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"of the priests were early taught that the figure of a "crocodile stood for such a sound, and, if they did not "know the meaning of the sound, it would certainly "stand with them for a sound; though, as the sound, "it signified also a quality or thing; and they might "afterwards be taught the meaning of this sound; as "words are only sounds, which sounds we agree shall signify such and such things; so that, to children, "words only stand for sounds, which relate to such things as they know nothing of; and, in this sense, we say children learn many things like parrots, what they "do not understand, and their memories are exercised "only about sounds, till they are instructed in the "meaning of the words. This I thought it might be proper to observe, as some say hieroglyphics stood for things and not for words, it sounds articulated in a "certain manner are words. And though it may be "said, that in this case, when different nations, of dif"ferent languages, agree on common characters, that "stand for certain things they agree on, that then such figures stand for things: this will be allowed; but "then they stand for sounds too, that is, the sounds in "each language that signify such things: and, as ob"served before, to children, who know nothing of the several things they stand for; to them they are only "marks that express such and such sounds: so that "these figures stand not for things alone, but as words, "for sounds and things

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The design of this passage, the reader sees, is to oppose the principle I went upon, in explaining the Egyptian hieroglyphics, That they stood for things, and not for words. But that is all he sees; for the obscure expression, arising from a confusion of ideas, will not suffer one to do more than guess at the proof he aims at; which seems to be this-That hieroglyphics cannot be said to stand for things only; because things being denoted by words or sounds; and hieroglyphics exciting the idea of sounds (which are the notes of things), as well as the idea of the things themselves, hieroglyphics stand both for sounds and things.-This seems to be his argument, put into intelligible language. But, for fear

Pag. 228, 229, of a Book intitled, A Description of the East, &c.

of

of mistaking him, let us confine ourselves to his own words.

If hieroglyphical figures (says he) stood for words or sounds that signified certain things, the power of hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a number of letters composing such a sound that by agreement was made to signify such a thing. Without doubt, if hieroglyphics stood for sounds, they were of the nature of words, which stand for sounds. But this is only an hypothetical proposition: let us see therefore how he proves it.

FOR hieroglyphics, AS WORDS, seem to have stood for sounds, and sounds signify things; as for instance, it MIGHT have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile MIGHT stand for the same sound that meant what we call malice. The propriety of the expression is as remarkable as the force of the reasoning. 1. Instead of saying, but hieroglyphics, he says, for hieroglyphics; which not expressing an illation, but implying a reason, obscures the argument he would illustrate. 2. He says, hieroglyphics, as words, seem to have stood for sounds. Just before he said, hieroglyphics stood for words or sounds. Here they are as words, or, like words, and seem to stand FOR Sound. What must we stick to? are words sound? or, do they stand for sound? He has given us both to chuse of. But it is fit himself should chuse first which not having yet done, we go on, 3. Lastly, to complete all, he corroborates this seeming truth by an instance in which the possibility of its standing for a sound is made a proof of the likelihood of its so doing; It MIGHT (says he) have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile MIGHT stand, &c.

But he makes amends for his former diffidence in what follows. The children of the priests were early taught that the figure of a crocodile stood for such a sound, and if they did not know the meaning of the sound, it would certainly stand with them for a sound. This indeed is an anecdote. But where did he learn that these children, before they could decipher the sounds of their own language, were taught hieroglyphics? Till now, hieroglyphics were understood to be reserved for those instructed in their secret and mysterious science. But let us suppose that they were taught to children amongst their

first elements: yet even here, as we shall see from the nature of the thing, they could never stand as marks for words or sounds. When a child is taught the power of letters, he learns that those letters, that compose the word malice, for instance, express the sound: which, naturally arising from a combination of the several powers of each letter, shews him that the letters stand for such a sound or word. But when he is taught that the figure or picture of a crocodile signifies malice, he as naturally and necessarily conceives (though he knows not the meaning of the word) that it stands for some thing signified by that word, and not for a sound: because there is no natural connexion between figure and a sound, as there is between figure and a thing. And the only reason why the word malice intervenes, in this connexion, is because of the necessity of the use of words to distinguish things, and rank them into sorts. But the veriest child could never be so childish as to conceive that, when he was told the figure of a beast with four legs and a long tail signified malice, that it signified the sound of malice; any more than if he were told it signified a crocodile, that it signified the sound of the word crocodile. The truth is, the ignorant often mistake words for things, but never things for words. The former is so true, that they frequently take the name of a thing for its nature; and rest contented in the knowledge which that gives them. I remember a country fellow staring at the picture of an elephant, a thing he had never seen before, asked his friend who stood by, What it was? and, on his answering, that it was the great Csar, inquired no further, but went away well satisfied in his acquaintance with the strange beast. Yet I apprehend he did not understand his informer to mean that it signified only the sound of that word. perhaps our Author will say, the cases are different; that the elephant was a mere picture, and the crocodile a sign or mark. But I have proved at large that the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics were at first mere pictures; and that all the alteration they received, in becoming marks, was only the having their general use of conveying knowledge rendered more extensive and expeditious.

But

Το

To proceed; our Author considers next what he apprehends may be thought an objection to his opinion, And though (says he) it may be said that, in this case, where different nations of different languages agree on common characters, that stand for certain things they agree on, that then such figures stand for things. To which he answers, This will be allowed, but then they stand for sounds too, that is, the sounds in each language that signify such things. He who can allow this, and without injury to his cause, need be under no fear of ever giving his adversary advantages. We may expect to hear him say next, when disputing about the colour of an objectthat it is black, will be allowed; but then it is white too. For a mark for things can no more be a mark for sounds, than black can be white. The reason is the same in both; the one property excludes the other: thus, if hieroglyphic marks stand for things, and are used as common characters by various nations differing in speech and language, they cannot stand for sounds; because these men express the same thing by different sounds; unless, to remove this difficulty, he will go farther, and say, not, as he did before, that one hieroglyphic word (to use his own language) stood for one sound, but, that it stands for an hundred. Again, if hieroglyphic marks stand for sounds, they cannot stand for things: not for those things which are not signified by such sounds; this himself will allow: nor yet, I affirm, for those which are; because it is the sound that stands for the thing signified by the sound, and not the hieroglyphic mark. But all this mistake proceeded from another as gross, though less glaring, namely, that words stand both for sounds and things, which we now come to. For he concludes thus, So that these figures (viz. hieroglyphics) stand not for things alone, but, as words, for scunds and things. An unhappy illustration! which has all the defects, both in point of sense and expression, that a proposition can well have. For if, by words, he meant articulated sounds, then the expression is nonsense, as affirming, that sounds stand for sounds. And that he meant so is possible, because, in the beginning of the passage quoted, he uses words for articulate soundsHieroglyphics, says he, stood for words or sounds. But VOL. XI.

R

if

if, by words, he meant letters (and that he might mean so, is possible likewise, for he presently afterwards uses words in that sense too-Hieroglyphics as words, says he, seem to have stood for sounds) then the proposition is only false; the plain truth being this, Letters stand for sounds only; which sounds they naturally produce; as sounds arbitrarily denote things.

But to be a little more particular; as in this distinction lies the judgment which is to be made, if ever it be rightly made, of the controversy between us. All this confusion of counter-reasoning proceeds, as we observed before, first, from not reflecting that letters, which stand for words, and hieroglyphics which stand for things, have not an arbitrary but natural designation. For as the powers of letters naturally produce words or sounds, so the figures of hieroglyphics naturally signify things: either more simply, when they express substances; or more artificially, when they denote modes; yet in neither case arbitrarily but by representation in the first, and by analogy in the last. Secondly, from his not consider. ing, that as we cannot think nor converse about things either accurately or intelligibly without words, so their intervention becomes necessary in explaining the marks of things. But therefore, to make hieroglyphics the marks of sounds, because sounds accompany things, would be as absurd as to make letters the marks of things, because things accompany sounds. And, who ever (besides our Author) said that letters signified things as well as sounds? unless he had a mind to confound all human meaning. If he chose to instruct, or even to be understood, he would say, that letters naturally produced sounds or words; and that words arbitrarily denoted things and had our Author spoken the same intelligible language, and told us that hieroglyphics naturally ex pressed things, and that things were arbitrarily denoted by words, he would indeed have spared both of us the present trouble, but then he had said nothing new. But it is possible he might be led into his conclusion by mistaking, for Egyptian, a ridiculous kind of rebus-writing more ridiculously called hieroglyphics, the senseless amusement. of our idle people, in which, indeed, the figures stand only for sounds. As for those significative

figures