allowed to approach within a certain distance of Constantinople.

Greece, however, has had many other pre-occupations than the future status of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Fate was unkind to the Entente in developing in King Constantine a spirit of contrariness; but opportunities of securing Greek co-operation had been thrown away before this trait had become fixed. The project of forcing the Dardanelles was first mooted in British Government and naval circles in November 1914. By January the scheme was beginning to mature; and, in order to supplement the Allies' military deficiencies, overtures were made to Greece for her co-operation. She was to cede Kavalla and receive the western end of Asia Minor. Without entering into the merits of this bargain, it may be pointed out that the appearance of Greece as a Euro-Asiatic Power could not fail to affect the relative positions of the countries in the Near East, and therefore should have formed part of a comprehensive settlement of the Near Eastern question, with all the States privy to it. At one time King Constantine was not opposed to Greek co-operation with the Allies; but, in view of the danger which he feared from Germany and Bulgaria, he stipulated for a guarantee of territorial integrity for a period of five years after the conclusion of the war. To a certain extent this request was equivalent to a desire for a definite and final settlement of the Near Eastern question as a whole; for the guarantee of Greece's integrity predicated the contentment of Bulgaria and, ergo, peace in the Near East.

With a different handling of the problem King Constantine's stipulation might have been met. M. Venizelos, of a more open nature and taking a broader view of things than his Sovereign, was prepared to give the Allies the support of Greece unreservedly, in the certainty that the result of the war fought out in this way must carry with it the settlement of the Near Eastern question once and for all. The Allied Governments, not seeing the wood from paying too close attention to the trees, could not give King Constantine his guarantee because it raised the question of Kavalla (which they wished Bulgaria to regard as already decided in her favour), and entailed-the one thing they

seemed resolved to avoid-a round-table conference and the settlement of the Balkan problem. M. Venizelos tried to force the King's hand by resigning, but King Constantine defied him and the Constitution; and so far the Greek public has condoned the offence.

Its acquiescence is to be explained partly by the military prestige which the King acquired in the First and Second Balkan Wars, but still more by the popular superstition that has grown round his recovery from his illness. There had been a public demand that the sacred Ikon from Tenos should be used; but, so long as the German physicians had hopes of saving their patient's life, they refused to countenance any such (from their point of view) quackery. Only when they had virtually despaired of the King's recovery was their veto withdrawn. The Ikon was brought in procession to the Royal bedside, and, in raising himself to kiss it, King Constantine must have brought about the rupture required to remove the evil which had defied the doctors' efforts. He experienced almost immediate relief. The Ikon had performed its miracle. M. Venizelos is correct in saying that the theory of Divine Right does not hold in Greece; but a King who is the object of the miraculous intervention of Providence can hardly do wrong-whatever the Constitution has to say on the subject.

King Constantine has held his ground, and M. Venizelos and the Constitution have been twice defied. Whether a little more tactful conduct of the negotiations with Greece on the part of the Allies would have led to different results it is not possible to say. Greek feeling was embittered by the peremptory manner in which the question of Kavalla was ultimately raised, and still more by the exasperating methods of enforcing the right of search at sea on Greek ships. Two ways were open to the Allies, either to continue the negotiations on the most friendly lines possible, or to resort to an ultimatum and the exercise or display of force. The course actually adopted was to continue negotiations of a 'milk and water' order in Athens, while at sea no attempt was made to spare Greek feelings. Meanwhile the King and

* See, in this connexion, an interview with the Greek Premier, M. Skoulondis, published in the Daily Chronicle,' Dec. 23, 1915.

probably a number of his subjects came more and more under German influence. Not only did he adopt a thoroughly German attitude towards Greece's pledge to Serbia, but his repudiation of the treaty has been acquiesced in by the country.

Nothing could have courted failure so surely in dealing with the Balkan States as the indecision which characterised the diplomacy of the Entente Powers and especially of the British Government. The latter allowed itself to be deceived all along the line by Germany, and, even when hostilities broke out, refused to admit the importance of the Balkans in relation to the war. Thus, when the Allies could have secured the support of the neutral States, they would not. Months later, when the axioms of the Near Eastern question had been learned in the stern school of defeat, the Allies would, but they could not. No doubt they will worry through, and a spirit of invincible complacency bids us regard the worst blunders as merely the misfortunes of war, for which no responsibility can attach. The adage that as you make your bed so you must lie applies, perhaps, to a nation which leaves the conduct of a war for its very existence to a Government which did not believe in war, would not prepare for war, and had made no study of war. But the Balkans had a right to expect better things of the high priests of Pacifism. If ever a question needed a pacific settlement, so far as the States directly affected were concerned, it was the Near Eastern problem. At the hands of the Allies, however, it was neglected, until it stood committed to the arbitrament of war. But war between the Balkan States can bring no final settlement in the Near East. Bulgaria by rights ought to have received concessions in Macedonia. If she does not receive them, the apple of discord remains; if she receives them, her perfidy will be rewarded at the expense of our Allies. The failure to understand the Near Eastern question has led to grave military difficulties; but the penalty of ignorance and indifference will, unfortunately, not end there.

Art. 11.-BELGIAN REFUGEES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

1. First Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to consider and report on questions arising in connection with the reception and employment of the Belgian Refugees in this country. [Cd. 7750.] Wyman, 1914. 2. Minutes of evidence taken before the Departmental Committee [etc., as above]. [Cd. 7779.] Wyman, 1915.

THERE is no single phase of the war which has more touched the hearts and imaginations of the British people than the fate of Belgium. By the noble stand made in the cause of liberty and independence by this little nation against the aggression of a mighty power, by the splendid heroism of its people, and by their unparalleled sufferings, chords of sympathy have been struck which have vibrated throughout the Empire. Mingled with an infinite compassion for the oppressed of this martyr kingdom and a consuming fire of indignation at the barbarous deeds of its oppressors, has been a steadfast determination to right the wrongs that have been perpetrated largely in pursuit of a mean-spirited policy of revenge. It would be idle to assert that the flame of righteous anger is still burning with the same fierceness as when, in the beginning of the war, every day brought to our shores cargoes of hapless refugees, driven forth by the German invasion from their peaceful Flemish homes. An unhappy sequence of events has made us only too familiar with German frightfulness; and it may be that our senses have grown dull to crimes which, although by repetition in varied spheres they have lost nothing of their turpitude, do not make the same fresh appeal as did the initial deeds of horror. Interest, too, in the cause of the victims may possibly have lost some of its intensity, owing to the prolonged nature of the struggle, which has brought with it new objects of benevolence and poignant anxieties for those nearest and dearest to us. But, even if we would, we cannot divest ourselves of our responsibilities. It is our bounden duty both to care for the fugitives to-day, and in the future to safeguard their devastated fatherland. Pledges have

been given which carry with them a solemn obligation, one neither to be evaded nor broken without loss of national honour. The Premier's words spoken at the Mansion House on Nov. 9, 1914, and re-affirmed later, are the pith and marrow of this unwritten contract. 'We shall never sheath the sword,' he said, until Belgium recovers, in full measure, all and more than all that she has sacrificed.' And in his contribution to King Albert's Book' Mr Asquith writes:

'Belgium has deserved well of the world. She has placed us under an obligation which as a nation we shall not forget. We assure her to-day in the name of this United Kingdom, and of the whole Empire, that she may count to the end on our whole-hearted and unfailing support.'

Speaking with all the authority of his great position as Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey has strikingly reinforced the Premier's view of our indebtedness to Belgium in these words:

'The wrongs done to Belgium have brought home to us that we must spare nothing and if need be must spend everything to secure justice for her and freedom for us all.'

In the same spirit of frank acknowledgment, Lord Curzon, in the publication referred to, paid a generous tribute to our heroic ally.

'Belgium, by her conduct and still more by her example, has rendered a priceless service to humanity, for she has once more taught the world the sublime truth that national honour is preferable to national security, and that, though the body may be destroyed, the spirit is immortal. For the moment a crown of thorns has been pressed down upon her temples, but Europe, nay the civilised world will see to it that she is healed of her grievous wounds; and some day, let us hope before long, she will live again in the recovered prosperity of her people, and the admiring gratitude of mankind.'

These declarations might be multiplied indefinitely, but the citations made are sufficient to prove that there is no room for apathy, weariness or parsimony in the work we have undertaken on behalf of the refugees.