at Whitehall, especially in the early days, was the Naval Intelligence Department under Captain Hall. The chief of that department when first formed in 1887 was his father, Captain W. H. Hall, who asked me to be one of his two assistants.

In the early 'sixties the three ablest young officers in the navy were considered to be John Fisher, Henry Coey Kane, and W. H. Hall. They were staff officers of the Excellent when I passed for sub-lieutenant and signed my certificate. There are many who believe we had no sort of general staff, including intelligence, before the war. All I know is that Captain Hall prepared plans of campaign with each maritime country, which no doubt are still in the Admiralty records. He began work at four in the morning, and I attribute his comparatively early death to those efforts. To the work of his son we have now an impartial tribute from enemy sources. In the last instalment from the German Naval History published by The Times, referring to the Dogger Bank action, its Berlin correspondent says:

Once again the Intelligence Service of the British Admiralty was on the spot. Signals were sent to Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Beatty and Commodore T. [Tyrwhitt] giving an exact account of the German plans. The Germans did not then know that the British Admiralty were deciphering their new code; subsequently they discovered the fact, and assigned it to the probable capture of a German code signal book by the Russians when the Magdeburg stranded.

It would be interesting to know how it was actually acquired! As regards the fight, it is stated:

The report of the captain of the Seydlitz embodied a very sharp criticism on the inadequacy of the Intelligence [German] Service, the lack of preparations and the folly of allowing battle cruisers to undertake an expedition of this sort without the High Seas Fleet to fall back upon.

There is little new in the German account of the action. The loss of the Blucher is attributable to associating an inferior vessel with much superior cruisers. We did the same at the Battle of Jutland by mixing up the Warrior type with the first battle line. Several were speedily overwhelmed. The loss of the Blucher, though a severe blow to the Germans, and the temporary disabling of the Lion, Admiral Beatty's flagship, probably saved the rest of the German squadron, for several of our ships hung round the Blucher, already in extremis, and when, by some accident, one of her guns went off, they opened fire upon her again. By this time Admiral von Hipper had obtained such a lead that further pursuit was abandoned. The German historian is quite candid in his criticism of this operation, and quotes the report of the chief of staff to Admiral von Pohl, which comments on the lack of foresight and caution displayed; but it appears to be undoubted that the prompt appearance of Admiral Beatty's squadron took the

Germans by surprise, and any success achieved is largely due to the efficiency of our Naval Intelligence. Our own official naval history is excellent in its compilation of facts, but one seeks in vain for candid criticism of much which disturbed our peace in the early days of the war.

The German naval policy was as defective as its Intelligence. The cheap swagger obtained by a rush bombardment of a quiet watering-place like Scarborough was not worth the risk involved of being cut off, which more than once nearly occurred; while for the main fleet there were two courses open: to stay in harbour or go out and fight; to be sunk in the North Sea after an honourable struggle was preferable to an uninjured sinking in Scapa Flow. Only Von Tirpitz seems to have had the right idea of the fleet's mission, but he was powerless against the insane idea of the Kaiser and his Chancellor of preserving the fleet as an asset when peace negotiations began. This is the danger of a war lord without knowledge, as we have often experienced. If a general or an admiral suffers defeat he is usually brought to book, but the Minister who initiates the campaign which leads to defeat or disaster escapes censure or is translated to a higher office. So we lose the benefit of investigation for use in future wars, while the reputation of statesmen is given a fictitious value. To the memory of those who fell at the call of duty in the war we owe some proof that they had not been set an impossible task.

S. EARDLEY-WILMOT.

1923

WILL DISARMAMENT BRING PEACE?

BEFORE the beginning of the Christian era Publius Syrus had enunciated his maxim, 'We should provide in peace what we need in war.'

Whether this maxim has or has not been consistently obeyed in the past, whether it should or should not receive attention in the present, one thing, at least, is clear from even the most perfunctory reading of history: all through the ages it has been the custom of men to provide in war what they need in peace. Whatever tends to increase man's needs, or supposed needs, is to be regarded as a potential cause of war.

The wars which have not been provoked for the sake of gain have been few. Possibly, on a close analysis, it could be shown that no such wars have ever been waged. Wars to right wrongs have been provoked by strife which was embarked upon for gain. Did primitive man, armed with a club, attack his neighbour for the sake of using that club or because of something which he either did not own or feared to lose?

Within the past quarter of a century we have heard repeatedly of one nation's 'earth hunger' and of another's 'need of warm water ports.' If the last great war was provoked simply and solely because a ruler, who knew more of despotism than of benevolence, had under his control an army trained and equipped to a condition of supposed invincibility, and because that ruler's son spoke of ' a war for the fun of the thing,' we may still conclude that both father and son were mental perverts who would not have been permitted to exercise a mere whim had not some powerful section of their people seen possibilities of gain. Even if in the immediate past it has been possible for a megalomaniac to be the sole cause of war, that possibility seems, by recent events, to have been removed. To-day no first-class Power is ruled by anything approaching autocracy. If large navies and large armies continue to exist, the danger of their being regarded or used as playthings for the gratification of unbalanced minds appears to have passed. In the light of history and of present conditions, it seems not unreasonable to assert that any war embarked upon in the near future would in reality be a matter of commercial speculation VOL. XCIII-No. 556

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rather than of militant enterprise. So murderous a speculation would probably be attributable either to the inordinate greed of some excessively powerful group within the aggressor nation or to what may be termed the economic needs of that nation. As regards the first of these hypotheses, we know that outstanding personalities have figured in the history of the world concerning whom it has been remarked that they were subjects kings ought to flatter or destroy.' In quite modern times we have heard whispers about the sinister aims of persons said to desire nothing so much as the creation of demand for munitions of war. If such suggestions have no foundation in fact, it is yet certain that they derive verisimilitude from the generally commercial atmosphere of our times.

In the remote past and in the Middle Ages wars were precipitated crudely enough for gain. In modern times much the same motives can frequently be traced, even though the term ' economic necessity' has come into use. If such necessity increases, can it be supposed that the hostility between nations will grow less? However we may answer this question, we shall be compelled to admit that one of the tendencies of modern development is to bring possible foes within closer striking distance of one another. Deprive each potential belligerent of some part of her armoury, will that create any reluctance to make use of what is still in being? Suppose every navy and every army to have been reduced to but I per cent. of its former strength in both personnel and munitions, would the casus belli of yesterday seem insufficient to-morrow on that account? Remembering that in modern conditions a hostile expedition need number no more than two, even though seas and continents are to be crossed, we realise that a smaller number of fighting men cannot be said to make fighting a remote possibility.

Military disarmament will by itself do nothing to reduce the possibilities of international war. On the contrary, it is much to be feared that any such reduction will tend to embitter the rivalry between nation and nation. War is no longer the last argument of kings.' It has become the final move in games of commercial speculation. As such rivalry increases, so also will the chance of war. If we accept the main teaching of Malthus, we must also accept the assertion that commercial competition will grow greater in volume and more keen in spirit. In other words, conditions which we have come to accept as natural, if not inevitable, are developing towards increased probability of international strife. Simultaneously a variety of other artificial conditions are being fostered, each one of which has its well-marked tendency to make the struggle for existence more severe. We see, for example, in our own country, that land is considered far more seriously as something whereon games may be played than as a possible pro

ducer of corn. It may be urged here that, since the areas involved are so small, argument based upon them is of trivial importance. We may admit this and yet realise that so slight a thing as a feather will often serve to show the direction of the prevailing wind. Has there ever been a period in the world's history when the lot of the affluent has appeared so enviable to even the most level-headed of workers? Has there ever been a time when remunerative employment was so difficult to obtain? Will a continuance of these conditions make for peace, either at home or abroad? Modern man has all the primitive needs of his ancestors. Upon them many artificialities have been grafted. Needs, whether they be real or artificial, tend to the cultivation of acquisitiveness. Not merely things, but also territories, hitherto deemed of little value, have, under modern conditions and development of those conditions, become cause of covetousness. The widespread and rapidly increasing use of the internal combustion engine has made oil a necessity, not merely for foolish young women, but for hard-headed business men and for nations. What are the latent possibilities there? Are the possibilities still absolutely latent?

Excess of luxury, want of work, and the comparatively sudden recognition of requirements hitherto unthought of, are all factors tending to stir up strife. How will reduction of armaments tend to affect those conditions? Only, it is to be feared, by still further increasing the danger of international wars.

Many years ago it was said of conscription that it had at least one advantage: it eased conditions in the labour market. To-day, while we are at what may certainly prove the apex of an acute crisis, steps are being taken very largely to reduce navies and armies. The addition of but 10,000 seeking work will be a serious matter in more countries than one. There will be less available work in the world and more would-be workers clamouring for their share of what remains. Nor does this exhaust the purely industrial danger of reducing armaments. It is a well-recognised fact that in modern times some of the most subtly ingenious minds are engaged upon the development of engines of destruction. Remuneration for such inventions has always been much greater than anything which could be earned through devices to prolong or to ameliorate life. Relieve even a few such minds of their present tasks, and in all human probability their attention will be devoted to that kind of invention which produces the next best rate of remuneration-the production, in fact, of labour-saving devices.

We are constantly told by so-called economists that such inventions do not create unemployment. This paradox is said to be explained by the simple assertion that when the product is cheapened the demand for it increases; therefore more employ