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The establishment of bridgeheads and zones, as will be seen, was a purely military measure, adapted to the requirements of the overwhelmingly strong Allied and Associated armies in order to admit of their most effective employment if there should be any further armed resistance, or an attempt at a counter-stroke by Germany. The extent of Germany's military collapse had not at that time been fully realised; she was credited with the will and the capacity to continue fighting, but the point is that the boundaries of the occupied areas were based solely upon military considerations. The economic factor was not taken into account. Had it been, there would have been no talk of 'bridgeheads'; the troops would have been concentrated in the most vital industrial areas, with their lines of communication, of course, properly secured and guarded. Such a policy was natural, as long as Germany was credited with the power to take military action. The boundaries and plan of occupation, being dependent upon military reasons, were determined by soldiers. Then came the Versailles Conference of civilian Ministers and the President of a great republic, representing the victorious countries. They demobilised the bulk of their armies, without which the military occupied areas became ineffective. Note again the term 'bridgehead.' A bridgehead is a defended place of assembly for an army, on the far side of a river, to enable that army to debouch into the country beyond, or it may be intended to deny to a hostile army all access to the crossing over the river which it covers. If economic pressure was the object in view, it was necessary rather to hold the sources of economic prosperity, and armies became merely accessories, incapable of themselves of attaining the object desired.

Armies are the agents of destruction in international relationship. What was required was construction, the creation of wealth, from which reparation' and 'restitution' could be obtained from Germany, and also some sure means of securing for the Allies a fair proportion of the wealth so created. A small concentrated Allied army in (say) the Ruhr district, or in control of commercial harbours, would have been far more effective in securing the economic object than would large armies scattered throughout the whole length of a scientific frontier, with its system of bridgeheads. Against what was security most required? Against the prospect of invasion of French and of Belgian territory by German armies? They had been heavily defeated, and had little fight left in them. Or against German trickery? Violence and cunning' were the ideals that were held before the German nation in their war-book. The violence had broken itself; the cunning might survive. (It appears to have done so.)

We now come to the peace terms as drawn up at Versailles. These were the articles affecting occupied areas:

Article 428. As a guarantee for the execution of the present Treaty by Germany, the German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Article 429. If the conditions of the present Treaty are faithfully carried out by Germany, the occupation referred to in Article 428 will be successively restricted as follows: [Here follow clauses providing for the evacuation of the Cologne bridgehead and territory after five years, the Coblenz bridgehead and territories after ten years, and the bridgeheads of Mainz, Kehl, and all occupied territory after fifteen years]. If at that date [after fifteen years] the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered efficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees.

Article 430. In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty with regard to reparation, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be reoccupied immediately by the Allied and Associated forces. Article 431. If before the expiration of a period of fifteen years Germany complies with all the undertakings resulting from the present Treaty, the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately.

We can note incidentally the constant use of the words 'and Associated,' which remind us of the main reason for the present unsettlement and distress in the Old World, in Europe and in Asia. To revert to the main issue, it seems that whereas, in the British war strategy, other than military considerations dominated the policy that was adopted, when the time arrived to make peace military considerations overrode the consideration of effective economic control, upon which satisfactory guarantees for 'restitution and reparation' depended. All nations will suffer in due proportion from the aftermath of this error, now to be seen in the French action in the Ruhr. The proportion in which the suffering will be distributed depends, for each individual nation, upon its reliance upon outside sources for economic prosperity. Britain for this reason will probably be hit the hardest. The peace terms reduced the industrial productiveness of the winning nations in so far as they imposed upon them the need to maintain large standing armies, while relieving Germany of this obligation. At the same time, little provision was made for controlling the wealth produced by German labour. Under existing conditions, the winners do not seem likely to recover from Germany much more than the cost of the armies engaged in their enforcement, and the immediate effect of the French and Belgian action has been to revive in Germany a national spirit, without which there was no danger of military aggression.

8 The temporary nature of the task allotted to the British Army of the Rhine has not, perhaps, been generally recognised,

It is too late to revise the mistakes made in British military strategy during the war. We must face their aftermath as best Is it too late to revise the mistakes made by the Allied and Associated Powers at Versailles?

GEORGE ASTON.

NOTE. No reference has been made in this article to the faulty strategy in keeping at Salonika an army too strong for defence and not strong enough for offence. Sir William Robertson, in a lecture delivered after the article was written, has laid stress on this error, which was due to a compromise between the British and French Governments.-G. A.

COMPETITION AND WAR

THE progress of human ingenuity, through barbaric, Homeric, chivalric and mechanical contests to modern war, grows more and more menacing. The duel was killed by ridicule and lethal weapons. It does not appear probable that war will be killed by either. Virgil, who was thinking of slave wars and civil wars and barbarian wars following upon the drama in three parts entitled Delenda est Carthago, complains that

Hinc movet Euphrates, illinc Germania bellum,

and he goes on to compare the world to a charioteer who vainly tugs at the reins while his horses career furiously round the arena. Such is our case.

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Is it possible to abolish competitive trials of strength? dolph swaggers on the stage till Fluellen (a great Welshman) trounces him. Bob Acres shivers piteously while Sir Lucius O'Trigger (a great Irishman) explains about snug lying in the Abbey. We laugh, and the duel gets discredited because-we dislike the idea of coffee and automatic pistols. That isn't fair competition. When competition leads to war, and war is so destructive that no one gets reparations, the spirit of jurisprudence retires in disgust. Then the strong man armed possesses his goods in peace, until the next war. We have reverted to the Border

Law (for which both the English and the Scots were responsible).

The good old rule, the simple plan ;

That he should take who hath the power,

And he should keep who can.

In this paper we set out to discuss three questions :—

I. Is Competition of the essence of Society? Can Society in its modern sense cohere or hold together without it?

II. If there is uncontrolled or unregulated Competition, will it inevitably lead to War?

III. Can we regulate this sort of Competition? If by a relentless process it does lead to War, can we regulate it so as to limit or prevent wars ?

I. Is Competition of the essence of Modern Society? In this new industrial and mechanical age it is necessary to define it. I

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would define it as competition in material things,' as the measuring of the intellect and resources of a man, or of a group of individuals against those of another man or of another group, working in the same field of human endeavour, to create or produce or distribute what the world needs.' It presupposes co-operation among the different elements composing the competitive unit. Thus a single man must employ all his energies. No one ever excelled even in a game without doing that. A competitive group is composed of numerous individuals all of whom possess wealth,' potential or dynamic. If these forces work together harmoniously, their tendency is to displace other competitors, and thus supply with their products or services the consumer who pays for the thing he gets.

The aim, in theory, of each competitive unit, which is rarely attained, is to achieve a monopoly. If that happens, various services arise to regulate or destroy it. But, as a rule, the clash of competitive groups leads to further co-operation and produces what mankind requires and pays for by the elimination of inefficient competitors. In this way supply is always arising to satisfy demand.

This sort of thing is, I suppose, as old as Time, but in its modern form is leading towards acute danger, yet it is of the very essence of the human nature of each individual. In all the activities of a competitive unit the desire or necessity to gain a given object furnishes the incentive to work. This of course applies to each individual member of the unit. The necessity of eating and being housed and clothed is the primary compelling force in the case of each individual. The desire for marital relationship introduces the element of partnership, and spurs both members to earn the wherewithal to provide for the rising family. The pure tonic of love of work operates only in selected individuals dominated by constructive ideals. Thus Shakespeare, finding himself at twenty-one years of age the father of twins, was forced to go and hold horses at a theatre door through which he caught glimpses of a career involving world-wide fame and the lay-rectorship of Stratford Church. As he made progress with his associates, the practical part of him was buying houses and lands while his imagination ran riot in Italian romances. His distanced competitors railed at him as an upstart crow beautified with our feathers.' But he gave his public what they wanted. He could not have done so without the co-operation of Burbage, Hemming, Condell and others, and the competition of Ben Jonson and others. Publicity is another thing which, in our modern sense, he did not have. Think how much he owes to the Baconians !

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Competition, therefore, originates in the individual, leads of necessity to co-operation, involves the use of the energies or

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