city, is ordered to point his piece in the direction of his own dwelling. To disobey, is death. To obey, is to put in jeopardy those who are dear to him. He hesitates, but finally chooses to obey orders. He aims his piece as directed, sadly against his inclination; yet, on the whole, it is his choice to do it. He prefers that to the certainty of dis honorable death, a death which would in no way benefit or protect those whom he wishes to save. A man, of his own accord, lies down upon the surgeon's operating table, and stretches out his arm to the knife. It is his choice a hard choice, indeed, but, nevertheless, decidedly his choice. He prefers that to still greater suffering, or even death. In these cases and they are only instances and illustrations of what, in a less marked and decided way, is continually occurring we see the utmost strain and pressure of circumstances upon a man's choice, making it morally certain that he will decide as he does, shutting him up to that decision, in fact, yet his choice remaining unimpaired, and his act a free act; free, because he does as he, on the whole, and under the circumstances, chooses to do. He does the thing voluntarily.

Another Case supposed. Suppose, now, the man were forcibly seized, and borne by sheer strength to the table, and placed upon it, and held there while the operation was performed. In that case, he no longer acts, is only acted upon, no longer chooses and wills to go there, nay, chooses and wills directly the contrary. The difference in the two cases, is the difference between a voluntary act, chosen reluctantly, ndeed, and under the pressure of an exigency, but still chosen, and the passive suffering of an action which, so far from being voluntary, was, in no sense, an act of his own.

Choice always influenced by Circumstances. — Now, as regards the actual operation of things, our choices are, in fact, always influenced by circumstances, and these circumstances are various and innumerable; a thousand seen and unseen influences are at work upon us, to affect our decisions.

Were it possible to estimate aright all these influences, to calculate, with precision, their exact weight and effect, then our choice, under any given circumstances, might be pre dicted with unerring certainty. This can never be exactly known to man. Sagacity may approximate to it, and may, so far, be able to read the future, and predict the probabl conduct of men in given circumstances. To the omniscient, these things are fully known, and to his eye, therefore, th whole future of our lives, our free choices and voluntary acts, lie open before they are yet known to ourselves.

Conclusion stated. From what has been said, it appears that it is not inconsistent with the nature of choice, to be influenced, nay, decided by circumstances, even when those circumstances are beyond our control.

Diversity of Objects essential to Choice.-What is implied in an act of choice? Several things. In order to choice, there must, of course, be diversity of objects from which to choose. If there were but one possible course to be pursued, it were absurd to speak of choice. Hence, even in the cases just now supposed, there was a diversity of objects from which to choose― death, or obedience to orders, suffering from the surgery, or greater suffering and danger without it, and between these the man made his choice. - As a further conLiberty of Selection also essential. dition of choice, there is implied liberty of selection from among the different objects proposed. It were of no use that there should be different courses of conduct-different ends, or different means of attaining an end—proposed to ⚫our understanding, if it were not in our power to select which we pleased, if we were not free to go which way we will. Choice always implies that different actions and volitions are possible, and are, as such, submitted to our de cision and preference. There can be no volition without choice, and no choice without liberty to choose. Whatever interferes, then, with that liberty, and diminishes or takes it away, interferes, also, with my choice, and diminishes or

destroys that. The very essence of a voluntary act consists in its being an act of choice, or a free-will act. No tyranny can take this away, except such as destroys, also, all volun tary and responsible action. You may command me to burn incense on a heathen altar. The very command leaves it optional with me whether to obey. If I do not, the penalty is death. Very well-I may choose the penalty, rather than the crime, and no power on earth can compel me to choose otherwise. I die, but I die a free man. True, you may bind me, and by mechanical force urge me to the altar, and by superior strength of other arms, may cause my hand to put incense there, but it is not my act then; it is the act of those who use me as a mere passive instrument; it is no more my act, than it would be the act of so much iron, or wood, or other instrument.

Deliberation implied. - Choice, moreover, implies deliberation, the balancing and weighing of inducements, the comparison and estimate of the several goods proposed, the several ends and objects, the various means to those ends; the exercise of reason and judgment in this process. I see before me different courses, different ends proposed to my understanding, am conscious of diverse inducements and reasons, some urging me in one direction, some in anotner. Native propensities impel me toward this line of conduct. Rational self-love puts in a claim for quite another procedure. Benevolence, and a sense of duty, it may be, conspire to urge me in still another direction. I am at liberty to choose. I must choose. I can go this way or that, must go in one or the other. I hesitate, deliberate, am at a loss.

Now there is no choice which does not virtually involve gome process of this kind. It may be very rapid; so rapid as to escape detection, in many cases, so that we are hardly conscious of the process. In other cases, we are painfully conscious of the whole scene; we hesitate long, are in doubt and suspense between conflicting motives and interests. Desire and duty wage a fierce contest within us Shall we

choose the agreeable? Shall we choose the right? And then, again, which is really the agreeable, and which is truly the right?

Final Decision. As the result of this deliberation, we finally decide, one way, or the other. This decision is our preference, our choice. Our minds, as we say, are made up what to do, what course to pursue. When the time comes, we shall act. Something may prevent our having our way, opportunity may not offer, or we may see fit, subsequently, to reconsider and revoke our decision. Otherwise, our choice is carried out in action.

Choice implies, then, these things: diversity of objects, liberty of selection, deliberation, decision, or preference.

The final Element. - III. EXECUTIVE VOLITION. — In our investigation of the several elements or momenta of an act of the Will, we have as yet considered but two, viz., motive and choice—the first, more properly a condition of voluntary action, than itself a constituent part of it, yet still, a condition so indispensably connected with volition, as to require investigation in connection with the latter. It only remains now to notice the last stage of the process, the fiual element, which added, the process is complete — that is, the executive act of the mind, volition properly so called. Wher the objects to be attained have been presented, when the motives or inducements to action have been considered, when, in view of all, the choice or preference has been made, it still remains to put forth the volition, or the act will not be performed. This may never happen. Oppor unity may never offer. But suppose it does. We will This done, the bodily mechanism springs into play, obedi ent to the call and command of the soul.

Even now, the action does not of necessity correspond to the volition. Even now, we may be disappointed. Other wils may be in action in opposition to ours. Other arms may move in obedience to those other wills. Or we may find the thing too much for us to do, impracticable, beyond

our strength and means, or disease may palsy the fiame, so that it shall not obey the mandate of the spirit. Nevertheless the volition is complete. That depends not on the success of the exertion. We have willed, and with that our mental action ceases. What remains is physical, not psychological. If we succeed, if the volition finds itself answered in execution, then, also, the act once performed is thenceforth out of our power. It is done, and stands a per manent historic event, beyond our control, beyond our decis ion or revocation. Our power over it ceases in the moment of volition. Our connection with it may never cease. It moves on in its inevitable career of consequences, and, like a swift river, bears us along with it. We have no more to do with it, but it has to do with us; it may be to our sorrow, it may be, forever.

Such are, in brief, the main psychological facts, relating to the will, as they offer themselves to our consciousness and careful inspection.

CHAPTER II.

RELATION OF THE WILL TO OTHER POWERS OF THE MINP

Activity of the Intellect in Volition. It is a matter of some importance to ascertain the relation which the will sustains to the other mental powers. There can be no doubt that the activity of the will is preceded, in all cases by that of the intellect. I must first perceive some object presented to my understanding, before I can will its attain ment. In the case aiready supposed, the book lying on my table is an object within the cognizance of sense, and to per ceive it is an act of intellect. Until perceived, the will puts not forth any volition respecting it. Nor does the mere perception occasion volition. In connection with the per