faculty thus employed, in distinction from other leading divisions of the intellectual powers, we may call Sense, or the Presentative faculty. Its distinctive office is to present to the mind, through the senses, objects external, sensible, as now and here present.

The Representative Power. But the mind not only receives impressions of external objects, as present, and acting

on the organs of sense; it has also the faculty of conceiving

of them in their absence, and representing them to itself This faculty, as distinguished from the receptive power, or sense, we may call the Representative Power.

Mental Reproduction, and mental Recognition as distinguished. This power operates in various forms. There may be the simple representation of the absent object, without reference to the act of former perception, as when I think of the Strasburg tower, without recalling any partic ular instance of its perception. Or there may be such recalling of the former act and instance of perception. The thought of the tower, as it presents itself to my mind, may stand connected definitely with the idea of the time, and place, and attending circumstances in which, on some occasion, I saw that object. It is then recognized as the object which was seen at such or such a time. The former is an instance of mental reproduction simply the latter, of mental recognition. We have in common language but one name for the two- although the term more strictly belongs only to the latter and that is, Memory.

Representation of the Ideal in distinction from the Actual. Again, unlike either of these, there may be a conception and representation of the object, not at all as it is in reality, and as it was perceived, but varied in essential particulars, to suit our own taste and fancy- a tower not of ordinary stone, but of some rare and costly marble-not of ordinary height, but reaching to the skies, etc., etc. In the former cases we conceived only of the actual, now of the ideal. This faculty is called Imagination. Both are forms

of the representative power, not presenting, but only repre senting objects.

Conception of the Abstract.—The Discursive or Reflective Power.-In the cases thus far described we have conceived of some sensible object, considered in and by itself, capable of being represented to thought. We may, however, con ceive not of an object in itself considered, but of the proper ties and relations of objects in the abstract. Thus we compare and class together those objects which we perceive to possess certain properties in common; as books bound in cloth, or in leather, octavos, or duodecimos. In so doing we exercise the faculty of generalization, which involves comparison, and also what is usually termed abstraction. Or we may reverse the process, and instead of classing together objects possessing certain elements in common, we may analyze a complex idea, or a comprehensive term, in order to derive from it whatever is specifically included in it. Thus from the general proposition, "All men are mortal," inasmuch as the term "all men" includes Socrates, I infer that Socrates is mortal. The process last named is called

reasoning.

In either case, both in the synthetic and the analytic process now described, we are dealing not with the concrete but the abstract. The properties and relations of things, rather than things themselves, are the objects of our thoughts. Still they are the properties and relations primarily of sensi ble objects, and of these objects as conceived, and not as presented to sense. To distinguish this class of conceptions from those previously considered, and also from that pres ently to be noticed, we may designate this power of the mind as the Discursive or Reflective Power. Its results are notions of the understanding rather than impressions of sense, or ideas of reason.

Conceptions not furnished by Sense. The Intuitive Power. We have considered thus far those intellectual operations which fall within three leading departments of

mental activity;-the Presentative, Representative, and Discursive Powers. These operations all have reference directly or indirectly to sensible objects. The first regards them as present; the second represents them as absent; the third considers their properties and relations in the abtract.

But the mind has also the faculty of forming ideas and conceptions not furnished by the senses. It departs from the sphere of sense, and deals with the super-sensible, with those primary ideas and first principles presupposed in all knowledge of the sensible. Such are the ideas of time, space, cause, the right, the beautiful. These are suggested by the objects of sense, but not directly derived from nor given by those objects. They are ideas of reason, rather than notions of understanding. They are awakened in the mind on occasions of sensible perception, but not conveyed to the mind through the senses, as in perception, nor directly derived from the object as in the case of the representati and discursive powers. This faculty we may call the Origin ative or Intuitive Power, in distinction from those previously considered.

Summary of leading Divisions. We have then four grand divisions of intellectual operations, under which the several specific faculties arrange themselves; viz., the Presentative, the Representative, the Discursive, and the Originative or Intuitive faculty. The first has to do with sensible objects, as present; the second has to do with the same class of objects as absent; the third deals with their abstract properties and relations; and the fourth has to do not with the sensible, in any form, but with the super-sensible.

I believe the faculties of the intellect, in pure thinking, may all be reduced to those forms now specified, under these four leading divisions

§ III-HISTORICAL SKETCH-VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.

The earlier Division. - The general division of the powers of the mind, for a long time prevalent among the earlier modern philosophers, was into two chief departments, known under different names, but including under the one what we now term the intellect, under the other what we designate as the sensibilities and the will, which were not then, as now, distinguished from each other in the general division, but thrown into one department. Under the first of these departments, they included the thinking and reasoning powers, the strictly intellectual part of our nature; under the second, whatever brings the mind into actionthe impelling and controlling power or principle- the af fections, emotions, desires, volitions, etc. The names given to these two divisions varied with different writers, but the difference was chiefly in the name, the principle of division being the same. By some authors they were designated as the contemplative and the active powers, by others cognit ive and motive. The latter was the nomenclature proposed by Hobbes. Others again adopted the terms understanding and will, by which to mark the two divisions; Locke, Reid, some of the French philosophers, and, in our own country, Edwards, followed this division. Stewart designates them, the one class as the intellectual, and the other as the active

and moral powers. Brown objects to this phraseology on the ground that the intellectual powers are no less active than the other. He divides the mental powers or states primarily into what he calls external and internal affections of the mind, comprehending under the former all those mental states which are immediately preceded by and connected with the presence of some external object; under the latter, those states which are not thus immediately preceded. The latter class he divides into intellectual states and emotions, a division corresponding essentially to those of the authors previously mentioned, the emotions of Brown comprehending essentially the powers which others had termed motive, or active and moral.

Prevalence of this Method. This twofold division of the mental powers, under different names, as now stated, has been the one generally prevalent until a comparatively recent date. It may doubtless be traced, as Sir William Hamilton suggests, to a distinction made by Aristotle, into cognitive and appetent powers.

The more recent Method. - The threefold division of the mental faculties very early came into use among philosophical and theological writers in this country, and is now very generally adopted by the more recent European writers of note, especially in France and Germany. According to this division the various affections and emotions constitute a department by themselves, distinct from the will or the voluntary principle. There are many reasons for such a dis tinction; they have been well stated by Professor Upham Cousin adopts and defends the threefold division, and pre viously still, Kant, in Germany, had distinguished the mental powers under the leading divisions of intelligence, sensibil ity, and desire.