lities in the creature, not merely in mode or degree of perfec tion, but in kind;-had he, we say, contented himself with pointing out the difference of mode between the Divine knowledge and ours, his reasoning would have been less novel, but more correct. The truth is, that we arrive at the idea of God, and at that of his essential natural perfections, exactly in the same way; not by analogical comparison, but by testimony, concurring with the almost innate suggestions of reason and

consciousness.

2. A second objection related to the inference which Dr. Copleston wished to establish on this false analogy. Because there is no connexion between human expectation and foresight, and the course of events, he would argue, that there is none between what comes to pass, and the Divine foreknowledge. This is a manifest absurdity. Man has absolutely no knowledge of the future, except what is derived from revelation. A calculation of probabilities is not knowledge. He is in uncertainty as to the possible event of the next moment. But the Almighty has a perfect, certain, universal knowledge of future events: and it is, therefore, a conclusion which the Author will never be able to invalidate, that between future events and Divine foreknowledge, there must be some connexion; events which are contingent to us, being certain to Him.

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3. We objected, thirdly, to what appeared to us nothing better than a play upon words, where the Author is pleased to deny, that what is certainly future, and declared to be so, must necessarily come to pass. We observe, however, that he still adheres to this strange position. It is, he says, the only re'source' against the Predestinarian hypothesis, not to admit the position as a necessary truth, that what is foreseen, is fixed, and cannot be otherwise:" and it is one principal object of my argument, to prove that we are not bound to admit it, because there is no contradiction involved in the de'nial of it.' Surely, the cause must be desperate when this bold expedient is the only resource left to its advocate. That what is foreseen may be in its own nature contingent; that is to say, that the thing's not happening, or happening differently, would imply no natural contradiction; is admitted. It was foreseen, that Judas would betray his Master; but his not doing so would have involved no contradiction, had it not been foretold; and the contradiction, had events happened otherwise, would have related to the prophecy, not to the nature of the event, which was contingent, and admitted of the alternative. But contingent as an event may be in its own nature, its contrary implying no natural contradiction, and the cause why it so happens rather than otherwise being wholly unknown to

us; yet, when foretold, it becomes certainly known to be future; and if known to be certainly future, it must be fixed. Its being not fixed or uncertain, and yet certainly known, involves a palpable contradiction. The assertion, that a thing can be in the same respect at once certain and uncertain, is an absurdity. But an event's being predicted, though it makes the future event known to us, does not cause it to come to pass, does not in any way necessitate it. It was equally fixed or certain, therefore, before it was declared to be so by the prediction, before its futurity was revealed. What the circumstance of an event's being foretold, proves with regard to that particular event, it proves, as we remarked before, with regard to all other events, that they are foreseen by God; and if foreseen, known to be future; and if known by the Divine Mind to be future, certainly future,-fixed; equally certain with what to us is present or past. And the explanation of this fact is, that the cause which determines that a contingent event falls out in the manner that it does, rather than otherwise, is known to Him who knoweth all things, by virtue of his incommunicable attribute of Omniscience. We know of no other way which Dr. Copleston can evade this conclusion, than by maintaining, either that events are effects which take place without a cause, or that the causes which determine these effects, are unknown to God himself. If every effect has a cause, a contingent event must be determined by some cause; and that determining cause being foreknown, the effect must be foreseen; being foreseen, it must be fixed or certain; and if so, it cannot be otherwise. Not that its being otherwise would involve a physical contradiction, such as it would be to affirm that a part is equal to the whole, or that a ball gravitated towards the zenith. But, inasmuch as it is foreseen to be future, there are reasons, unknown to us, and wholly inscrutable, which make it certain that it will not be otherwise; for, in the Divine mind, it is as it will be. We challenge all Oriel College to disprove these positions. Were they our own, this might savour of arrogance; but they have been, for substance, long before the world, as urged by some of the acutest reasoners of any age. They have never yet been, and we are confident, never will be invalidated.

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4. A fourth objection brought forward in our review of the learned Provost's Inquiry, was directed against his statement relative to the paralysing effect of the creed of the Fatalist. We took the liberty of charging upon the Author a palpable blunder, in confounding a belief that things are fixed, with a knowledge of things as fixed-a belief in the absolute predestination of events in general, with a foreknowledge of particu

lar events as inevitable. For he has attributed to the former, which is the creed of the Fatalist, an effect on the mind which could result only from the latter; that is to say, from that certain anticipation which amounts to foreknowledge with respect to the particular event. And he has erred still further, in representing the annihilation of all motive as the natural tendency of a belief in the unalterableness of events, even in a future state; arguing from the operation of certain notions on a depraved nature, to what must be the effect of the same principles in a holy nature. For the proof adduced in support of this charge, we must refer our readers to that article. We would now only remark, by way of further illustration, that instances are not wanting, which would completely overthrow the Author's representation. But then, his saving clause, that some powerful counteracting cause had interfered, would enable him to parry off the conclusion. There was at least ONE inhabitant of our fallen world, who had a firm belief in the unalterableness of the whole series of events in which he was to take the most prominent part; who knew the unalterable conditions under which he was placed; yet, in whom that belief and knowledge had no tendency to extinguish motive, or to paralyse exertion. A measure of that foreknowledge, including the certainty of their eventually participating in his glory, he was pleased to communicate to the most distinguished of his followers; and in them, this tendency never developed itself. In the writings of those illustrious individuals, we find the Divine predetermination of events, and their personal, unalterable predestination, frequently adverted to; yet, strange to say, instead of being employed as a reason for supineness, these references are seemingly introduced to heighten the force of motive, and the vigour of exertion. But then, the Apostles had not studied at Oxford; they were not metaphysicians; their belief in these doctrines was nominal rather than real;' and its being unattended with its natural consequences, doubtless only proves, that some powerful counteracting cause interfered to prevent it!

It is mortifying to find a vulgar fallacy, urged by some halfwitted reprobate in apology for his vice, more in bravado than in sober earnest, dignified by learned writers with the name of an argument, and treated as a serious difficulty. Thus we find Archbishop King gravely pleading on behalf of his hypothesis, that it will supply an answer to that argument that has puzzled mankind, and done so much mischief in the world: viz. 'God foresee or predestinate that I shall be saved, I shall infallibly be so; and if he foresee or have predestinated that I ⚫ shall be damned, it is unavoidable; and therefore it is no

If.

< matter what I do, or how I behave myself.' The Archbishop admits, what Dr. Copleston and his authority Heylin seem not to have been aware of, that many answers have been given to this argument.' In fact, such is its palpable folly, that it scarcely deserves a serious answer. Any man of plain sense would perceive, that between the proposition and the inference, there is no more rational connexion, than there would be between the -sentences, If I am well, I shall get up to-morrow; therefore, I will not go to bed to-night. Or take a mode of reasoning more closely parallel: If God foresee that I shall be rich, I shall be rich; therefore, I need not work. The Tread-mill at Brixton would be the best school for such a reasoner. Yet, change a little the terms, so as to include the inclination with the action foreseen or preordained, and Dr. Copleston seems to think that it would be difficult for Philalethes, if not for the Provost of Oriel himself, to find an answer. We may state it thus; says A., If I am predestined to choose to do evil, I shall infallibly choose to do evil; or, if to choose the contrary, I shall choose ⚫the contrary.' ' And what then?' a plain man might ask in his simplicity. A. Therefore, it is no matter which I choose to do.' B. Why is it no matter?' A. Because it cannot be otherwise.' B. Otherwise than what? A. Why, otherwise than it is.' B. Softly, my good friend; you mean, or ought to mean, that it will not be otherwise than it will be, or cannot be otherwise than God sees it will be; which is true, indeed, but nothing to the present purpose, because you do not and cannot know how it will be, except as you are resolved how it shall be. You have therefore given no reason at all. The present and the future are alike with God; so that, did his knowing what you will do, or will choose to do, form any ground for your present plea, his knowing what you are, ought to make you equally indifferent to any existing evils. Try the efficacy of this logic. God sees whether I am happy or miserable; therefore, it is no matter which I am, for I cannot be both at once. Just as rational is the argument, that your future happiness does not depend on your present conduct, because God foresees what both your conduct will be, and to what it will lead. This is putting the matter in a familiar way; but, in truth, the whole perplexity arises from wrapping up vague ideas in metaphysical language; and a little common sense on these points is worth whole pages of philosophizing.

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5. We objected, in the fifth place, to Dr. Copleston's very dangerous and heretical notions respecting the Providence of God, connected with his idea, that the Divine Prescience and the free agency of man are truths apparently incompatible. The doctrine of Predestination is, in fact, only another phrase

for the doctrine of Providence; and if one is given up, both must be. The same word in Scripture is indifferently used in reference to the events of this life, and the interests of the next; and it is to be regretted that our Translators should have rendered it variously: as Acts iv. 28. " determined before:;" 1 Cor. ii. 7." ordained before ;" Rom. viii. 29, Eph. i. 5, bl. "predestinated." If God's seeing a free agent act, or, what amounts to the same thing, his fore-seeing how he will act, is thought to infringe apparently on the liberty of the agent,* so as to constitute a metaphysical difficulty; much more must God's employing that free agency seem incompatible with human freedom. Accordingly, the learned Provost considers á controlling superintendence of events as a suspension, so far as exercised, of free agency; as leaving no room for freedom. Very different were the views of the acute and learned Horsley, who speaks of the foreknowledge and providence of the Deity, and that liberty which doth truly belong to man as a 'moral agent,' as things not only perfectly consistent,' but naturally connected. What that liberty is, he is careful to explain, resolving it into the conscious power which every man feels he has, to do the action he approves, and to abstain from another which his conscience condemns,-a conscious power connected with a sense of accountableness. Happy, thrice happy,' he exclaims, they who act invariably by these (moral) perceptions! They have attained to the glorious liberty of the sons of God!' Here, then, the Bishop recognises another sort of liberty than that which is necessary to accountableness; that liberty of which St. Paul speaks when he says, that the law (or principle) of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus" had set him "free from the law of sin and death"-a freedom which he contrasts with the moral bondage of the sinner. Now then, it is quite clear, that free agency does not require this higher species of freedom, which is peculiar to the regenerate; and this is all that the Calvinist maintains. He denies the monstrous figment of the Arminian, a will independent of motives, independent of the nature of the agent, self moved, and sovereignly indifferent; he denies that the will of man is free from bias; but he does not dispute that man is free to will, that is, that he acts freely. It is truly astonishing how much nonsense has been talked on both sides for want of defining terms. Yet, the language of the Confession of Faith agreed

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*We do not deny that the attribute of foreknowledge in the Deity makes it difficult to conceive how men can be regarded by him as free and accountable agents.'

Copleston's "Inquiry." p. 78.