SOME benevolent reformers have been sufficiently struck with the more palpable evils of the present law of removal, and especially with its cruel operation on the poor in the day of their distress, to propose that all removals should cease. They would not, however, in any respect, change the law of settlement, but would merely substitute, for the present order of removal, under the statute of Charles II., an order of justices, granted at the instance of the parish of the pauper's residence, and requiring payment, by the parish of settlement, of all necessary relief to be given to the pauper. No doubt such a change in the law may easily be made. The question of parochial charge, in the event of an appeal against such an order, would thus be determined between the contending parishes, as is now done in the case of lunatic paupers, without, in any case, inflicting on the pauper the hardship, or on the parish the expense, of an actual removal.

Certainly it would be a good thing to prevent parish officers from daily traversing the country, with paupers in their custody, under warrants of removal. The unfortunate paupers are often dragged, on the occasion of merely temporary want of their usual work, from the only home they have ever known; from the scene of their youth, and the residence of all their relations and friends; and, what is still more important to ratepayers, often from a manufacturing to an agricultural, or from an agricultural to a manufacturing, district; from the place where their industry is usually able to maintain them, to a place where they will prove a permanent parochial burden.

preserve that close connexion with the man's own personal interest who administers the poor funds, on the other hand, you must so extend your area of taxation, as not to throw an undue burden upon parts of the community which are incapable of bearing it.”

The present mode of collection of poor-rate in England, the application of the fund on the spot where it is raised, and by those who have contributed to raise it, has unquestionably prevented the occurrence of far greater evils than any which have, as yet, been felt under the poor laws. Great as are the evils of the existing law, it would nevertheless, be better to bear them, than to fly to others, the extent of which cannot be measured, or even estimated. Had a national fund been provided for relieving the poor in 1795, when the allowance system was first introduced, it is pretty plain that the institution of National Workhouses, or Ateliers Nationaux, as our neighbours recently called analogous establishments, would, in a few years, have swallowed up much of the accumulated capital of the country. The wealth of England would have been unequal to feed such a ravenous communism, increasing daily by what it fed on.

It will appear, in the next chapter, that a rational remedy for many of the existing evils of our pauperism may be found, without abandoning the principle of local government, and without plunging into any such unfathomed abyss as that of a national charge.

The next project is a general property tax, specially appropriated to the relief of the poor. The liability, in strict law, of inhabitants of a parish, to be included in the poor-rate, under the statute of Elizabeth, in respect of visible and personal property locally found in the parish*, has been the pretext on

*The Court of King's Bench decided, in the latter part of the 18th century, when Lord Kenyon was chief justice, that "stock in trade, if it be the property of the person in possession, and productive, is rateable to the poor." (Rex v. Darlington, Term Reports, vol. vi. p. 468.) In cases which occurred previously, Lord Mansfield had strongly leant against holding personal property to be within the statute of Elizabeth. (Rex v. Ringwood, Cowper's Reports, p. 326.) But the ordinary practice continued unaltered; and, as a general rule, personal property has not been rated, even in the cases in which it was declared to be

have been treated, for nearly two centuries, by this power of removal, under the statute of Charles II., would justly be considered as a national gain.

It may, no doubt, be objected, by some, that the abolition of the power of removing the poor to some place or other of "settlement," would increase the amount of parochial rates; and that the guardians of any union, in bestowing relief, would do so more liberally if acting as mere agents for the ratepayers of a distant parish of settlement, than if they were paying away their own funds. But some grounds exist for thinking that the boards of guardians, who would pay for their own paupers residing in other unions just as they received for other paupers residing with them, may be trusted in such a matter as this, and would do neither more nor less than their duty.

Every board of guardians already acts in this character of agent to other boards, in numerous cases of giving relief. The yearly amount of money paid to resident non-settled poor, by the guardians of every union, as mere agents for the guardians of some other union in which such poor are settled, is many times greater than the amount of relief actually distributed yearly, by the same union, to those whom it provides for, under the coercion of orders of removal. In such cases, therefore, the sense of justice and convenience, pervading the breasts of those who have to administer relief to the poor, silently repeals the law of removal; and serves to suggest that a similar mode of proceeding ought to be established in all cases, if any law of parochial or union settlement be retained.

It must, however, be conceded, that the due performance of the duty to the distant parish of settlement would be far better secured, if the relieving parish had some direct and substantial interest in the payments made to relieve its resident destitution. Such an interest may easily be created. The law may so apportion the burden of relief, in all cases of its bestowal by one parish on "non-settled" poor, when another parish is looked to for reimbursement, as to ensure fidelity in the discharge of the duty of relieving. For instance, the liability to pay one-third of the money due

under the order, may be thrown on the parish of residence, and two-thirds on the parish of settlement. It is manifest that, by such a change as this, which I now suggest, a good deal of the utterly useless expense and hardship of the present law of settlement and removal would be avoided.

It may also be objected that the proposed change in the law, by substituting an order for reimbursement of relief in the place of an order of removal, would tend to make the indigent poor apply for relief in some cases in which the terrors of the present power of removal prevent them from doing so. It is probable that such would be the result of the change; but, on the other hand, there would be a corresponding economy in respect of all the money now expended in travelling, and other charges incident to the actual removal.

Neither would it be desirable to preserve any such terrors as those of the despotic power of removal. The existence of such a power over the poor does not furnish a convenient or just test of destitution in any case; and there is no doubt that, in many instances, it produces only mendicancy, vagrancy, and other offences, by the commission of which, society loses much more than it can ever gain by the exchange of paupers between parishes.

*

Another reason why the expense and hardship of these

* Sixth Report of the Commons' Committee, 1847, H. Coppock, 5206. “If it is a case of destitution; if a man has no means of labour to obtain a livelihood, and is in want of food (and I presume those are the only cases in which the poor laws ought to relieve); if you refuse that relief which is requisite, by making it so oppressive to that poor man's feelings that he would rather beg, steal, or use any unfair means of getting a living, you do a great injury to society, by allowing that test to be applied."-5209. "I have known men frequently say, especially the Irish at the present moment, and I have heard it said by Englishmen, I would rather die here than be removed there!'"_5219. "What you mean is, that the horror of removal is so great, that people will submit to the most dreadful privations, and very often privations ending in death itself? No doubt about it."-5226. "When you say that a man is driven to shift for himself, and that men who are destitute are often driven to shift for themselves from the knowledge that they are liable to be removed, you do not mean that they prefer the alternative of starvation, but that in many cases they may resort to mendicancy and vagrancy, or something short of starvation, under pressure of their necessities? No doubt of it."

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actual removals of paupers from one parish to another ought to be done away with, even if the law of settlement be retained, is found in the undoubted fact, that such removals frequently fail to effect the transfer of the burden of destitution to the place of settlement. An order for repayment of relief given by the parish of the pauper's residence, would much more certainly effect the transfer to the parish of settlement of that burden which, according to the present law, the place of settlement ought to bear.

When a man is removed with his family from a place where, perhaps, he is likelier to maintain himself and them, than he will be in the place to which he is removed, it often turns out, after all the trouble and expense incurred, that a merely momentary change of burden is effected; for the paupers frequently return, sometimes on the same day*, to the home from which the law has removed them, and they so return in total disregard of the vain threat of punishment for vagrancy held out to all who return and again become chargeable to the place which had removed them.

Men of great experience in the administration of relief to the poor, are of opinion, that the forced removal of the poor, is the occasion, in the majority of instances, of just as much money as such removal costs being entirely thrown away; "for," say they, "more than half of the paupers removed will come back again." They generally return, because they have their connections in the place from which they have been sent, and, being known there, are likely to obtain

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*R. Long, in Reports to the Poor Law Board, 1850, p. 60., speaking of the Ipswich Union, says: "Many, after a heavy expense incurred by removal, return with a weekly allowance from their settlement parish. Many of this class (ablebodied men, with wives and families, removed in consequence of temporary sickness, or want of work) have returned the same day they were removed, and the generality of them, after a short time, if they have had a few years' residence in the parishes from which they were removed." In the same volume, W. G. Dennis, speaking of unions in Essex, says: "With reference to removal of the poor, I can say, from my experience as a guardian of two unions, that in many cases when paupers have been removed, perhaps at a considerable expense and trouble, they will return within a very short period, and I have known them to occupy the same residence."