the relative loss is a minor point. Even here, however, very different language might have been employed, though, since the Admiralty refuse to allow the first telegram they received to be seen, one cannot tell whether they could have gone quite as far as Beatty did in his subsequent speech to his men, saying, 'You can take it from me now that the damage that we inflicted on the Germans was far greater than that which they inflicted on us.' It is, however, in connexion with Russia that the greatest opportunity for announcing important results was lost. 'An enterprise directed north' implies an attempt to strike at the munitions route to Archangel. A battle forced at some hazard, inflicting great damage on the German fleet, sensibly improves the position of the Russian Baltic fleet, and lessens the aid which the sea can render to Hindenburg's army. It shows a great lack of imagination to have missed such an opportunity of making a reassuring statement.

We must remember that Germany has to provide for a triple demand in the Baltic during the summer months, viz. (a) the Gulf of Riga operations; (b) the blockade of the Sound; (c) the safeguarding of transports to Libau, and of merchant ships to Sweden. Now the wastage of Germany's fast small cruisers was notorious; it has been accelerated by the recent action. With some of their battle-cruisers sunk and others badly damaged, they have little to oppose to the four great 'Borodinos' of 27 knots' speed, armed with 14-inch guns, two of which are certainly completed or nearing completion. It was only by battle-cruisers that Great Britain was able to interfere with the enterprise' of the German battle-cruisers. One can easily conceive operations which two 'Borodinos' could carry through, if no German battle-cruisers were on guard, which would revolutionise

the whole position in the Baltic to Germany's permanent disadvantage.

Apart from the above-mentioned results, we have much reason for satisfaction. The effect of Mr Churchill's alarmist naval speech on March 7, 1916, has been dispelled, not by discussion in the House of Commons, but by the failure of his imaginary guns and ships to materialise. He himself has now recognised this. There are no surprises or unforeseen features,' he says in his Press Bureau statement on June 4, 1916. 'An accurate measure can be taken of the strength of the enemy; and his definite inferiority is freed from any element of uncertainty.' The tactical methods of the new German admiral have been disclosed. Once more it is seen that our best defence is to hit the enemy and keep on hitting him as fast and as hard as possible, though care must be taken not to expose ammunition which may be exploded by enemy fire and cause disaster to the ship.

It was a considerable achievement to have thwarted the German plans by bringing the High Seas Fleet to action. Could not this have enabled the Admiralty to have covered Beatty until his return home? It is absolutely essential to the command in war, that a General or an Admiral should feel that the men behind him in Whitehall will not permit his prestige to be tarnished. You must defend Paris to the end,' said M. Millerand to General Galliéni. Take all the initiative and all the responsibility. I cover you.' It was the shabbiest of cover that the Board of Admiralty gave to the country's trusted sailors.

Mr Balfour has begged the public not 'to discuss the details of this battle' until the Commander-in-Chief's despatch appears. Even if we had the will to refuse, we have not the means, for only fragmentary and contradictory accounts have been published-the fitful observations of men busy about their own duties, catching glimpses through the smoke of a battle fought on a foggy evening into the middle watch of the night. For Beatty's despatch on the comparatively small fight of Jan. 24, 1915, we had to wait 38 days. For official reports of the earlier action on Aug. 27, 1914, we waited 57 days,

because the Admiralty wished to date its announcement on Trafalgar Day. For the despatches concerning the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts, we have already waited sixteen months.

Formerly, an Admiral wrote his own despatch, and it was a real human document. Nowadays, letters, telegrams and individuals pass to and fro; and the final product is liable to be toned down into what Whitehall considers a harmonious picture suited to Parliament, press and public. Mr Balfour's predecessor claimed the right to edit the despatches after they had been received. We are not sanguine, therefore, of obtaining a complete and coherent picture of the battle even when the ban on criticism is removed; and probably for a generation to come it will occupy the critic and the historian, as official and private documents gradually come to light.

The action of a leader of tactical insight and prudent courage can never be decided on the lines of mere material weighed in the balance, as we played our wargames during peace. Nelson, who is known chiefly for his more daring feats, could be very cautious when circumstances dictated it, as Mr H. W. Wilson has shown by some useful letters in 'The Times.' If Beatty were by nature rash and impetuous, as his critics alleged, he would have acted very differently in the Battle of the Bight on Aug. 27, 1914. He did not risk his important units until the need was urgent, and, with a cruiser at his mercy, he did not pursue. Our destroyers (he said) had reported the presence of floating mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a withdrawal.' That was the act of a man whose sense of proportion tells him when risks are not worth running.

Very different were the circumstances of the Dogger Bank fight on Jan. 24, 1915. It is now known that the Admiralty made an incorrect statement in saying that the action was broken off because the squadron had 'reached an area where dangers from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.' The action was broken off 70 miles W.N.W. of Heligoland; and Beatty's official despatch merely states that, on the disablement of his ship, he boarded the 'Attack' and 'proceeded at