 | Benedictus de Spinoza - 1901 - 478 pagina’s
...consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct — that is, a true — idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had... | |
 | Ralph Barton Perry - 1905 - 478 pagina’s
...philosophy. The evidence of existence, he declares, is clear and distinct conceivability. "For a person to say that he has a clear and distinct — that is, a true — idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had... | |
 | Oliver Joseph Thatcher - 1907 - 484 pagina’s
...consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct — that is, a true — idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had... | |
 | Columbia University. Department of Philosophy - 1918 - 292 pagina’s
...distinct idea of substance that warrants and requires the belief. "For a person to say," he urges, "that he has a clear and distinct — that is, a true — idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had... | |
 | Benedictus de Spinoza - 1928 - 324 pagina’s
...it exists in themselves, because through themselves they are conceived. If any one should say, then, that he has a clear and distinct, that is a true, idea of substance, and should nevertheless doubt whether such substance existed, he would indeed be like one... | |
 | E.E. Harris - 1973 - 296 pagina’s
...exist in virtue of its own self-complete nature. "If anybody were to say, therefore," Spinoza comments "that he has a clear and distinct, that is, a true, idea of substance, and nevertheless doubts whether such substance exists, it would indeed be the same as if... | |
 | Frederick Charles Copleston - 1957 - 384 pagina’s
...in this idea we perceive that existence pertains to the essence of substance. 'If anyone says, then, that he has a clear and distinct, that is, a true idea of substance and nevertheless doubts whether such substance exists, he is like one who says that he has... | |
 | Frederick Copleston - 1999 - 388 pagina’s
...in this idea we perceive that existence pertains to the essence of substance. 'If anyone says, then, that he has a clear and distinct, that is, a true idea of substance and nevertheless doubts whether such substance exists, he is like one who says that he has... | |
 | Roger Ariew, Eric Watkins - 2000 - 326 pagina’s
...through themselves, their truth external to the intellect is only in themselves. So if someone were to say that he has a clear and distinct— that is, a true — idea of substance and that he nevertheless doubts whether such a substance exists, this would surely be just... | |
 | Oliver J. Thatcher - 2004 - 466 pagina’s
...consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct — that is, a true — idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had... | |
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Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct — that is, a true — idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no... 
