all men in time past; or again, they may be pleasures derived from abstract and ideal creations of the mind, in these various cases exhibiting varying degrees of reality and ideality. The pleasures of heaven may arise from the transference to a future state of specific pleasures actually experienced in the past, or may be those accompanying the most exalted and elaborate creations of the imagination. The pleasures of social liberty may, in like manner, accompany more simple representations of experienced freedom, or may be those attached to an ideal creation of a perfect social state.

§ 15. A third remark to be made is upon the complex union and interference of pleasures and pains. As to the former specifications the primary are more simple, but even among these the simplicity is only relative. The pleasures of air and exercise are blended; respiration is itself a variety of exercise. The pleasures of society and sexual gratification are closely allied. There is a connection between repletion and repose, and between hunger and irritation; while the pleasures of integrity and nervous vitality may be considered to have a part in all the others. In the higher divisions the same fact is noticeable in a more marked degree. The pleasures of occupation imply those of freedom of movement; the pains of want of necessaries are associated with those of insecurity. The pleasures of wealth are made up largely of those of power and the converse; the pains of ignorance carry with them sometimes in association the pains of poverty. The pleasures of heaven are a vast complex of other pleasures; so also of corresponding pains are made up the pains of hell.

In like manner interference is frequent and characteristic. The pleasures of repose may be detrimental to and subversive of those of exercise; those of sexual gratification to those of heat; those of aggression and conflict of those of security; the happiness of those about us to pleasures of food and drink, clothing and fire; the presence of the opposite sex to occupation. Knowledge may be opposed to health, wealth to knowledge; good character may even be hostile to good repute; and always social order and liberty are at the sacrifice of some individual and egoistic pleasures.

§ 16. It may perhaps excite the wonder of the reader that no place is apparently provided for the æsthetic pleasures. The deficiency is not, however, more than a seeming one. Esthetic pleasures may arise in connection with any of the pleasures

may be seen in and around all objects which excite pleasure or in representations of them. The ideal pleasures of the first, second and third order include all the æsthetic delights. Anger is a pleasure, but there could be made no class of objects of anger; the emotion arises in consequence of and auxiliary to certain appetites. Esthetic emotions are those which spring forth upon the ideal contemplation of certain objects which are associated with the satisfaction of volitions. Beautiful objects are those which evoke æsthetic emotions; these latter are sublimated ideal pleasures, primary, secondary and tertiary, belonging to all three of the grand divisions and peculiar to no one of them.

§ 17. The fact that indulgence of pleasures of one sort is often at the expense of other pleasures leads to the association of pleasures of one description with pains of another, so that under one name both are recalled. We are accustomed to speak of the pleasures and pains of knowledge or wealth, associating together under the term knowledge those pleasures which knowledge brings and the pains resulting from the crowding out of other pleasures, as those of health for instance. But what we really have in such case is not pains of knowledge but of disease; there occur in conjunction pleasures of knowing and pains of disintegration of the body. We might speak of the pleasures and pains of security in like manner; the signification of our language being the pleasures of security and the limitation of the pleasures of freedom of movement, or in other words the pains of restraint. Conversely, were we to refer to the pains and pleasures of restraint we should mean the pains of restraint and the pleasures of security. While, therefore, pleasures and pains are continually checking each other and are so associated as to be clustered around the same objects, it will be well for us to keep distinct the causes both of the one and of the other.

§ 18. A comparison of the table of primary pleasures and pains with the classification of peripherally-initiated feelings given in an earlier part of this work (Chap. XXVI.) will show the one last mentioned to be really the foundation of the other. Our primary pleasures are the ultimate sensations of organic life and representations thereof. The five senses are ministers of organic life. Taste and smell are subservient to alimentation; their pleasures and pains are all attached to those of appetitive cravings which have been enumerated; touch is equally so, being associated closely

all men in time past; or again, they may be pleasures derived from abstract and ideal creations of the mind, in these various cases exhibiting varying degrees of reality and ideality. The pleasures of heaven may arise from the transference to a future state of specific pleasures actually experienced in the past, or may be those accompanying the most exalted and elaborate creations of the imagination. The pleasures of social liberty may, in like manner, accompany more simple representations of experienced freedom, or may be those attached to an ideal creation of a perfect social state.

§ 15. A third remark to be made is upon the complex union and interference of pleasures and pains. As to the former specifications the primary are more simple, but even among these the simplicity is only relative. The pleasures of air and exercise are blended; respiration is itself a variety of exercise. The pleasures of society and sexual gratification are closely allied. There is a connection between repletion and repose, and between hunger and irritation; while the pleasures of integrity and nervous vitality may be considered to have a part in all the others. In the higher divisions the same fact is noticeable in a more marked degree. The pleasures of occupation imply those of freedom of movement; the pains of want of necessaries are associated with those of insecurity. The pleasures of wealth are made up largely of those of power and the converse; the pains of ignorance carry with them sometimes in association the pains of poverty. The pleasures of heaven are a vast complex of other pleasures; so also of corresponding pains are made up the pains of hell.

In like manner interference is frequent and characteristic. The pleasures of repose may be detrimental to and subversive of those of exercise; those of sexual gratification to those of heat; those of aggression and conflict of those of security; the happiness of those about us to pleasures of food and drink, clothing and fire; the presence of the opposite sex to occupation. Knowledge may be opposed to health, wealth to knowledge; good character may even be hostile to good repute; and always social order and liberty are at the sacrifice of some individual and egoistic pleasures.

§ 16. It may perhaps excite the wonder of the reader that no place is apparently provided for the aesthetic pleasures. The deficiency is not, however, more than a seeming one. Esthetic pleasures may arise in connection with any of the pleasures

may be seen in and around all objects which excite pleasure or in representations of them. The ideal pleasures of the first, second and third order include all the aesthetic delights. Anger is a pleasure, but there could be made no class of objects of anger; the emotion arises in consequence of and auxiliary to certain appetites. Esthetic emotions are those which spring forth upon the ideal contemplation of certain objects which are associated with the satisfaction of volitions. Beautiful objects are those which evoke æsthetic emotions; these latter are sublimated ideal pleasures, primary, secondary and tertiary, belonging to all three of the grand divisions and peculiar to no one of them.

§ 17. The fact that indulgence of pleasures of one sort is often at the expense of other pleasures leads to the association of pleasures of one description with pains of another, so that under one name both are recalled. We are accustomed to speak of the pleasures and pains of knowledge or wealth, associating together under the term knowledge those pleasures which knowledge brings and the pains resulting from the crowding out of other pleasures, as those of health for instance. But what we really have in such case is not pains of knowledge but of disease; there occur in conjunction pleasures of knowing and pains of disintegration of the body. We might speak of the pleasures and pains of security in like manner; the signification of our language being the pleasures of security and the limitation of the pleasures of freedom of movement, or in other words the pains of restraint. Conversely, were we to refer to the pains and pleasures of restraint we should mean the pains of restraint and the pleasures of security. While, therefore, pleasures and pains are continually checking each other and are so associated as to be clustered around the same objects, it will be well for us to keep distinct the causes both of the one and of the other.

§ 18. A comparison of the table of primary pleasures and pains with the classification of peripherally-initiated feelings given in an earlier part of this work (Chap. XXVI.) will show the one last mentioned to be really the foundation of the other. Our primary pleasures are the ultimate sensations of organic life and representations thereof. The five senses are ministers of organic life. Taste and smell are subservient to alimentation; their pleasures and pains are all attached to those of appetitive cravings which have been enumerated; touch is equally so, being associated closely

pains of hearing can be referred to repose and irritation, prostration and vitality, sex, alimentation, society, etc. So of the pleasures and pains of sight. That the sensations of the five senses are not ultimate but only accessory is evident from the fact that the senses can be abrogated and yet life continue, except in the case of touch, which cannot be dissociated from muscularity. By means of sight, and to a less degree by means of hearing, intellectual pleasures and pains are developed to a far greater extent than by any other sensibilities. Some of the pleasures of light may be referred to the sense of sight, but others with those of heat are more correctly traced back to sensations of the general system and the nervous system. The pleasures and pains of society are joined with those of sexual gratification, but for reasons which will hereafter be given, it is thought advisable to afford them a department by themselves.

CHAPTER LX.

PRIMARY PLEASURES AND PAINS.

§ 1. IN the classification of pleasures and pains just presented it is not claimed that a complete list is given, or that the best grouping is made that can be made. The attention of psychologists has been comparatively little devoted to the emotional department of mind. While treatises upon intellect have been abundant, and while the process of cognition and the nature of cognitions have come within the purview of philosophy in all ages, the subject of feeling has been neglected. Few have attempted a thorough study or made an elaborate survey of the feelings. Accordingly science, so far as it relates to pleasures and pains, sensations and emotions, is lamentably defective. Moreover, this branch of mental science is an exceedingly difficult one. No phenomena of the mind are so perplexing, from the vast multitude and variety of facts to be considered, as are the feelings. They are so complex, so blended and interwoven, so subtle, so indefinable; they are not susceptible of analysis, and scientific co-ordination, in as satisfactory degree as are cognitions. The sources and