And it will be admitted, that we know less of the future world than of the present, and that the little knowledge which we have concerning it, is in its relations more enveloped in mystery. Hence it follows, a fortiori, that if it is impossible for our present limited capacities to comprehend the modes and circumstances of the truths of the present world, which are less mysterious; much less can they comprehend those of the truths relating to the future world, which are more mysterious.

Again: The same relation between a certain truth which was unknown and other truths and principles which were known and understood, which led the mind to the discovery of the unknown truth, also implies some similarity or analogy or connexion with the truth which was known and understood; by virtue of which the truth discovered is also at least in some degree intelligible. And the same relation between the faculties of the human mind and an unknown truth, by virtue of which there was a peculiar adaptation in the mind for the discovery of that truth, rather than of others which it never could discover, and for a knowledge of which we are indebted to revelation alone, also implies a peculiar adaptation in the mind to understand the truth discovered. Thus the fact that the illustrious Kepler was able to comprehend those principles, a knowledge of which led him to the discovery that the orbits of the planets are not spherical but elliptic, also implied his ability to comprehend the properties and relations of an ellipsis; and his comprehension of these and of the related truths, conducted him to the additional discovery that the planets, in their revolutions, describe equal areas in equal times. The acquaintance of the great Sir Isaac Newton with the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and those enlarged views of the solar system as one connected whole, which led him to the thought that the same principle which brought the apple to the ground, might (as it reached without any sensible diminution to the summit of the highest mountains) as well extend to the moon and other planets, implied in him an

ability to comprehend the effects of this principle when once the thought had been started. Similar to this is the case of those truths, relative to the existence and nature of God, which reason teaches. Thus, it is an undisputed principle, that the framer of a machine, in the structure of which there are evidently design and adaptation to an end, must be an intelligent being. And perceiving the manifest design and adaptation in the construction of the universe, men may justly infer the intelligence of the Author of it. Now, the relation between the doctrine that God is an intelligent Being and the principle that every machine manifesting design and adaptation must have an intelligent being for its author, implies some analogy or similarity or connexion between them, from which it results that as the principle is intelligible, the doctrine which flows from it will be so also, at least in some degree; and that the same adaptation of the human faculties and knowledge of related truths which led to the discovery of the doctrine, or which enables us to perceive evidences of its truth, also implies, at least in some degree, the ability to comprehend the truth discovered. From these considerations it necessarily follows, that we have reason to believe that those truths which are contained in a divine revelation and are also taught by reason, are in their nature less incomprehensible and less involved in mysterious relations, than those between which and the knowledge obtained by our natural faculties, there is no such analogy or connexion as could lead to their discovery, or could afford evidence of their truth after they are revealed. Hence, it follows that among the truths contained in a divine revelation, the mode and relations of those which were taught by revelation alone [articuli puri] will probably be more mysterious than of those, of which the light of nature affords us some knowledge. And hence it follows, in reference to the Deity, that as the mode and many of the relations of those truths relative to the nature of the divine Being which are taught by reason, are absolutely incomprehensible, it may naturally be ex

pected that if any additional truths are revealed to us on this subject, their mode and relations would be still more mysterious; inasmuch as they would have no analogy or similarity to the knowledge which we possess.

Finally; in reference to those truths relative to the divine Being (such as omniscience, knowledge of future contingencies and the like) which are taught by reason, we find that those relations of them which were incomprehensible by the light of reason, are just as incomprehensible after the truths to which they refer have been also taught by revelation, as they were before. But if it were the intention of God, that we should fully comprehend all the relations of the truths contained in his revelation, he would at least have perfected our knowledge of the relations of those truths which even reason had taught us to understand. But this he has not done. Therefore it is not his intention, and we have no ground to expect, that our limited capacities should be able to comprehend the modes and circumstances and relations of those truths which reason could not teach, and which are known only by revelation, any more than of those truths known without revelation; but on the contrary, it is natural to expect, that their relations would be still more enveloped in mystery.

PROP. 5. We can believe, and it is our duty to believe, those truths of revelation which are untaught by reason, as far as they are revealed, i. e. made comprehensible, but no farther; for this is impossible, and the Scriptures do not require it.

It will be admitted, that almost every thing in which we believe (taking the word in its popular latitude) is in some respect or other inexplicable. We believe that we exist (without requiring the famous argument of Des Cartes to convince us of the fact); yet there are a thousand things relative to the mode of our existence which we cannot understand. We be

lieve the existence of all the external objects of which we obtain a knowledge through the medium of our senses; yet relative to every one, it were easy to propose some interrogatory to which no man could give a satisfactory reply. We believe in all those relations of visible objects and of abstract truths, the evidence of which appears to the human mind satisfactory; yet what reflecting mind does not know, that mystery envelopes all those particulars of our faith? The chymist believes in all those beautiful affinities of his science, the existence of which experience has taught him; and the lover of natural philosophy, in general believes in all those properties of matter and laws of the material world, of which observation or credible testimony assures him; but would he be entitled to the name of a philosopher, who (with our present scanty knowledge) should pretend that he fully comprehended the mode of operation and the relations of any one of these principles or laws? We believe that God is uncreated; but how any being could exist without having at some time or other began to exist, who can comprehend? Some of the ancient philosophers who received not the revelation, have inculcated the omniscience of God in very pleasing and explicit terms. Seneca the moralist, in admonishing his fellow men not to believe that they had escaped punishment because their crimes were concealed from the view of mortals, remarks, "nam ille in cujus conspectu vivimus scit omnia, he in whose presence we live (i. e. God) knows all things." The same proposition is believed alike by Deist, by Unitarian, and by the disciple of that glorious Redeemer to whom his apostle said, "Lord, thou knowest all things, thou knowest that I love thee." But is not the mode of the divine omniscience equally incomprehensible to all? Since, then, it is a fact that all men positively do believe a thousand propositions, when they cannot ` comprehend the mode and relations of the truths asserted in them; it necessarily follows that we can do it: which was the first point to be proved.

Again as it will be admitted that we are under obligation to believe the whole of a revelation which has been proved divine, it follows that it is our duty to believe every part; and consequently those parts also which contain truths or propositions, the mode of which or many of the relations of which are incomprehensible to us: and this was the second point.

Finally to say that we believe in a proposition, when we have no idea of the truth intended to be affirmed in it, is an absurdity; the thing is impossible, and cannot be a duty. By belief in a proposition, we mean the judgment of the mind that the idea affirmed by the terms of the proposition is true. Hence, to say that we believe in a proposition which we do not understand, is to say that we judge some particular idea to be true, but we do not know what idea. For we believe, either from evidence presented to our minds, or upon the testimony of one in whom we confide. We cannot believe in an unintelligible proposition, from its own evidence; for the evidence of the truth of an idea must be found in its relations to other truths or principles which are more evident; but if we do not even know what the idea in question is, much less can we know its relations. Hence it is impossible to believe in an unintelligible proposition, from its own evidence; for evidence unknown to the mind can have no influence in producing belief of any kind. Nor is it possible to believe in an unintelligible proposition, on the testimony of any being whatever. For it is impossible, by the laws of our mental nature, to judge that an idea is true or not, unless we know what the idea is. If an unintelligible proposition were contained in a divine revelation, we might express the general judgment, that, as it is of divine origin, it contains a truth which it would convey to a being that could understand it, whatever that might be, for God cannot lie. But we could not believe that any particular idea is true, on the authority of such a proposition, until we knew that it is contained in it. Hence it is evident that a belief in an unintelligible proposition, is a con