manner are generally careful to disclaim, it is true, any such sense; but such are our associations with the word cause, as ordinarily employed, that it is difficult to avoid sliding, unawares, into the old and familiar idea of some sort of abso lute physical necessity. It were better to say, therefore, that motives are the reasons why we act thus and thus. To go further than this, to call the motive the cause of the volition, is neither a correct nor a fortunate use of terms, since the idea is thereby conveyed, guard against it as you will, that, in some way, the influence was irresistible, the event unavoidable. The Phrase "moral Necessity."-The same objections lie with still greater force against the phrase moral necessity as applied to this subject. Those who use it are careful, for the most part, to define their meaning, to explain that they do not mean necessity at all, but only the certainty of actions. The word itself, however, is constantly contradicting all such explanations, constantly suggesting another and much stronger meaning. That is necessary, properly speaking, which de pends not on my will or pleasure, which cannot be avoided, but must be, and must be as it is. Now, to say of an act of the will, that it is necessary, in this sense, is little short of a contradiction in terms. The two ideas are utterly incongru ous and incompatible. A volition may be certain to take place; it may be the motive that makes it certain, but if this is all we mean, it is better to say just this, and no more. If this is all we mean, then we do not mean that volitions are necessary in any There is no need to use the proper sense of that term. word necessity, and then explain that we do not mean neces sity, but only certainty. It is precisely on this unfortunate use of terms that the strongest objections are founded, against the true doctrine of the connection of motive with volition. Even Mill, one of the ablest modern necessitarians, objects to the use of this term, and urges its abandon ment. The true Connection. What, then, is the connection be tween Motive and Volition?—I have all along admitted, that there is such a connection between volitions and mo tives, that the former never occur without the latter, that they stand related as antecedent and consequent, and that motives, while not the producing cause of volitions, are still the reason why the volitions are as they are, and not otherwise. They furnish the occasion of their existence, and the explanation of their character. So much as this, the psy chology of the subject warrants—more than this it does not allow. More than this we seem to assert, however, when we insist on saying that motive is the cause, and volition the effect. We seem, however we may disclaim such intention, to make the mind a mere mechanical instrument, putting forth volitions only as it is impelled by motives, these, and not the mind, being the real producing cause, and the volitions following irresistibly, just as the knife or chisel is but the passive instrument in the hand of the architect, and not at all the producing cause of the effects which follow. Difference of the two Cases. Now there is a vast difference between these two cases. The impulse, communicated to the saw, produces the effect irresistibly; not so the motive. The saw is a passive instrument; not so the mind. There is, in either case, a fixed connection between the antecedent and the consequent, but the nature of the connection is widely different, and it is a difference of the greatest moment. It is precisely the difference indicated by the two words cause and reason as applied to account for a given occurrence -the one applicable to material and mechanical powers and processes, the other to intelligent, rational, voluntary agents. There is a cause why the apple falls. It is gravitation. There is a reason why mind acts and wills as it does. It is motive. But Is the Mind the producing Cause of its own Volitions? -This, the advocates of moral necessity deny. "If we should thus cause a volition," says Dr. Edwards, "we should doubtless cause it by a causal act. It is impossible that we cause any thing without a causal act. And as it is supposed that we cause it freely, the causal act must be a free act, i. e., an act of the will, or volition. And as the supposition is, that all our volitions are caused by ourselves, the causal act must be caused by another, and so on infinitely, which is both impossible and inconceivable." That is, if the mind causes its own volitions, it can do it only by first acting to cause them, and that causative act is, itself, a volition, and requires another causative act to produce it, and so on ad infinitum. - The Dictum Necessitatis proves too much. - This celebrated argument has been called, not inappositely, the dictum necessitatis. It rests upon the assumption, that no cause can act, but by first acting to produce that act. Now this virtually shuts out all cause from the universe, or else involves us in the infinite series. Apply this reasoning to any cause whatever, and see if it be not so. Suppose, e. g., that motive, and not the mind itself, is the producing cause of volition. Then, according to the dictum, motive cannot act, but by first acting in order to act, and for that previous causative act, there must have been an ulterior cause, and so on forever, in an endless succession of previous causative acts. The Dictum as applicable to Mind. But it may be said this dictum applies only to mind, or voluntary action. How, then, is it known, that mind cannot act without first acting m order to act? Would not this virtually shut out and extinguish all mental action? The mind thinks; must it first think, in order to think? It reasons, judges, conceives, imagines, must it first reason, judge, etc., in order to reason, and judge, and conceive, and imagine? If not, then why may it not will without first willing to will? The Dictum as applicable to Deity. - If mind is not the cause of its own volitions, then how is it with the volitions of the irfinite and eternal mind? Are they caused or un caused? If caused, then by what? If by himself, ther there is again the infinitely recurring series according to the dictum. If by something else, still we do not escape the series, for each causative act must have its prior cause. Are the volitions of Deity, then, uncaused? Then certainly there is no such thing as cause in the universe. Motives, then, are no longer to be called causes. Deity is not, in fact, the cause of any thing, since not the cause of those volitions by which alone all things are produced. If he is not the cause of these, then not the cause of their consequences and effects. In either case, you shut out all cause from the universe, whether the dictum be applied to mind or to motion, to man or to God; or else you are, in either case, involved in the vortex of this terrible infinitive series. To give up the dictum, is to admit that mind may be the producing cause of its own volitions. CHAPTER V. THE DOCTRINE OF THE WILL VIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH CERTAIN TRUTHS OF RELIGION. The Relation of Psychology to Theology.-The very close connection between the philosophy of the will, and the science of theology, has already been remarked. We have discussed the questions which have come before us thus far, on purely psychological grounds, without reference to their theological bearing. It would be manifest injustice to the matter in hand, however, were we to overlook entirely the relation of our philosophy to those higher truths which pertain to the domain of theological science. The whole question respecting the freedom of the human will, especially, assumes a new importance, when viewed in connection with the truths of natural and revealed religion It ceases to be a speculative, and becomes an eminently prac tical question when thus viewed. There are two points which require special attention, as regards that connection; the one, God's power over man; the other, man's power over himself. 8L-THE POWER WHICH GOD EXERTS OVER THE HUMAN MIND AND WILL. Dependence of Man. It seems to be the teaching of reason, no less than of religion, that man stands to the Creator in the relation of absolute dependence. The one is the subject, the other the sovereign. The control of Deity extends, not merely to the elements and forces of nature, which are by no means the chief and most important part of his works, but over all intelligent, rational beings. This is implied, not only in the fact that he is the Creator of all, but in the fact of moral government, and of a superintending providence. Manifestly, there could be no such thing as moral government, and no control over the af fairs of the world, if the conduct of men, the minds and hearts of intelligent beings, were not subject to that control. This is not only the inference which reason draws from the acknowledged supremacy of the Creator, it is not only thus a tenet of natural religion, but it is also one of the plainest doctrines of revealed truth. In the most explicit and direct terms, the Scriptures ascribe to God the supreme control of human conduct, of the human mind and heart. This power over the thoughts and purposes of intelligent beings is the very highest power. This Control unlimited. This control, moreover, in order to be complete and effective, must reach beyond the present and passing moment, must take in the future, must sweep through the whole range of coming duration, and comprehend whatever is to be. Nothing must take place without his foreknowledge and permission. The mi |