to Locke, who distinguished between knowledge and judg ment. Reid, on the contrary, regards knowledge as only one class of judgments, namely, those about which we are most positive and certain. According to this view, judg ment seems to cover the whole field of mental activity. Sir William Hamilton thus regards it. We cannot even exporience a sensation, he maintains, without the mental affirma ion or judgment that we are thus and thus affected.

Common Speech distinguishes them. It must be admitted, however, that in common use there is a distinction between knowing and judging, the one implying the comparative certainty of the thing known, the other implying some room and ground for doubt, the existence of opinion and belief, rather than of positive knowledge. The word itself, both in its primitive signification, and its derivation, indicating, as it does, the decision by legal tribunal of doubtful cases, favors this usage. That an exercise of judgment is, strictly speaking, involved in all knowledge, is, nevertheless true, since, to know that a thing is thus and thus, and not otherwise, is to distinguish it from other things, and that is to judge.

§ III-HISTORICAL SKETCH.

The Realist and Nominalist Controversy.

The Question at Issue. No question has been more earnestly and even more bitterly discussed, in the whole history of philosophical inquiry, than the point at issue be tween the Realist and Nominalist, as to what is the precise object of thought when we form an abstract general concep ion. When I use the term man, for example, is it a mere name, and nothing more, or is there a real existence corre. sponding to that name, or is it neither a mere name on the one hand, nor, on the other, a real existence, but a conception of my own mind, which is the object of thought?

These three answers can be made, these three doctr.nes held, and essentially only these three. Each has been actu. ally maintained with great ability and acuteness. The names by which the three doctrines are respectively designated are, Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptualism.

Early History of Realism. Of these doctrines, the former, Realism, was the first to develop itself. To say nothing of the ancients, we find traces of it in modern philosophy, as early as the ninth century. Indeed, it would seem to have been the prevalent doctrine, though not clearly and sharply defined; a belief, as Tissot has well expressed it, "spontaneous, blind, and without self-consciousness." John Scotus Erigena, and St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, both philosophers of note, together with many others of less distinction, in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, were prominent Realists. The Platonic view may, in fact, be said to have prevailed down to that period. The early fathers of the Christian Church were strongly tinged with Platonism, and the Realistic theory accordingly very naturally engrafted itself upon the philosophy of the middle ages. The logical and the ontological, existence as mere thought of the mind, and existence as reality, were not distinguished by the leading minds of those centuries. The reality of the thought as thought, and the reality of an actual existence, corresponding to that thought, were confounded the one with the other. As the rose of which I conceive has existence apart from my conception, so man, plant, tree, animal, are realities, and not mere concep. tions of the mind. 7 Rise of Nominalism.—It was not till nearly the close of the eleventh century, that the announcement of the opposite doctrine was distinctly made, in opposition to the preva lent views. This was done by Roscelinus, who maintained that universal and general ideas have no objective reality; that the only reality is that of the individuals comprised ander these genera; that there are no such existences as

man, animal, beauty, virtue, etc.; that generality is only a pure form given by the mind to the matter of its ideas, a pure abstraction, a mere name.

In this we have the opposite extreme of Realism. If the Realist went too far in affirming the objective reality of his conception, the Nominalist erred on the other in overlooking Its subjective reality as a mode or state of the mind, and ro ducing it to a mere name.

The

Dispute becomes theological. The dispute now, unfortunately, but almost inevitably, became theological. Realist accused the Nominalist of virtually denying the doctrine of the Trinity, inasmuch as, according to him, the idea of Trinity is only an abstraction, and there is no Being corresponding to that idea. To this, Roscelinus replied, with at least equal force and truth, that on the same ground the Realist denied the doctrine of divine unity, by holding a doctrine utterly incompatible with it. Roscelinus, however, was defeated, if not in argument, at least by numbers and authority, and was condemned by council at the close of the eleventh century.

Rise of Conceptualism. It was about this time, that Abelard, pupil of Roscelinus, proposed a modified view of the matter, avoiding the extreme position both of the Realist and the Nominalist party, and allowing the subjective, but not the objective reality, of general ideas. This is substan tially the doctrine of Conceptualism. The general abstract idea of man, rose, mountain, etc., has indeed no existence or reality as an external object, nor is there among external objects any thing corresponding to this idea; but it has, nevertheless, a reality and existence as a thought, a concep tion of my mind.

Prevalence of Realism during the twelfth and thirteenth Centuries. The doctrine, as thus modified, gained some prevalence, but was condemned by successive councils and by the Pope. Sustained by such authority, as well as by the names of men greatly distinguished for learning and

philosophy, Realism prevailed over its antagonists during the latter part of the twelfth and the whole of the thirteenth century. The fourteenth witnessed again the rise and spread of the Conceptualist theory, under the leadership of Occam. The dispute was bitter, leading to strife and even blood.

Later History of the Discussion. In the seventeenth century we find Hobbes, Hume, and Berkley advocating the doctrine of the Nominalists, while Price maintains the side of Realism. Locke and Reid were Conceptualists, Stewart a Nominalist.

CHAPTER II.

THE ANALYTIC PROCESS-REASONING.

* Relation to the Synthetic Process. We have thus fai considered that form or process of the reflective faculty, by which we combine the elements of individual complex conceptions, to form general conceptions and classes, on the basis of perceived agreements and differences. This we have termed the synthetic process. The divisive or analytic process remains to be considered. This, as the name denotes, is, so far as regards the method of procedure, the opposite of the former. We no longer put together, but take apart, no longer combine the many to form one, but from the general complex whole, as already formed and announced, we evolv the particular which lies included in it. This process comprehends what is generally called analysis, and also reasoning.

In discussing this most important mental process, we shall have occasion to treat more particularly of its nature, its forms, and its modes.

Conceptions often Complex. It was remarked, in speak. ing of our conceptions, that many of them are complex. My notion of a table, for example, is that of an object possessing certain qualities, as form, size, weight, color, hardness, each of which qualities is known to me by a distinct act of perception, if not by a distinct sense, and each of which is capable, accordingly, of being distinctly, and by itself, an object of thought or conception. The understanding combines these several conceptions, and thus forms the complex notion of a table. The notion thus formed, is neither more nor less than the aggregate, or combination of the several elementary conceptions already indicated. When I am called on to define my complex conception, I can only specify these several elementary notions which go to make up my idea of the table. I can say it is an object round, or square, of such or such magnitude, that it is of such or such material, of this or that color, and designed for such and such uses.

Virtual Analysis of complex Conceptions. - Now when I affirm that the table is round, I state one of the several qualities of the object so called, one of the several parts of the complex notion. It is a partial analysis of that complex conception. I separate from the whole, one of its component parts, and then affirm that it sustains the relation of a part to the comprehensive whole. The separation is a virtual analysis. The affirmation is an act of judgment expressed in the form of a proposition. Every proposition is, in fact, a species of synthesis, and implies the previous analysis of the conception, or comprehensive whole, whose component parts are thus brought together. Thus, when I say snow is white, man is mortal, the earth is round, I simply affirm of the object designated, one of the qualities which go to make up my conception of that object. Every such statement or proposition involves an analysis of the complex conception