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Aristotle on Fallacies; or, the Sophistici Elenchi. With a translation and ...
Volledige weergave - 1866
ambiguous Analytica answerer argument Aristotle avrb avrov axiom conclusion confutation Coriscus definition dialectic dpyrj dXXa dXXd eari eariv eaTiv eirl eivai elvai enstasis erepov eristic etvai Euthydemus eXeyyos eyei fallacy fallacy of composition false fiev fikv firj genus Hippocrates ignoratio elenchi induction irapa irapd irepl irpbs irpbs tov Kadokov KaKov Kal tov Kal yap Kara koyov loci lunules method minor premiss napa napd nepl npbs oiov olov orav otov ov yap ovra ovre ovSev ovtcos ovtos p.ev p.rj paralogism paronyms petitio principii pirastic predicate principles proof proposition prove question ravra reasoning rfjs rrjs rrjv solecism solution sophism sophistic syllogism tcov term theorems thesis tion tivos to>v tois Topica tov Xoyov tovto Trjs Trjv tS>v tt)v ttjv Xeyeiv Xoyos yiverai yjrevSos
Pagina 229 - If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
Pagina 228 - Then we may reason thus: b and c are not effects of A, for they were not produced by it in the second experiment; nor are d and e, for they were not produced in the first. Whatever is really the effect of A must have been produced in both instances; now this condition is fulfilled by no circumstance except a. The phenomenon a cannot have been the effect of B or C, since it was produced where they were not; nor of D or E, since it was produced where they were not. Therefore it is the effect of A....
Pagina 228 - A general proposition inductively obtained is only then proved to be true, when the instances on which it rests are such that if they have been correctly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be inconsistent with the constancy of causation ; with the universality of the fact that the phenomena of nature take place according to invariable laws of succession.* It is probable, therefore, that M.
Pagina 229 - The method of agreement stands on the ground that whatever can be eliminated is not connected with the phenomenon by any law. The method of difference has for its foundation that whatever cannot be eliminated is connected with the phenomenon by a law.
Pagina 229 - Agreement, we endeavoured to obtain instances which agreed in the given circumstance but differed in every other: in the present method we require, on the contrary, two instances resembling one another in every other respect, but differing in the presence or absence of the phenomenon we wish to study.
Pagina 227 - The casual circumstances being thus eliminated, if only one remains, that one is the cause which we are in search of: if more than one, they either are, or contain among them, the cause: and so, mutatis mutandis, of the effect. As this method proceeds by comparing different instances to ascertain in what they agree, I have termed it the Method of Agreement: and we may adopt as its regulating principle the following canon...
Pagina 229 - The axioms implied in this method are evidently the following: whatever antecedent cannot be excluded without preventing the phenomenon is the cause, or a condition, of that phenomenon; whatever consequent can be excluded, with no other difference in the antecedents than the absence of a particular one, is the effect of that one.
Pagina 229 - Instead of comparing different instances of a phenomenon to discover in what they agree, this method compares an instance of its occurrence with an instance of its non-occurrence to discover in what they differ.
Pagina 227 - Whatever circumstance can be excluded, without prejudice to the phenomenon, or can be absent notwithstanding its presence, is not connected with it in the way of causation. The casual circumstances being thus eliminated, if only one remains, that one is the cause which we are in search of: if more than one, they either are, or contain among them, the cause: and so, mutatis mutandis, of the effect. As this...